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Office of Planning and Research Invites Comments on Proposed Update to CEQA Guidelines

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The Office of Planning and Research has released a preliminary discussion draft of updates to the CEQA Guidelines. OPR invites public comment on those updates by October 12, 2015. The proposed Guidelines address a broad range of topics, such as updates to address efficiency in implementing CEQA, substantive improvements, and technical improvements. Specific amendments address issues such as determining the baseline, deferral of mitigation, exemptions, analysis of energy impacts, water supply, tiering, and many more topics.

 

The preliminary discussion draft can be found here.

Supreme Court Holds State Agencies Cannot Decline to Make Fair-Share Mitigation Payments Where Legislature Does Not Appropriate Funds for Such Mitigation

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On August 3, 2015, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion for City of San Diego v. Board of Trustees of the California State University, Case No. S199557. The Court held that a state agency may not condition its fair-share contribution to off-site mitigation on receipt of Legislative appropriations, to the exclusion of other available sources of funding, and then find mitigation infeasible if the funds are not appropriated. The Court dismissed as dictum its prior statement that “a state agency’s power to mitigate its project’s effects through voluntary mitigation payments is ultimately subject to legislative control; if the Legislature does not appropriate the money, the power does not exist.” (City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341.) The Court found that permitting projects whose mitigation were premised on Legislative appropriations to move forward with no analysis of alternate mitigation funding, should the appropriations never materialize, would lead to absurd practical results. Such a rule would substantially impair the fundamental CEQA directive that each public agency mitigate or avoid the significant effects of its projects.

For a more detailed analysis, please see our blog post here.

Supreme Court Holds State Agencies Cannot Decline to Make Fair-Share Mitigation Payments Where Legislature Does Not Appropriate Funds for Such Mitigation

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On August 3, 2015, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion for City of San Diego v. Board of Trustees of the California State University, Case No. S199557. The Court addressed the following issue:

Does a state agency that may have an obligation to make “fair-share” payments for the mitigation of off-site impacts of a proposed project satisfy its duty to mitigate under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) by stating that it has sought funding from the Legislature to pay for such mitigation and that, if the requested funds are not appropriated, it may proceed with the project on the ground that mitigation is infeasible?

The Court answered in the negative. It held that a state agency may not condition its contribution to off-site mitigation on earmarked appropriations, to the exclusion of other available sources of funding, and then find mitigation infeasible solely upon denial of Legislative funding.

Facts and Procedural Background

In 2005, the California State University (CSU) Board of Trustees (Board) prepared an EIR for a project to expand the campus of San Diego State University (SDSU) to accommodate over 10,000 additional students over the next several years. The project would contribute significantly to traffic congestion off-campus in the City of San Diego. The EIR identified improvements that would avoid most traffic impacts, and calculated CSU’s “fair share” for the cost of the improvements. But the EIR stated payment of fair-share funding was conditioned on requesting and obtaining funds from the California Legislature. If the Legislature did not appropriate the money, then the funding would not be provided and impacts would be significant and unavoidable. The Board asserted that any contribution of its own funds for off-site mitigation would amount to a prohibited assessment of state property and an unlawful gift of public funds, and thus concluded that the SDSU was not legally responsible for funding or constructing road improvements. The Board received criticism from the City on this approach. In response, the Board committed to ask for the appropriations, but also conditioned its fair-share payment on receiving those funds.

The trial court held the Board had complied with the Supreme Court decision in City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341 (City of Marina), where the Court wrote that “a state agency’s power to mitigate its project’s effects through voluntary mitigation payments is ultimately subject to legislative control; if the Legislature does not appropriate the money, the power does not exist.”

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. It held the Board had violated CEQA by failing to consider alternative approaches to making fair-share payments for off-site traffic impacts, and by assuming an appropriation from the State Legislature was the only means of making such payments. The Court ruled the Board had an obligation to consider other ways of raising the money necessary to pay its fair share for these improvements. The court dismissed the cited City of Marina passage as misconstrued dictum. It noted that no law precluded the Board from using non-legislatively-appropriated funding for making voluntary mitigation payments, and thus held the availability of potential sources of funding other than the Legislature should have been addressed in the EIR before being deemed infeasible.

