Archives: January 2022

FOURTH DISTRICT UPHOLDS EIR FOR MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING PROJECT AND FINDS CITY PROPERLY USED A PLANNED DEVELOPMENT PERMIT TO ALLOW A VARIATION FROM CONVENTIONAL ZONING REGULATIONS

In Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association v. City of Santa Cruz (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 985, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that an EIR for a multi-family housing project properly relied on the biological resources analysis and mitigation measures identified in the initial study for the project, and sufficiently addressed the project objectives, alternatives, and cumulative impacts to water supply and traffic. Reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeal also held that the City complied with its municipal code by using a planned development permit as a variation from its conventional slope regulations.

Background

The proposed project consisted of a 40-unit residential complex on a vacant lot in the City of Santa Cruz. The City prepared an initial study that discussed, among other topics, biological impacts that would be reduced to less-than-significant with mitigation, and later circulated a draft EIR and recirculated draft EIR before certifying the final EIR. The City Council approved a reduced-housing alternative with 32 units.

Along with a general plan amendment, rezone, and other entitlements, the City approved a planned development permit (PDP) to allow a variation from the conventional slope regulations in the City’s zoning code.

The Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association (OSENA) filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the EIR and the City’s approval of the PDP. The trial court ruled that the City complied with CEQA, but found the City violated its municipal code by not requiring compliance with the conventional slope regulations. OSENA appealed and the City and Real Parties in Interest cross-appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

CEQA and Adequacy of the EIR

Upholding the trail court’s ruling on the CEQA claims, the Court of Appeal concluded that the EIR was adequate. The court held that impacts that are less than significant with mitigation may be discussed in an initial study rather than in the EIR as long as the EIR fulfills its purpose as an informational document. The court noted that the EIR summarized the impacts and mitigation measures, and the EIR’s reference to the initial study—which was attached to the EIR as appendix—sufficiently alerted the public to the environmental issues and provided readers with adequate information. Accordingly, the court determined that it was appropriate for the EIR to rely on the biological resources analysis and mitigation measures identified in the initial study.

The court also rejected OSENA’s argument that the mitigation measures were vague and improperly deferred because OSENA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies as to this issue and did not raise it in the trial court proceedings. The court nonetheless explained that even if it considered this issue on the merits, it would reject OSENA’s arguments because the question of effectiveness of a mitigation measure is a factual one, which, in this case, was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

The court further concluded that the project’s objectives and alternatives analyses were adequate, and that OSENA’s arguments amounted to mere disagreement with the City’s conclusions. The court explained that rejecting or approving an alternative is a decision only for the decisionmakers, and they may reject alternatives that are undesirable for policy reasons or fail to meet project objectives. While the project objectives included specific targets, those objectives did not improperly restrict the range of alternatives analyzed in the EIR, and the City justified its reasons for rejecting alternatives with even less housing than the 32-unit alternative.

Additionally, the court determined that the EIR sufficiently analyzed the project’s cumulative impacts on water supply and traffic. Regarding water supply, the court explained that the EIR’s analysis properly considered the water supply impact in light of city-wide needs and future demand, and properly relied on the City’s Urban Water Management Plan. Regarding traffic, the court held that OSENA’s arguments challenging the EIR’s analysis of LOS impacts were moot because CEQA Guidelines section 15064.3, which took effect after the case was initiated, provides that a project’s effects on automobile delay shall not constitute a significant environmental impact.

Therefore, the Court affirmed the portion of the trial court’s order and judgment concluding that the City complied with CEQA.

Santa Cruz Municipal Code

Reversing the trial court’s ruling on OSENA’s municipal code claims, the Court of Appeal held that the City did not violate its municipal code by granting a PDP without also requiring compliance with the conventional slope modification regulation procedures in its zoning code. The City’s PDP ordinance allows a variation from certain zoning regulations including “Slope Regulations Modifications, pursuant to procedures set forth in Chapter 24.08, Part 9 (Slope Regulations Modifications).” Rejecting OSENA’s claim that the City was required to comply with the conventional regulations in Chapter 24.08, Part 9, in addition to the requirements for a PDP, the court explained that the City should be afforded deference in the interpretation of its own municipal code. The court upheld the City’s determination that the granting of a PDP does not require compliance with the conventional slope regulations, as this interpretation was consistent with the text and purpose of the ordinance and interpreting the PDP ordinance as requiring compliance with both the PDP ordinance and the slope regulations would have served no readily apparent purpose.

RMM Partners Christopher L. Stiles and Tiffany K. Wright represented the Real Parties in Interest in this case.  Chris Stiles argued the case in Court of Appeal on behalf of the City and Real Parties.

