FIRST DISTRICT HOLDS BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL VIOLATED BROWN ACT BY RELOCATING MEETING RATHER THAN REMOVING DISRUPTIVE ATTENDEES

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In Berkeley People’s Alliance v. City of Berkeley (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 984, the First District Court of Appeal held that the Berkeley City Council violated the Brown Act by recessing public meetings and reconvening in a different room in response to disruptive attendees. Although the Brown Act permits a legislative body to address disruptions that prevent the orderly conduct of a meeting, the court held that relocating the meeting rather than clearing the room fell outside that exception.

Key Takeaways

  • The Brown Act exception for disruptive situations is literally construed and does not apply in “functionally equivalent” scenarios.
  • In his statement concurring with the Supreme Court’s denial of depublication, Justice Groban encourages the Legislature to consider local legislative bodies’ “legitimate concerns” about responding to unruly individuals at open meetings.

Background

The Brown Act includes various requirements intended to protect the public’s right to attend and participate in meetings of local governing bodies, subject to limited exceptions. One such exception, set forth in Government Code section 54957.9, permits a legislative body to clear the meeting room and continue in session if a group of attendees willfully disrupts the meeting to the point that it cannot proceed and order cannot be restored by removing the individuals responsible.

During three city council meetings in 2023 and 2024, the mayor determined that disruptive attendees prevented the council from continuing the meetings and that removing them was not feasible. The mayor therefore recessed and reconvened the meetings in a different room, allowing members of the press to attend in person while providing the public with access via video.

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the City Council failed to comply with Government Code section 54957.9 because it did not “order the meeting room cleared and continue in session” as the statute requires. The City demurred, contending that the council had effectively cleared the room by recessing and relocating the meetings. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and the plaintiffs appealed.

Appellate Decision

The Court of Appeal reversed. Interpreting Government Code section 54957.9 de novo, the court emphasized that exceptions to the Brown Act must be narrowly construed. Looking to the statute’s plain language, the court explained that relocating a meeting to a different room is not equivalent to “clear[ing] the meeting room and continu[ing] in session,” as the statute expressly requires. Because the Council recessed the meetings and reconvened them in a new location rather than clearing the original meeting room, the court held that the statutory exception did not apply.

Subsequent Proceedings

The California State Association of Cities and the League of California Cities requested an order to depublish the opinion, and the Supreme Court declined. In a concurring statement, however, Justice Groban encouraged the Legislature to revisit the statute, citing local legislative bodies’ “legitimate concerns that attempting to clear a room of unruly members of the public could create a dangerous situation for attendees and government officials alike.”

— Louisa I. Rogers