Meanwhile, the Board requested $10.5 million in funding for the off-site environmental impacts at SDSU in three separate years, but received no legislative appropriations.

Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court considered whether the dictum in City of Marina supported the Board’s assumption that CSU may not contribute its fair share to mitigate the off-campus environmental effects of campus expansion unless the Legislature makes an appropriation for that purpose. The Court concluded the cited passage did not justify the Board’s arguments, and that the Board’s other, later-raised contentions under the Education Code and Government Code also lacked merit.

The Court noted that a lead agency may disclaim responsibility for mitigating effects on regional infrastructure only when another agency has exclusive responsibility for such effects. Otherwise, CEQA does not limit a public agency’s obligation to mitigate or avoid significant environmental effects to those effects occurring on the agency’s own property.

In any case, the dictum in City of Marina did not justify the Board’s position that the University may contribute funds for off-campus environmental mitigation only through an appropriation designed for that specific purpose. The Court characterized its prior proclamation that “if the Legislature does not appropriate the money, the power does not exist” as a mere overstatement. In mitigating the effects of its projects, the Court explained, a public agency has access to all of its discretionary powers and not just the power to spend appropriations. Indeed, all but one of the new physical facilities proposed in the EIR were to be financed with nonappropriated funds.

Furthermore, the Board’s interpretation of the City of Marina dictum depended on a legally erroneous distinction between environmental impacts occurring on the project site and those occurring off-site. CEQA does not draw such a distinction with regard to mitigation.

The Court laid out the unreasonable consequences that would ensue under the Board’s proposed rule. For one, it would force the Legislature “to sit as a standing environmental review board to decide on a case-by-case basis whether state agencies’ projects will proceed despite unmitigated off-site environmental effects.” The cost of addressing the project’s cumulative impacts on local infrastructure would fall on local and regional government agencies. Off-site mitigation would likely be found infeasible for many, if not all, state projects that receive non-state funding. And, in any event, the Court could not compel the Legislature to make such appropriations.

In summary, adopting the Board’s proposed rule would substantially impair the fundamental statutory directive that each public agency shall mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of projects it carries out or approves whenever it is feasible to do so. The Court emphasized that while education may be CSU’s core function, avoidance or mitigation of the environmental effects of its projects is also one of its functions—and is “the plain import of CEQA.”

 

The opinion is located here.

Fourth District Court of Appeal Denies Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Finding Petitioner Was Not the Catalyst for City’s Revocation of Land Use Entitlements

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Coalition for a Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa (July 6, 2015) __ Cal.App.4th __, Case No. E57589.

A petitioner group challenged the City of Yucaipa’s certification of an EIR and approval of land use entitlements for a Target shopping center project. The project was to be developed on land owned by Palmer General Corporation. The trial court denied the petition and petitioner appealed. That appeal became moot when both Target and the landowner abandoned the project due to a contract dispute, which caused the city to revoke the entitlements. The Court of Appeal directed that the order below be reversed with directions to dismiss the action with prejudice due to mootness. After the trial court dismissed the action as directed, petitioner brought a motion for attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, asserting the petition was the catalyst for the city’s action to revoke the entitlements—the relief petitioner had sought at trial. The trial court denied the motion and petitioner appealed again. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding petitioner’s action was not the catalyst for the city’s actions.

A party seeking attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 must first show it is a “successful party.” It is not necessary to achieve a favorable final judgment so long as the petitioner’s actions were the “catalyst” for the defendant’s actions. More specifically, the catalyst theory permits an award of fees absent judicial resolution if the defendant changes its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by, the litigation. To obtain attorneys’ fees under this theory, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense; and (3) the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit. To satisfy the first prong, a petitioner need not show that litigation was the only cause of respondent’s acquiescence, only that it was a substantial factor.

Here, the court found that evidence supported the trial court’s finding that petitioner’s action was not a substantial factor contributing to the entitlement revocation.