-Veronika S. Morrison

THIRD DISTRICT UPHOLDS CITY’S DETERMINATION THAT PROJECT WAS CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE PLANNING DOCUMENTS

In Old East Davis Neighborhood Association v. City of Davis (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 895, the Third District found the trial court erred in concluding the record did not support the city’s decision that a mixed-use development project was consistent with the general plan, specific plan, and design guidelines. Rather, using the deferential standard of review applied to general plan consistency determinations, the court found sufficient evidence to support that the city’s consistency determination was not unreasonable.

Background

The challenged project is a four-story mixed-use building development offering ground floor retail and apartment units on the three upper levels. The project is located in an area referred to as a “transition area” between the Downtown Core and the Old East Davis residential neighborhood. Both the Downtown Core and the project site are subject to the Core Area Specific Plan and the Downtown and Traditional Residential Neighborhoods Design (DTRN) Guidelines.

A Sustainable Communities Environmental Assessment/Initial Study (SCEA) prepared for the project concluded the project would be consistent with the general plan and would adhere to the design guidelines.

The staff report recommending approval of the project found the project consistent with general plan policies requiring an “architectural fit” with the city’s existing scale and specific plan policies “encouraging more intense mixed-use development and accommodating buildings with floor areas up to three times the site area, while still maintaining scale transition and small city-character.” The report further explained that consistent with the DTRN guidelines the project had been designed to provide a transition area from Downtown to the Old East Neighborhood and to remain in scale with the adjacent area through use, in part, of stepped-back upper stories to concentrate building mass away from the nearby residential properties.

The city council approved the project finding it conformed with the general plan and the specific plan. Petitioner filed suit challenging the approval on the basis that the project failed to meet requirements for an SCEA assessment and that the project was inconsistent with applicable planning guidelines.

The trial court granted the petition in part reasoning that the project did not meet the general plan’s “fundamental policy” that it be a transition property. The city appealed and petitioner cross-appealed.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

On appeal, the city argued that the trial court failed to afford the appropriate deference to the city’s consistency determination. The appellate court agreed. Articulating the applicable standard of review, the court explained that a general plan consistency determination will only be reversed if it is unreasonable based on all the evidence in the record. It further noted that the city is uniquely competent to interpret adopted planning policies and the reviewing court’s role is only to decide whether the city considered the applicable policies and the extent to which the project conforms with those policies.

Applying the correct standard of review, the court found substantial evidence supported the city’s finding that the project serves as a “transition.” The court noted that the applicable planning documents did not provide a formula for determining what constitutes a “transition.” The determination instead rests on subjective criteria, e.g., “architectural fit” and “appropriate scale and character.” The court rejected petitioner’s arguments that the project could not be a transition between Downtown and Old East Davis because it was the largest building in the area, noting that nothing in the planning documents compels such a conclusion. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court erred in applying a formulistic approach that discounted the step-back design, the SCEA analysis, and other factors relied on by the city.

Petitioner also argued that the project violated DTRN guideline language stating that “a building shall appear to be in scale with traditional single-family houses along the street front” — asserting that the use of the word “shall” makes this language mandatory. The court disagreed. The DTRN guidelines explained that, unlike standards, which use unequivocal language to prescribe minimum acceptable limits, guidelines are descriptive statements that illustrate a preferred course of action. Given this, the court held that the DTRN guideline language was “decidedly subjective.” Even if the language could be deemed mandatory, the court found that the city’s conclusion that the scale of the project was consistent with the DTRN guidelines was reasonable based on the evidence in the record.

Petitioner’s cross-appeal raised three issues with the SCEA that were raised in the trial court, but the judgment did not address. Petitioner argued 1) the SCEA failed to adequately analyze historic resources impacts to the Old East Davis conservation district; 2) the SCEA failed to analyze changes to the project that would be necessary if a lease on part of the project site were not renewed; and 3) the SCEA failed to adequately analyze potential hazardous material impacts associated with the historic railroad use of the site.

The Court of Appeal concluded that petitioner had forfeited its claims because it did not challenge the trial court’s tentative decision, and, in any case, found Petitioner’s claims to be without merit. First, the court found that SCEA concluded that the Old East Davis conservation district was not a historic resource. Second, the SCEA did analyze the potential loss of the lease, and the project approvals allowed for that contingency. Third, the SCEA analyzed the potential for discovering hazardous materials and concluded that any impacts would be addressed through standard regulatory conditions.

Lastly, petitioner argued that the project did not meet the requirements for relying on a SCEA because of potential impacts to historic resources and that the city’s findings under Public Resources Code, section 21155.2, were not supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected these arguments, concluding that petitioner relied on the wrong statutory provision in claiming the project did not qualify for a SCEA and failed to raise its challenge to the City’s findings in its opening brief.

– Nina Berglund

FOURTH DISTRICT HOLDS CITY OF PALM SPRINGS’ SHORT-TERM RENTAL ORDINANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH ZONING CODE

The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Protect Our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs (Jan. 7, 2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 667 (part. pub.), upheld the City of Palm Springs’ ordinance authorizing short-term rentals in residential zones as consistent with the City’s Zoning Code.

