Archives: December 2021

Changes to State Clearinghouse Document Submission Process (AB 819) Effective January 1, 2022

On January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill (AB) 819 (Levine, 2021), signed into law on July 16, 2021, takes effect and changes several CEQA communication, noticing, and filing requirements. Most notably, Public Resources Code section 21082.1(c)(4) now requires electronic submissions of draft environmental documents to the State Clearinghouse for all projects subject to CEQA review, regardless of whether the agency is a lead, responsible, or trustee agency or if the project is of sufficient statewide, regional, or areawide environmental significance. Documents include environmental impact reports (EIRs), negative declarations (NDs), and mitigated negative declarations (MNDs).

Other notable changes:

  • Public Resources Code section 21092.2(d) requires that all lead agencies post CEQA-related notices on their websites, “if any.”
  • Public Resources Code section 21092.3 requires notices of preparation (NOPs) and notices of availability for review (NOAs) to be posted on the county clerk’s website.
  • Public Resources Code section 21108(d) now requires electronic filing of all notices of determination (NODs) and notices of exemption (NOEs) with the State Clearinghouse for which the lead agency is a state agency.
  • Public Resources Code section 21161 requires all notices of completion (NOCs) to be filed electronically with the State Clearinghouse; mailed copes are no longer required.

All document submitters must be registered in OPR’s “CEQA Submit” to upload and submit documents and notices. For instructions on how to register and electronically submit documents, visit: http://opr.ca.gov/sch/document-submission.html.

For the State’s technical advisory on AB 819, visit: http://opr.ca.gov/sch/docs/20211202-Submitting_CEQA_Docs_to_the_SCH_Under_AB_819.pdf.

FIRST DISTRICT UPHOLDS STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD’S RELIANCE ON CEQA’s MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION FOR REGISTRATION OF APPROPRIATION OF WATER FOR DOMESTIC USE UNDER THE WATER RIGHTS PERMITTING REFORM ACT

In Mission Peak v. State Water Resources Control Board (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 873, the First District Court of Appeal held that the State Water Resources Control Board’s (Board’s) registration process is ministerial and therefore exempt from CEQA.

Background

The Water Rights Permitting Reform Act of 1988 permits eligible persons to acquire a right to appropriate up to 10 acre-feet per year of  water for domestic or other specified uses by completing a registration process with the Board. Pursuant to this Act, the State Water Resources Control Board granted a small domestic use registration to two Alameda County property owners without conducting environmental review on the premise that the action was ministerial and thereby did not trigger CEQA.

Mission Peak Conservancy and Kelly Abreau (collectively, Mission Peak) sued the Board, alleging that it violated CEQA by approving the registration without conducting CEQA review. Mission Peak contended that the Board’s approval was discretionary and that it should have denied the registration because the property owners did not qualify for small domestic use and also because their registration form contained false information. The Board filed a demurrer, which the trial court sustained without leave to amend. Mission Peak appealed.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal determined that the Board’s registration process was indeed a ministerial act, not discretionary, and was therefore exempt from CEQA pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (b)(1). As the court explained, “[m]inisterial projects involve ‘little or no personal judgment by the public official as to the wisdom or manner of carrying out the project.’ (Guidelines, § 15369.) . . . The test is whether the law governing the agency’s decision to approve the project gives it authority to require changes that would lessen the project’s environmental effects.”

The court determined the Board did not have such authority here. Although the Board has statutory authority to impose general conditions applicable to all registrations, it did not have authority “to place conditions on the . . . registration to lessen its environmental effects.” The Board determines whether a registration is compliant by applying a checklist of fixed criteria, and the registration is automatically deemed complete if it meets these criteria. Accordingly, there is no discretion involved in the registration, and it is therefore not subject to CEQA.

Specifically, the Court rejected Mission Peak’s argument that “a different agency, the Department of Fish and Wildlife, has discretion to impose conditions that could ameliorate the project’s environmental impacts” and therefore the the process is discretionary. Not so. As the court explained, another agency’s discretionary authority for its review cannot be imputed to the Board. Mission Peak then argued that “the project did not satisfy the requirements for a small domestic use registration because the [applicant] misrepresented facts,” and thereby the Board did have discretion in that it could deny the project or request changes to meet program requirements. But, “the test is whether the Board had the legal authority to impose environmentally beneficial changes as conditions of the project,” not whether the agency could request changes on an application or deny it.  Lastly, Mission Peak argued that the Board violated CEQA because the project did not meet program requirements. The court pointed out that “this is simply an argument that the Board made an erroneous ministerial decisions.” And such an error is not the basis for a CEQA claim. Plainly stated, “CEQA does not regulate ministerial decisions—full stop.”