First, before the land use entitlements were revoked, the trial court had denied the petition, which was a win for the city. Petitioner did not prevail, but instead appealed the judgment. Filing an appeal from the adverse judgment did not convert the unsuccessful action into a meritorious one. And the court’s direction to dismiss the action with prejudice on remand was not a favorable outcome. The court noted that none of the cases applying the catalyst theory involved situations in which an adverse judgment had already been rendered against the party seeking attorneys’ fees. Thus, having lost twice, petitioner could not show that it had prevailed by “threat of victory.”

Second, the city did not change its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by,the litigation. The city had been successful in defending the CEQA action and did not revoke the entitlements for any reason related to the EIR or the CEQA violations alleged by petitioner. Rather, the city revoked the entitlements because the developer and the landowner had both abandoned the project due to a contract dispute. Petitioner could not demonstrate a nexus between the merits of its action and the city’s revocation of the entitlements. Therefore, the action was not the catalyst for the revocation and petitioner was not entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Fourth District Court of Appeal Upholds Supplemental EIR for Jail Facility Upgrade Project

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City of Irvine v. County of Orange (July 6, 2015) __ Cal.App.4th __, Case No. G049527

The court upheld a Supplemental EIR prepared by the County of Orange for a jail upgrade project over a decade after the original EIR had been certified. The court found the project was not substantially different than the project analyzed in the original EIR and that the Supplemental EIR adequately addressed the minor project changes and changed circumstances. And after a hearty dissertation on CEQA’s responses to comments requirement, the court determined that the county’s responses to comments on the Supplemental EIR were adequate.

The county prepared an EIR in the 1990s for the expansion of the James A. Musick Jail Facility. The City of Irvine challenged that EIR and lost; however, project construction was delayed indefinitely by a lack of funding. In 2012, the county decided to move forward with the project and prepared a Supplemental EIR to account for project changes and changed circumstances. Irvine filed a petition challenging the Supplemental EIR on various CEQA grounds. The trial court rejected the challenge and Irvine appealed.

On appeal, Irvine first claimed that the County was required to prepare a “Subsequent EIR” rather than a “Supplemental EIR.” Regarding the Supplemental EIR, Irvine’s contentions focused primarily on traffic impacts during construction and the loss of agricultural land. Irvine’s main argument, however, was that the county’s responses to Irvine’s comments on the Supplemental EIR were inadequate. The court rejected each of these claims in turn.

Irvine’s first claim was that the County was obligated to prepare a Subsequent EIR as opposed to a Supplemental EIR for their analysis of the impacts of the expansion. The court rejected this claim, explaining that courts should look to the substance of the EIR, not its nominal title.

Irvine’s next argument concerned the Supplemental EIR’s analysis of traffic impacts during project construction. Due to delays, there were discrepancies in the county’s construction timeline. Irvine claimed that these discrepancies amounted to an unstable project description that prevented the Supplemental EIR from adequately assessing project impacts. The court disagreed, finding that the project description was distinct from the interim impacts of construction. Specifically, Irvine claimed the county had failed to provide a stable project description because it could not account for the traffic impacts caused by construction in a given year. The court found that CEQA does not require a continuous update of traffic impacts as a result of construction delays and that, regardless of the delay, the impacts would not be substantially different from those disclosed in the Supplemental EIR even if traffic data was updated, and therefore, there was no prejudice.

The third claim concerned mitigation for the loss of agricultural land that would occur as a result of the expansion. The Supplemental EIR discussed seven possible mitigation measures, but none were found to be feasible. Irvine challenged the county’s feasibility findings for three of the measures: (1) the purchase of conservation easements on existing agricultural land to prevent it from being used in the future for nonagricultural purposes, (2) a transfer of development rights program, and (3) a “right to farm” ordinance.

