On September 2, 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released two draft rules for implementing the EPA’s new permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program. That program, which is part of the EPA’s new greenhouse gas (GHG) Tailoring Rule, will restrict emissions from new and modified large stationary sources beginning January 2, 2011. Continue reading →

On September 23, 2010, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted targets for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with automobiles and light trucks in years 2020 and 2035. The targets were adopted pursuant to Senate Bill (SB) 375, also known as the Sustainable Communities Climate Protection Act of 2008, which requires each of California’s 18 federally designated Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) to consider the impact of land use patterns and transportation on GHG emissions. The MPOs collectively represent nearly 90 percent of California’s population and GHG emissions. Continue reading →

On September 7, 2010, the California Water Impact Network (C-WIN), the California Sportfishing Protection Alliance (CSPA) and AquAlliance filed suit in Sacramento County Superior Court alleging that the State Water Resources Control Board and the California Department of Water Resources have failed to protect the public trust in their enforcement of water quality and fishery protection laws and in decisions to export water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta.   Continue reading →

In California Oak Foundation v. Regents of the University of California ( 2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 227, appellants California Oak Foundation (California Oak) challenged the Regents of the University of California’s certification of the EIR for the University’s Southeast Campus Integrated Projects, prepared for seven related projects at the University of California at Berkeley, and its approval of the proposed Student Athlete High Performance Center, which is the first phase of one such project, the California Memorial Stadium Seismic Corrections and Program Improvements Project (Stadium Project). Appellants claimed that in certifying the EIR and approving the Athlete Center, the Regents violated the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act and CEQA.

The First Appellate District, in affirming the trial court judgment, found that while the Athlete Center is subject to the Alquist-Priolo Act based on its proposed location within an earthquake fault zone, the Regents could properly find the Athlete Center will not be an “addition” or “alteration” to the University’s California Memorial Stadium, as defined by the statute, and thus is not subject to the statute’s value restriction on certain projects coming within those definitions. The court further held that the Regents acted in accordance with CEQA in certifying the EIR because it contains sufficient information regarding the projects’ likely environmental impacts, as well as feasible alternatives to or mitigation measures for those projects to avoid or minimize the identified impacts.

The Integrated Projects are part of the UC Berkeley 2020 Long Range Development Plan. While the Regents certified an EIR for the LRDP in 2005 (2020 LRDP EIR), the University determined the Integrated Projects could have significant impacts on the environment and that an EIR, independent from the 2020 LRDP EIR, was therefore necessary. The EIR “provides a project-level analysis of the [Integrated Projects] and is tiered from the 2020 LRDP EIR.” After circulation, public comments, public hearings and revisions, the EIR concluded that, by implementing the proposed mitigation measures, most of the Integrated Projects’ significant environmental impacts would be reduced to less than significant levels. The EIR further concludes, however, that in some areas significant impacts could not feasibly be mitigated.

The Stadium Project, consisting of three phases, is the first of the Integrated Projects scheduled to proceed. Only Phase I was presented to the Regents for approval in conjunction with certification of the EIR. Phase I involves construction of the Athlete Center, a multi-level, 158,000-square foot structure immediately to the west of the Stadium, designed to accommodate 13 varsity sports in addition to men’s football, and to provide training and program space for about 450 athletes. The Stadium, built in 1923, sits astride the Hayward fault, and was rated seismically “poor” under the University’s seismic evaluation guidelines. By moving these occupants out of the Stadium in Phase I, the University would be able to proceed with Phases II and III, which involve renovation and seismic retrofitting of the Stadium. Phases II and III, along with the remaining Integrated Projects, were to be presented to the Regents for budget and design approval at a later date, at which time the Regents would also decide whether additional CEQA environmental review was necessary.

California Oak filed petitions challenging the Regents’ certification of the EIR and approval of the Athlete Center project under both CEQA and the Alquist-Priolo Act. After a trial on the merits, the trial court ultimately denied California Oak’s CEQA and Alquist-Priolo Act claims, each with one exception. The trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the Regents to take action consistent with its conclusions. The trial court thereafter deemed the Regents’ response to its June 18, 2008 order, which was submitted on June 27, 2008, to be a return to the writ of mandate. In this response, the Regents advised the trial court that the elements of the Stadium and Athlete Center projects that had given rise to the trial court’s exceptions had been subsequently removed. Based on this response, the trial court permitted construction of the Athlete Center to begin.