Factual Background

The 2008 Short-Term Rental Ordinance

The City of Palm Springs’ Zoning Code authorizes two uses in a single-family residential (R-1) zone without a permit: (1) a “permanent single-family dwelling”; and (2) uses “customarily incident to the permitted uses when located on the same lot therewith.” All other uses not expressly permitted are prohibited, and the Planning Commission shall not permit commercial uses in such zones.

As a popular vacation destination, the City has expressly allowed for short-term rentals of single-family dwellings since 2008. The corresponding ordinance initially applied to rentals for 28 days or less and limited occupancy based on the number of bedrooms. Rental owners were required to register the property with the City and use “reasonably prudent business practices” to ensure that renters and their guests did not create unreasonable disturbances or engage in disorderly conduct.

The 2016–2017 Ordinance Amendments

In 2016, the City amended the short-term rental ordinance to authorize short-term rentals of single-family residences and duplexes, but not apartments. The City adopted subsequent amendments in 2017, which barred ownership of more than one vacation rental, limited rentals to 36 per year, and added new provisions for “estate homes” (5+ bedrooms) and “homesharing.” The 2017 amendments also included findings that—when taken together—confirmed vacation rentals are permitted in R-1 zones as “ancillary and secondary uses of residential properties.”

Procedural Background

Protect Our Neighborhoods, an organization of homeowners opposed to vacation rentals, filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging the 2017 amendments violated the City’s Zoning Code, General Plan, and CEQA. The trial court denied the petition. Protect Our Neighborhoods appealed on the zoning code claims, but did not appeal the trial court’s ruling on the CEQA or General Plan claims.

The Court of Appeal’s Opinion

On appeal, petitioners alleged short-term rentals violated the zoning code because they are “commercial,” not “residential” uses, and improperly change the character of the R-1 Zone. Petitioners also contended that, if the zoning code permits short-term rentals at all, it only does so on the condition that an owner obtain a land use or conditional use permit.

Conflict With the Zoning Code

Effect of a Conflict

The Court of Appeal rejected petitioners’ contention that the ordinance conflicted with the zoning code. Petitioners treated the code as some kind of “higher law” that invalidated any subsequent conflicting law, even though the zoning code and ordinance are “coequal parts of the Municipal Code.” The court thus reasoned that, to the extent they conflicted with one another, “the most recently enacted statute expressed the will of the Legislature.” Therefore, even if the ordinance and zoning code could not be reconciled, the ordinance would remain valid because the City’s findings evinced its intent to repeal any inconsistent provision of the zoning code.

Existence of a Conflict

The court also rejected petitioners’ claim that vacation rentals constituted “commercial uses” that were barred in R-1 residential zones. The court noted that R-1 zones expressly permit any use that is “customarily incident to” the use of a “permanent single-family dwelling.” A “dwelling” includes “a building or portion thereof designed exclusively for residential occupancy…” Here, the ordinance plainly states that “vacation rentals are an ‘ancillary and secondary use of residential property…’” Petitioners failed to establish that this interpretation was erroneous.

Petitioners also failed to establish how short-term vacation rentals fell within the definition of a “commercial use.” The zoning code meaningfully distinguishes between commercial stays, and the City could reasonably conclude that the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling has different impacts than the short-term rental of a 20, 50, or 100-unit motel. That vacation rentals will impermissibly change the character of the R-1 zone is equally unavailing. Petitioners mistakenly cited to the “business regulations” provision of the code’s “home occupations” chapter, which does not apply to short-term rentals. Nevertheless, even if rentals did affect nearby single-family residents, allowing them was a legislative judgment left up to the City.

The Ordinance’s Findings

Petitioners claimed the ordinance’s supportive findings were internally inconsistent because they impliedly permitted an owner to acquire property and exclusively use it as a short-term rental without ever living in it. The court observed that a property can be “residential,” even if it is vacant. The code defines “dwelling” based on whether the building is designed exclusively for residential occupancy, not whether the building is actually occupied. The building is then limited to use as a single-family residence or uses customarily incident thereto, such as vacation rentals.

Need for a Discretionary Permit

Finally, petitioners argued short-term rentals in R-1 zones required issuance of a discretionary permit. Though the zoning code only requires permits for large day cares, model homes, temporary onsite trailers in conjunction with sale of subdivision lots, accessory apartments, churches, schools, and golf courses in R-1 zones, petitioners argued that vacation rentals have greater impacts than those uses. The court rejected this by observing that the zoning code does not require permits for “similar uses” with “similar impacts.” Rather, uses customarily incident to uses as a single-family dwelling—i.e., vacation rentals—are allowed without a permit.

– Bridget McDonald