Archives: November 2019

Third District Court of Appeal Upholds EIR for Chico Walmart Expansion Against Challenge to Urban Decay Analysis

In a partially published decision issued on October 3, 2019, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment upholding an EIR for a Walmart expansion project in Chico against challenges to the EIR’s urban decay analysis. (Chico Advocates for a Responsible Economy v. City of Chico (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 839.)

In 2015, Walmart applied to the city to expand its existing Chico store in a regional retail center that includes the Chico Mall and several national chain retail stores. A FoodMaxx grocery store is also nearby. Walmart planned to expand its existing store by approximately 64,000 square feet, add an eight-pump gas station, and create two new outparcels for future commercial development. Approximately 49,000 square feet of the new space would be used for grocery-related sales.

The city prepared an EIR for the project that included, among other things, a “robust 43-page urban decay analysis.” The urban decay analysis was supported by a 123-page expert study prepared by ALH Urban & Regional Economics. The purpose of the ALH study was to assess the economic impact of the project on retailers in the surrounding area and to evaluate the extent to which the project could contribute to store closures and urban decay. For purposes of the study, “urban decay” was defined as “visible symptoms of physical deterioration . . . that is caused by a downward spiral of business closures and long term vacancies . . . [and]. . . so prevalent, substantial, and lasting for a significant period of time that it impairs the proper utilization of the properties and structures, and the health, safety, and welfare of the surrounding community.”

The ALH study concluded that, on its own, the project would have a negligible impact on sales for competing retailers and that store closures were not expected to follow. Based on these findings, the EIR concluded that the project would not cause the type of severe economic effects that would lead to urban decay. With regard to cumulative impacts, the ALH study concluded that the project, when combined with other planned retail projects in the area, could induce the closure of one full-service grocery store. The city’s retail vacancy rate, however, would only increase by approximately one percent and would remain “well within the range of a robust, healthy commercial retail sector.” The EIR further explained that Chico has a strong history of “backfilling” store vacancies, that existing vacant properties are well-maintained, and that the city has regulations to prevent decay and blight. For these reasons, the EIR concluded that although some economic impacts were expected, cumulative impacts likely would not result in urban decay.

Following the city’s certification of the EIR, Chico Advocates for a Responsible Economy (CARE) challenged the urban decay analysis in an administrative appeal to the city council. CARE supported its challenge with its own “retail expert” report refuting the city’s analysis. The city council denied the appeal.  CARE then filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to rescind the EIR and project approvals. The trial court denied the petition in full and CARE appealed.

On appeal, CARE challenged the EIR’s urban decay analysis on two grounds. First, CARE argued that the EIR relied on an “unnaturally constrained” definition of “urban decay” and, as a result, failed to treat the loss of “close and convenient shopping” as a significant environmental impact. Second, CARE argued that, due to flaws in the ALH study’s methodology, the EIR’s urban decay findings were not supported by substantial evidence.

Addressing the first issue, the court began its discussion by explaining the applicable standard of review for allegations that an EIR failed to include necessary information. Citing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, the court explained that CARE’s argument presented the predominantly legal question of whether the EIR included enough detail “to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed project,” which is subject to independent review. On this issue, the court found “CARE’s argument lacks merit – the City did not violate CEQA because the potential loss of close and convenient shopping is not an environmental issue that must be reviewed under CEQA.” “CEQA is concerned with physical changes in the environment,” the court explained, and “[a]lthough the loss of close and convenient shopping could impact some Chico residents psychologically and socially, such impacts are not, by themselves, environmental impacts.”

Next, the court turned to CARE’s attack on the methodology for the urban decay analysis. CARE alleged three flaws with the urban decay study’s methodology. First, CARE argued that the study relied on incorrect assumptions for calculating the anticipated grocery sales. Second, CARE argued that the study underestimated impacts on Chico stores by incorrectly assuming shoppers from the neighboring Town of Paradise would patronize the Walmart. Lastly, CARE argued that the study incorrectly assumed economic impacts would be spread amongst existing stores, rather than concentrated on the closest competitor – the FoodMaxx grocery.

In rejecting each of CARE’s arguments, the court explained that challenges to the EIR’s methodology are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Under this standard, challenges to the EIR’s methodology “must be rejected unless the agency’s reasons for proceeding as it did are clearly inadequate or unsupported.” Moreover, the court explained, when an agency is faced with conflicting evidence on an issue, it is permissible to give more weight to some evidence than others – mere “disagreement among experts” does not render an EIR inadequate.