On appeal, California Oak presented two principal issues for consideration. First, appellants contend the Regents violated the Alquist-Priolo Act by approving the Athlete Center project, which is Phase I of the Stadium project. With certain exceptions, the Alquist-Priolo Act prohibits the construction of structures for human occupancy across the trace of an active fault or within 50 feet of an active fault, and prohibits the construction of an addition or alteration to a structure already existing on the trace of an active fault if the value of the addition or alteration exceeds 50 percent of the value of the structure.

Second, appellants contend the Regents violated CEQA by certifying a defective EIR for the Integrated Projects and by approving the Athlete Center project. CEQA, among other things, requires a public agency to prepare and certify an environmental impact report for qualifying projects to identify the proposed project’s significant environmental effects, to identify possible alternatives to the project, and to indicate ways in which the project’s significant environmental effects can be mitigated or avoided. Continue reading →

In Butte Environmental Council v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (9th Cir. September 1, 2010, No. 09-16732) 607 F.3d 570, Butte Environmental Council (BEC), a nonprofit organization, challenged the Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to issue a section 404 permit pursuant to the Clean Water Act and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s biological opinion pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act for a proposed business park to be constructed by the City of Redding. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies and the City and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision.

The City’s proposed business park was located on a site (the Stillwater site) with wetlands that contained critical habitat for several species that were listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA. The development would entail discharge of dredged or fill material into protected wetlands, which required a Section 404 permit from the Corps. Upon review, the Corps, accepting that the overall project purpose was to construct a medium to large-sized regional business park, agreed that the City needed a single, contiguous site, concluded that the proposed Stillwater site was the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative (LEDPA), and issued the permit.

The BEC challenged this approval, contending the Corps’ decision was arbitrary and capricious for a number of reasons, none of which the court found persuasive. First, BEC argued that the Corps failed to apply the proper presumption under 40 C.F.R. §230.10(a)(3), that where a proposed activity was not water dependent, “practicable alternatives that do not involve special aquatic sites are presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise.” Here, the Corps acknowledged that the proposed project was not water dependent and then expressly concluded that, based on review of over a dozen alternative sites and consistent with CWA’s implementing regulations, the City “clearly demonstrated that there are no practicable alternative sites available.”

Second, the court found the Corps’ decision to issue a 404 permit was not inconsistent with the Corps’ earlier criticism of the draft EIS for the project. In its draft EIS, the City analyzed and compared a number of potential sites and concluded that the Stillwater site was the LEDPA that satisfied both the project’s purpose and the feasibility criteria. Upon review of the draft EIS, the Corps questioned the City’s determination that the Stillwater site was the LEDPA. In response, the City prepared a supplemental draft EIS in which the City agreed, among other things, to reduce the water impact of the proposed Stillwater site’s footprint, as well as its impact on ESA-listed species, to set aside a large portion of the total site as permanent open space and to include a plan for both on- and off-site compensatory mitigation of the project’s impact on aquatic resources. Based on the foregoing, the court remarked that the Corps’ ultimate decision as to the LEDPA was not a reversal, as claimed by BEC, but the culmination of years of investigations, meetings and reports. Agencies are entitled to change their minds, and the court had no trouble discerning the path of the Corps’ reasoning over several years of give-and-take with the City.

Third, BEC claimed that the Corps failed to make an “independent determination” of the project’s purpose or the size of the parcels needed. The court noted that rather than just accepting the City’s stated purpose for the project, the Corps, in its comments on the draft EIS, was initially skeptical that the City needed so large a site and questioned the City’s rejection of a non-contiguous parcel alternative as impractical. The City’s supplemental EIS, however, clarified why, in light of the project’s purpose, a minimum size parcel was necessary, and the Corps was obliged to consider the City’s purpose where it was genuine and legitimate.

Fourth, the court found that the BEC’s challenge to a rejected alternative on the basis of the cost of acquiring the site failed because the Corps did not consider acquisition cost when evaluating the site. Rather, the Corps determined this particular alternative site was not contiguous with property already owned by the City, the topography and geology of the alternative site was not conducive to the proposed development’s purposes, and the amount of property available for development was too little to achieve the project’s overall purpose. The Corps also believed the cost of infrastructure would be substantially greater with respect to the alternative site as opposed to other sites.

Finally, the court found there was no indication that the Corps’ granting of the permit on the condition that the City develop compensatory mitigation plans was meant to be in place of the City’s responsibility to adopt the LEDPA, as opposed to an additional obligation.

