In Russian Riverkeeper v. County of Sonoma (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 382, the Court of Appeal for the First District held that petitioners failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that the county did not comply with its public trust obligation in amending its groundwater well permit ordinance. The court also concluded that the county’s determination that the amendment was exempt from CEQA under the Class 7, Class 8, and commonsense exemptions is not supported by substantial evidence.
Key Takeaways
- Local agencies may share the State’s responsibility for administering the public trust. When a local agency has authority over an activity that affects public trust uses, it must consider those uses and protect them where feasible.
- A quasi-legislative ordinance challenged under the Public Trust Doctrine receives highly deferential review. The ordinance is presumed valid, and the petitioner must show the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support.
- Unsupported assumptions about reduced development or resource use are insufficient to support the commonsense exemption. The commonsense exemption applies only when it can be said with certainty that the project has no possibility of causing a significant environmental effect.
Background
In 2023, the county amended Chapter 25B of its county code, which regulates groundwater well permits, acting in response to Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Board (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 844 (Environmental Law Foundation), which held that counties share the State’s responsibility to administer the public trust when groundwater pumping affects navigable water ways.
Before adopting the amendment, the board held public hearings and convened policy and technical working groups. With assistance from a hydrologist, the groups evaluated potential approaches to groundwater well permitting, including cumulative impacts, conservation measures, monitoring requirements, and categories of ministerial and discretionary permits.
After considering the working groups’ recommendations and public comments, the board adopted the amendment and found it exempt from CEQA under the Class 7, Class 8, and commonsense exemptions.
Petitioners challenged the amendment. The trial court granted their petition, concluding that the county had not supported the amendment with evidence or analysis needed to evaluate its efficacy and feasibility and had not supported its CEQA exemption findings with substantial evidence. The county appealed.
Court of Appeal Decision
Public Trust Doctrine
The Court of Appeal followed Environmental Law Foundation and held that counties may share the State’s responsibility to administer the public trust. When an agency has authority over an activity affecting public trust uses, it has an affirmative duty to consider those uses and protect them where feasible.
The court nevertheless emphasized the highly deferential standard governing review of the county’s quasi-legislative action. The amendment was presumed valid, and petitioners had to show that it was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. The court found petitioners did not meet that burden, explaining that the record showed the county gathered information, engaged with the public, and balanced conflicting policy concerns and fashioned a compromise to address the practical realities of groundwater well permitting.
The court rejected petitioners’ three principal arguments—finding that (1) the county expressly considered cumulative impacts through its technical analysis, working-group process, and monitoring requirements; (2) the county had no affirmative evidentiary burden under the applicable standard of review to prove the effectiveness of its conservation measures; and (3) the ministerial permit categories were supported by findings that the covered wells presented a low risk to public trust resources or served an overriding public interest in maintaining water supplies for existing and domestic uses.
CEQA Exemptions
The court held that the county failed to show the Class 7, Class 8, and commonsense exemptions applied and were supported by substantial evidence.
The court first held that the amendment did not fall within the Class 7 or Class 8 exemptions as a matter of law. Although the amendment regulated private activity that might indirectly benefit natural resources, it was not strictly a preservation activity. It also both strengthened and relaxed existing environmental protections.
The court also found the county lacked substantial evidence to support that the amendment would maintain, restore, or enhance natural resources or the environment. Approximately 95 percent of well applications were expected to remain subject to ministerial review, and the record did not establish that discretionary review would result in permit denials, fewer wells, or reduced groundwater use. The expected benefits of conservation measures were also unquantified.
The court likewise rejected the county’s reliance on the commonsense exemption. It agreed with the county that the temporary moratorium was not the proper baseline because it reflected a temporary restriction rather than actual physical conditions. The baseline should instead reflect conditions before the moratorium, including existing wells, their annual water use, and resulting groundwater and streamflow conditions. Regardless of the baseline, the court found the county lacked substantial evidence that the amendment would reduce the number of wells or groundwater use. The county therefore could not establish with certainty that the amendment had no possibility of causing a significant environmental effect.