The court held that the county’s findings rejecting these measures as infeasible were supported by substantial evidence. Conservation easements were found infeasible because there was no additional land for agriculture in the county that would be profitable and putting a conservation easement for agricultural use on land that is already used for agriculture would do nothing to mitigate the loss of other agricultural lands. The court also noted that the county’s zoning laws did not support the feasibility of conservation easements. Transfers of development rights were found to be even less feasible because the county did not have land laying fallow for which they could transfer rights in the preservation of agricultural land use. Lastly, the court concluded that a right to farm ordinance was the least viable option of all. The Supplemental EIR recognized that the conversion of current non-agricultural land to agricultural land would itself entail significant environmental effects, including nuisance suits. Beyond that, the court noted, a right-to-farm ordinance is meaningless where no land owner wants to farm. The court held that it is a reasonable inference that no one would want to convert land that is currently non-agricultural and put it to agricultural use even if they have the ostensible legal right to do so.

Lastly, the court addressed Irvine’s claim that the county failed to adequately respond to comments. The court began with a thorough discussion of CEQA’s responses to comment requirement and a detailed assessment of the state of case law on the subject. The court noted several oft-repeated principles by which courts may evaluate the sufficiency of responses, including (1) a general comment can be adequately met with a general response; (2) responses need not be exhaustive; and (3) the sufficiency of responses should be “viewed in light of what is reasonably feasible.” From the cases, the court divined a few more basic standards for the adequacy of responses: (1) when a comment raises a “significant” environmental issue, there must be some genuine confrontation with the issue, it can’t be swept under the rug; (2) responses that leave big gaps in the analysis of environmental impacts are obviously inadequate; (3) comments that bring some new issue to the table need genuine confrontation; and (4) comments that are only objections to the merits of the project itself may be addressed with cursory responses. Based on these guiding principles, the court found that the county had adequately responded to each of Irvine’s comments that merited a response.

EPA and Corps Issue Final Rule Defining “Waters of the United States”

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On June 29, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers published a final rule defining the scope of “waters of the United States” protected under the Clean Water Act (80 FR 37054). The Final Rule was developed partly in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Rapanos v. United States. The Final Rule retains the definitions of traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, and territorial seas as jurisdictional waters. Within the definition of jurisdictional waters, the Final Rule includes impoundments and – for the first time – tributaries and all waters adjacent to tributaries. The Final Rule also modifies the definition of a tributary as a water “characterized by the presence of the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark.” The Final Rule, however, deletes the “waters of the United States” category of “other waters” whose use, degradation, or destruction would affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce and replaces it with a new category of waters determined to have a “significant nexus” to a traditionally navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial sea. The Final Rule also requires a case-specific “significant nexus” test for certain categories of identified waters (i.e., prairie potholes, Carolina bays and Delmarva bays, pocosins, western vernal pools, and Texas coastal prairie wetlands) and for any waters found within a 100-year floodplain or within 4,000 feet of a water of the U.S. Based on prior regulation and practices, the Final Rule also expressly excludes a number of waters and features such as artificial lakes, waste treatment ponds, detention and retention basins, and percolation ponds for wastewater recycling. By clarifying which waters are subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction, the Final Rule is meant to reduce the instances in which permitting authorities would make jurisdictional determinations on a case-by-case basis.

Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara

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Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara

(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 714

The County of Santa Clara adopted a mitigated negative declaration (MND) and granted a use permit allowing Real Party in Interest, the Wozniak Trust, to host a limited number of weddings and other events on property located in the Santa Cruz Mountains. Petitioner Keep Our Mountains Quiet, an unincorporated association of individuals who reside in the vicinity of the property, challenged the MND, asserting that the County should have prepared an EIR for the project. The lower court agreed and the Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court decision requiring an EIR.

The appellate court held that the administrative record contained substantial evidence of a fair argument that the project may have significant noise impacts. Although real party’s and the county’s noise experts concluded that the project would not exceed the noise standards adopted by the county in its general plan, the court agreed with petitioner that compliance with the county’s noise standards did not necessarily mean the project would not have a significant noise impact.  The court found the neighbors’ comments about the discrepancy in noise levels between the mock event used by the noise consultants to test and assess the project’s noise impact and actual events from past unpermitted weddings held at the property prior to any CEQA review constituted substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the project may have significant noise impacts. Relatedly, the court found that substantial evidence supported a fair argument that project-related crowd noise may have significant noise impacts on the surrounding residents.