– Veronika S. Morrison

SIXTH DISTRICT HOLDS COASTAL COMMISSION VIOLATED CEQA BY FAILING TO COMPLETE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PERMIT PRIOR TO PROJECT APPROVAL

In Friends, Artists, and Neighbors of Elkhorn Slough v. California Coastal Commission (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 666, the Sixth District Court of Appeal held that the California Coastal Commission (CCC) violated CEQA by analyzing a coastal development permit’s environmental impacts and adopting findings in support thereof after it had approved the permit and underlying project. Although the CCC is authorized to issue “revised findings” when the Commission’s action differs from what was proposed in the staff report, the court held that the revised findings in this case went too far and were an improper pot-hoc rationalization.

Background

In 2000, Real Party in Interest Heritage/Western Communities, Ltd., applied to the County of Monterey for a combined development permit and coastal development permit (CDP) for the Rancho Los robles Subdivision. The project proposed more than 100 residential units on a commercial parcel. Monterey County prepared an EIR containing several alternatives, including one with a reduced number of units.

In 2008, the County Planning Commission recommended denying the project due to water supply and traffic congestion issues. Heritage/Western appealed the denial to the County Board of Supervisors. The Board disagreed with the Planning Commission and approved the project. The Board also certified the EIR and adopted a statement of overriding considerations regarding significant and avoidable impacts to traffic, groundwater, and seawater intrusion.

In 2009, Friends, Artists, and Neighbors of Elkhorn Slough (FANS) appealed the Board’s decision to the CCC, alongside two Coastal Commissioners. CCC staff issued a staff report recommending denial of the CDP primarily due to lack of adequate water supply. The staff report concluded further analysis for certain issues was unwarranted in light of staff’s recommendation to deny the permit.

On November 8, 2017, the CCC held a de novo hearing and voted to approve the CDP, despite staff recommending denial.

In August 2018, CCC staff issued a subsequent report, containing revised findings in support of the CCC’s approval of the CDP. The 2018 report concluded that water supply was no longer an issue that necessitated denying the project. The 2018 staff report also considered other impacts previously identified in the 2017 report and determined they were no longer relevant or significant, and that staff’s prior conditions of approval would still apply to the project but be adjusted where necessary and implemented in a manner consistent with the project as approved by the Commission. Finally, the report concluded that the project was consistent with CEQA because it adequately addressed any potential adverse impacts to coastal resources, and there were no additional feasible alternatives or mitigation measures that would substantially lessen adverse impacts. The CCC approved the revised findings at a public hearing on September 13, 2018, approximately ten months after the CDP was approved.

FANS filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the CCC’s approval of the CDP. The trial court denied the petition, rejecting FANS’ assertion that the CCC violated CEQA by approving the project without conducting environmental review before making findings. FANS appealed.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

On appeal, FANS asserted that the CCC failed to employ the proper procedures required by CEQA and the Coastal Act because its “revised findings” were a post-hoc rationalization for the CCC’s prior decision to approve the project and went beyond what was permitted by the CCC’s regulations. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial court.

The Court of Appeal outlined the steps for seeking CCC review of an approved CDP application and noted that the Commission’s de novo review of a permit application mimics CEQA’s environmental review process. The analysis and recommendation in a staff report must be accompanied by specific findings regarding—among other factors—the project’s conformity with the Coastal Act and CEQA. If the CCC’s action on the project substantially differs from staff’s recommendation, the prevailing Commissioners must separately state the basis to allow staff to prepare a revised staff report with proposed revised findings that reflect the action taken by the Commissioners. Under section 13096 of the CCC’s regulations, a public hearing must be held before the revised findings are adopted. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, § 13096, subd. (c).) After the hearing, the CCC must vote on whether to adopt the revised findings.

Based on the facts of the case, the court held that the CCC’s environmental review for the CDP was incomplete at the time of approval, and the revised finding did not make up for the shortcoming. The court determined that the CCC’s decision to approve the project relied on a staff report that failed to contain elements required by CEQA (and the Commission’s certified regulatory program), including project alternatives, feasible mitigation measures to substantially lessen significant adverse effects, and conditions of approval.