In this case, the court concluded that CARE’s challenge amounted to “nothing more than differences of opinion about how the Project’s expected grocery sales should be estimated, how the Project’s market area should be defined, and which competitors are most susceptible to impacts from the Project.” These differences in opinion, the court explained, did not render the EIR’s analysis clearly inadequate or unsupported. Therefore, CARE’s challenge failed under the substantial evidence test.

The court further noted that although CARE’s own expert report showed additional store closures would occur, CARE failed to demonstrate how such closures would lead to urban decay. As the court explained, “Store closures, by themselves, do not amount to urban decay.”

Fourth District Affirms California Coastal Commission’s Authority to Impose Conditions on Coastal Development Permits Under Local Coastal Programs

On September 19, 2019, the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued its decision in Lindstrom v. California Coastal Commission (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 73, in which the appellate court partially reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the California Coastal Commission did not abuse its discretion with regard to three of four special conditions imposed on a coastal development permit for a residential project in the City of Encinitas. In upholding the three special conditions, two of which concerned setback requirements and the other prohibiting the construction of any shoreline protective devices, the court of appeal found the conditions to be consistent with the City’s local coastal program and within the Commission’s authority. The court ordered that the fourth condition be deleted or revised, however, as it found the Commission’s requirement that the home be removed if “any government agency” orders so “due to a natural hazard” to be both overly broad and unreasonable.

Background

In 2012, the Lindstroms applied for a coastal development permit with the City of Encinitas (City) to build a home atop a 70-foot high ocean-side bluff. To comply with the City’s Local Coastal Program (LCP), the permit application included a geotechnical report prepared by Geotechnical Exploration Inc. (GEI), an engineering firm hired by the Lindstroms. The LCP required the report to, among other things: (i) certify that the development would not endanger the bluff or require future bluff stabilization devices (i.e. coastal armoring or seawalls) based on a 1.5 safety factor over a 75-year time period, and (ii) calculate the minimum setback required for the development – a figure that could not be less than 40 feet. The GEI report concluded the proposed project could be built with a 40-foot setback without requiring bluff stabilizing measures in 75 years.

On May 2, 2013, the City’s planning commission approved the development permit with a condition requiring the Lindstroms to provide a letter stating the building could be removed in the event of endangerment. On May 28, 2013, GEI submitted a revised technical analysis which concluded the earlier report erred in calculating the development’s feasible setback. The new report stated the project would require a 72.25-foot setback, and proposed an alternate analysis based on the “natural angle of repose,” which would yield a 39.7-foot setback.

In June 2013, two Coastal Commission Commissioners appealed the City’s approval of the permit on grounds that it was inconsistent with the LCP. During the appeal process, the Lindstroms hired a second engineering firm, TerraCosta Consulting Group (TCG) and requested the Commission delay its decision. In October 2015, TCG prepared a new geotechnical report which concluded the slope would be safe with a 40-foot setback at a 1.29 safety level – a figure lower than the LCP-mandated 1.5 safety level.

The Coastal Commission heard the appeal in July 2016. As part of the appeal, a staff geologist concluded the proper setback should be 60 to 62 feet. The Commission agreed with the staff geologist, and approved the permit with four special conditions. The first condition (“Condition 1.a”) required construction to adhere to a 60- to 62-foot setback. The second condition (“Condition 3.a”) prohibited all use of coastal armoring devices. The third condition (“Condition 3.b”) required removal of the home in the event a government agency deemed occupancy unsafe due to natural hazards. The fourth condition (“Condition 3.c”) imposed mandatory remediation measures that the landowners would be required to take in the event hazardous bluff conditions threatened the structure.

In August 2016, the Lindstroms filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Commission’s conditions of approval. The trial court partially granted the petition and found in favor of the Lindstroms as to the first and second conditions (Conditions 1.a and 3.a) but found the Commission did not abuse its discretion in imposing the third and fourth conditions (Conditions 3.b and 3.c). The Commission and the Lindstroms appealed.

The Fourth District’s Decision

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal partially reversed the trial court’s holding, siding with the Commission on three of the four special conditions. Relying on the plain language in the City’s LCP and the Coastal Commission’s authority to impose reasonable conditions so long as they are consistent with the Coastal Act and the LCP, the court found the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it imposed Conditions 1.a, 3.a, and 3.c.  The court held that Condition 3.b, however, was improperly broad and not reasonably related to achieving the LCP’s purpose. That condition required that the Lindstroms remove their home in the event “any government agency” deemed it a “natural hazard.” That condition, according to the court, was poorly drafted and could have been read to require the Lindstroms to remove their home under unreasonable circumstances. The court therefore ordered the trial court enter a new judgment requiring the Coastal Commission to either delete or revise and clarify the condition.

 

Bridget McDonald