The court also found evidence supported a reasonable inference that noise from the project may have significant impacts on wildlife at a nearby open space preserve, but no substantial evidence supported the argument that the project might have significant noise impacts on visitors to the open space preserve, which was open to the public by permit only. The court stated it “need not consider the impacts on hypothetical users of nonexistent trails.”

The court also found substantial evidence that the project may have significant traffic impacts. The testimony the court cited related facts about road conditions based upon local residents’ personal knowledge. The court found a fair argument had been made concerning increased traffic from the project and its effect on existing traffic safety conditions.

Lastly, the court upheld the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the petitioner, but rejected the petitioner’s argument that the trial court improperly denied a multiplier in determining the amount of fees properly awarded to petitioner.

RMM partners James Moose and Sabrina Teller, along with senior counsel Jennifer Homan, represented Real Party in Interest, the Wozniak Trust, on appeal.

Fourth District Court of Appeal Holds Removal of Conservation Overlay on Land Is a Project and Is Not Exempt from CEQA

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Paulek v. Western Riverside County (June 17, 2015) __ Cal.App.4th __, Case No. E059133

In a decision reversing the trial court, Division Two of the Fourth District held that the removal of a conservation overlay constituted a project under CEQA and that the project did not fall within the identified exemptions. The decision involves a Multiple Species Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) to maintain open spaces in western Riverside County. The HCP identified a “criteria area” broken down into cells, each about 160 acres in size, that were to be evaluated to determine what portions of the criteria area should be included in the conservation area. Part of the criteria area included the Warm Springs Ranch owned by Anheuser-Bush; a conservation overlay had been placed upon the ranch.

In 2005, Anheuser submitted applications to develop the Ranch. The County informed Anheuser that all but 71 acres of the Ranch would be acquired for conservation under the HCP, and in 2011 the parties reached a settlement agreement whereby the Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority (the Agency) would purchase the Ranch from Anheuser. The property was to be purchased in 9 phases, and phase 9, which consisted of a 200-acre area, would cost $11 million. One of the purchasing conditions for the phase-9 property was that the conservation overlay would be removed.

Paulek asserted that the Agency should have considered whether removing the conservation overlay would have a significant environmental impact, and contended possible development on that area had the potential to affect wildlife by reducing habitat. The Agency contended that because, as part of the agreement with Anheuser, 1,064 acres would be acquired by the Agency and protected as open space, and because the phase-9 property was highly degraded habitat, the conservation transfer would result in more and better land being protected. Therefore, the Agency reasoned, the action was not a project under CEQA, and if even it was, it was exempt from CEQA.

The court rejected the Agency’s arguments, holding that the removal of the conservation overlay from the phase-9 property constituted a project under CEQA. Among other things, the court reasoned that removing the overlay was analogous to amending a general plan or changing a zoning ordinance, which are projects under CEQA. Removing the conservation overlay embodied a fundamental land use decision that had the potential to cause physical changes in the environment in that the land protected for conservation purposes would no longer be subject to such protections. Therefore, the Agency’s decision to remove the overlay was a project under CEQA.

The court was unpersuaded by the Agency’s arguments concerning the protection of 1,064 acres of more environmentally pristine land in exchange for the 200-acre phase-9 property. The court explained that the decision to remove the overlay was a separate decision from the decision to put 1,064 acres of other land in conservation. But even if the removal of the overlay and addition of overlay elsewhere was considered part of the same project, the fact remained that the 200 acres of the phase-9 property would no longer be protected by the conservation overlay. The court characterized the Agency’s argument as “essentially washing over any negative changes to the phase 9-property by highlighting the positive changes to the [other] properties.” For instance, noted the court, there are two species present on the phase-9 property that are not present on the 1,064 acres, so the land swap would not protect these two species.