In reaching its conclusion, the court explained the importance of these factors: “Requiring specific findings about alternatives and mitigation measures ‘ensures there is evidence of the public agency’s actual consideration of alternatives and mitigation measures, and reveals to citizens the analytical process by which the public agency arrived at its decision.’ [Citation.]” (Opinion, p. 32.) Through this lens, the court clarified that section 13096 “requires commissioners to set forth the analytic route between the evidence and the action at the hearing before approval.” The court further observed that no prior case law involved facts similar to this one, where the CCC’s environmental analysis was this incomplete at the time a CDP was approved. Accordingly, the court found that the CCC abused its discretion because it was required to conduct the analysis before it approved the project.

– Bridget McDonald

FOURTH DISTRICT UPHOLDS EIR FOR ROADWAY CONNECTION PROJECT AND HOLDS CITY’S QUASI-LEGISLATIVE APPROVALS WERE NOT SUBJECT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

In Save Civita Because Sudberry Won’t v. City of San Diego (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 957, a partially published opinion, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the City of San Diego did not violate CEQA by failing to summarize revisions made in its recirculated draft EIR, and that the City’s certification of the Final EIR and approval of the project were quasi-legislative acts not subject to procedural due process requirements.

Background

In 2008, as part of an alternative to a proposed mixed-use development project, the City of San Diego proposed a four-lane major roadway in Mission Valley that would directly connect the development to local roadways. This connector roadway required an amendment to the Serra Mesa Community Plan (SMCP) and the City’s General Plan.

In April 2016, the City issued examined this connector roadway as its own project and prepared a programmatic draft EIR (PDEIR) for the SMCP and General Plan amendments. In March 2017, when roadway construction became foreseeable and upon a large volume of public comment, the City issued a revised and recirculated draft EIR (RE-DEIR) that looked at both the programmatic portion of the project, the adoption of amendments, as well as the actual construction of the roadway. In August 2017, the City issued the Final EIR for the project. Also in August 2017, the Planning Commission voted unanimously, with one member recusing, to recommend approval of the project and certification of the FEIR, with the City Council’s Smart Growth & Land Use Committee voting the same a month later. The City Council certified the Final EIR and approved the project in October 2017.

Save Civita Because Sudberry Won’t (Save Civita) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the City’s certification of the Final EIR and approval of the project on several grounds, namely here that it violated the requirement in CEQA Guidelines section 15088.5, subdivision (g) that a recirculated EIR summarize the revisions made to the prior EIR, and also that it violated procedural due process rights. The trial court denied the petition and complaint. Save Civita appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

Save Civita argued that the City violated CEQA Guidelines section 15088.5, subdivision (g), because it failed to summarize the changes in the RE-DEIR from the PDEIR, thereby forcing readers to “‘leaf through thousands of pages,’” and cause them “‘to have the mistaken belief’” that the two EIRs address the same project. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that statements in the RE-DEIR adequately summarized the changes to the PDEIR, and that these summary provisions informed the public that the revisions to the PDEIR were extensive and the PDEIR had been effectively “replaced” by the RE-DEIR. To make its determination, the court also looked to section 15088.5, subdivision (f), which requires that an agency inform the public that, when an EIR is so substantially revised that the document is recirculated, then comments on the prior EIR will not receive a response. The City fulfilled this criteria.

Furthermore, the court concluded that even if the City had failed to comply with the summation requirements of section 15088.5, any such failure was not prejudicial because it did not deprive the public of a meaningful opportunity to discuss and critique the project. Specifically, the court noted that the administrative record contained “ample and vigorous” public discussion of the RE-DEIR, proof that there were not fatal obstacles to public discourse created by any absence of a revision summary.

Save Civita also argued that the City’s certification of the Final EIR and project approval violated the public’s procedural right to due process and a fair hearing because a member of the City Council, who voted to approve the project was, according to Save Civita, “‘a cheerleader for the Project’” who had predetermined his vote. The court foreclosed this claim by explaining that procedural due process requirements are applicable only to quasi-adjudicatory hearings. Here, the City’s actions were quasi-legislative because they involved the adoption of generally applicable rules on the basis of broad public policy. The project approved by the City and analyzed in its EIR—construction of the roadway and amendment of planning documents—were, as the court determined, matters of public policy that required it to assess a broad spectrum of community costs and benefits. Therefore, procedural due process did not apply.

– Veronika S. Morrison