The court also rejected the Agency’s argument that the project fell within certain exemptions from CEQA. The court held that a Class 7 exemption, which exempts projects that consist of actions taken by regulatory agencies to assure the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of a natural resource, did not apply because a fair argument existed that removing the overlay could adversely affect certain species. Although the phase-9 property was not “prime” habitat for those species, there was no indication that it was so superfluous to those species that removing it from conservation would not adversely affect the species.

With respect to the Class 8 exemption, which is nearly identical to a Class 7 exemption except that it applies to the “environment” rather than natural resources, the court held that because there was uncertainty as to whether there would be a significant impact on the environment, the Class 8 exemption did not apply. Evidence in the administrative record demonstrated that the loss of the conservation overlay could affect the neighboring conservation area, and the effects could be significant such that there would need to be an attempt to lessen the effects.

The court also rejected the Agency’s claim that the project fell within the common sense exemption, which applies where it is certain that there is no possibility that an activity will have a significant effect on the environment. The change in designation of the phase-9 property from protected to unprotected had the potential for causing ultimate physical environmental changes, which was sufficient to take the project outside the purview of the exemption.

In addition to rejecting the Agency’s arguments on the merits, the court rejected various procedural arguments made by the Agency, holding that Paulek had standing, that Paulek’s action was timely, and that Paulek did not fail to join an indispensable party.

 

 

Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Inclusionary Housing Zoning

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In a loss for the building industry, the California Supreme Court upheld local jurisdictions’ police power to adopt inclusionary housing ordinances, which are laws that encourage or require developers to set aside a certain percentage of housing units in new projects for low- or moderate-income housing.  The court, in a unanimous decision (with concurring opinions by Justice Werdegar and Justice Chin) rejected the California Building Industry Association’s (CBIA’s) challenge to San Jose’s affordable housing law.

The City of San Jose’s ordinance requires developers creating at least 20 new homes to make 15% of those residences available for purchase by lower-income households, or else pay an in-lieu fee or dedicate land. As an apparent incentive to encourage developers to choose on-site inclusionary units, where the developer chooses one of the off-site options, the required low-income housing percentage rises to 20%. As an additional incentive to encourage developers to comply with the ordinance by providing affordable units on site, the ordinance permits a developer who provides all of the required affordable units on the same site as the market rate units to apply for and obtain a variety of economic benefits, including a density bonus, a reduction in the required-number of parking spaces, a reduction in minimum set-back requirements, and financial subsidies and assistance from the city in the sale of the affordable units.

CBIA filed a lawsuit seeking invalidation of the ordinance. The complaint alleged that the ordinance constituted a facially invalid exaction, in violation of the state or federal constitutions. The trial court agreed with CBIA’s legal position, concluding that the city had failed to show that there was evidence in the record demonstrating the constitutionally required reasonable relationships between the deleterious impacts of new residential development and the new requirements to build and dedicate the affordable housing or pay in-lieu fees.

The Court of Appeal reversed. The appellate court agreed with the City of San Jose that the ordinance’s inclusionary housing requirements must properly be evaluated under the deferential standard ordinarily applicable to general, legislatively imposed land use regulations—i.e., whether the ordinance’s requirements bear a real and substantial relation to the public welfare. CBIA petitioned for review before the California Supreme Court and the court granted the petition.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The court held that San Jose’s ordinance does not constitute an exaction. Instead, the ordinance only regulates the uses to which property owners may put their lands. Cities and counties have broad authority, under their police powers, to regulate the development and use of real property within their jurisdictions to promote the public welfare and the courts must uphold such regulations provided the bear a reasonable relationship to the public welfare. With regard to the in-lieu fee payment component of the ordinance, the court held that as long as the ordinance provides property owners with at least one alternative means of satisfying the condition, the fee does not constitute an unconstitutional taking.

As noted by the Supreme Court, more than 170 localities in California already have some version of an inclusionary housing ordinance. The decision will make it much more difficult for developers to succeed in challenges to affordable housing requirements in that the decision makes clear that a local agency’s adoption of an inclusionary housing ordinance represents an appropriate exercise of the agency’s police powers, provided that the ordinance bears a reasonable relationship to the public welfare.

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