BEC also challenged, as arbitrary and capricious, the FWS’s biological opinion that the Stillwater project would not result in the adverse modification or destruction of critical habitat. BEC claimed the FWS applied a definition of “adverse modification” that improperly failed to take into account the “recovery needs” of the affected species as required under Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services (9th Cir. 2004) 378 F.3d 1059. The court noted, however, that the biological opinion expressly stated the FWS relied on the Gifford Pinchot definition, and nothing in the biological opinion suggested that it ignored the value of critical habitat to the recovery of the affected species.

The court also rejected BEC’s claim that FWS’s finding of no adverse modification conflicted with its determination that critical habitat would be destroyed. The court found Gifford Pinchot had not altered the regulatory rule that an adverse modification occurs only where there is a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat. Thus, a small percentage of each affected species’ critical habitat could be destroyed without appreciable diminution in the value of the species’ overall critical habitat. The court declined to second-guess FWS, given that there was no evidence that some localized risk was improperly hidden by use of large-scale analysis, as claimed by BEC.

Finally, the court ruled that neither the ESA nor its implementing regulations required FWS to calculate a rate of loss. Rather, they required only that the FWS evaluate the “current status of the listed species or critical habitat,” “the effects of the action,” and the “cumulative effects on the listed species or critical habitat.” The court was satisfied that FWS had conducted such an analysis here and held the finding of no “adverse modification” was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

On September 1, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held in Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink (Sept. 1, 2010, No. 08-35359) that the U.S. Bureau of Land Management violated the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act when it adopted amendments to its grazing regulations. The court also held the district court erred in failing to consider plaintiffs’ claim based on the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) under the framework established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837 (Chevron).

On July 12, 2006, the Secretary of the Interior proposed eighteen amendments to the BLM’s grazing regulations and issued a Record of Decision. In March 2006, the BLM had issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement in connection with the proposed amendments. In the Final Rule, the BLM concluded the regulations would have no effect on endangered or threatened species or their critical habitat. For this reason, the BLM did not consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

The stated purpose of the proposed amendments was to improve the working relationships with ranchers to protect the health of rangelands and to increase the effectiveness of the BLM grazing management program. The proposed amendments, however, also would decrease public involvement and oversight in federal grazing management, allow the BLM additional time to take corrective action for violations of BLM standards and guidance, put new limitations on the BLM’s enforcement powers, and cede ownership rights to permanent rangeland and structures and water from the United States to private ranchers.

Plaintiffs, a non-profit conservation group advocating science-based management and conservation of BLM’s public land, filed suit, challenged the proposed amendments as violating NEPA, the ESA, and FLPMA. Two organizations representing ranchers, the Public Lands Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation, intervened on behalf of the BLM. In June 2007, the district court enjoined enforcement of the proposed amendments. The BLM and the intervenors separately appealed. The BLM subsequently dismissed its appeal, while the intervenors maintained their appeal. In addition to the substantive claims, both parties challenge the other’s standing on appeal.

Before addressing plaintiffs’ substantive claims, the court addressed the standing issues. The court concluded the plaintiffs had established standing. The proposed amendments posed an imminent harm to plaintiffs’ members’ aesthetic enjoyment of the rangeland and their involvement in public land grazing management. The plaintiffs’ NEPA and FLPMA claims also fell within the statutes’ respective zones of interest—a requirement for suits brought under the APA for a violation of NEPA or FLPMA—because they had a direct interest in seeing the BLM consider the environmental consequences of its actions. The court also concluded the intervenors had established standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because the individual members of the intervenor organizations would have standing to pursue the appeal in their own right as each member suffered a concrete injury related to their individual agreements with the BLM, among other reasons. The court also held the dispute over the regulations at issue in this case was ripe for review.

The plaintiffs first argued the BLM violated NEPA by failing to take the required “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the regulations. NEPA establishes “action-forcing” procedures that require agencies considering major federal actions to provide a full and fair discussion in an EIS of the significant environmental impacts of the proposed action. Here, the court agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding the BLM failed to consider “objectively and in good faith” the concerns raised by its own experts, FWS, EPA, and state agencies. The court also concluded the Final EIS downplayed the environmental impacts of the regulations. Significantly, the BLM’s experts concluded, among other things, that the reduction in public oversight proposed by the amendments would give ranchers greater access to the BLM’s decision-making process at the expense of advocates for wildlife resources, resulting in long-term adverse impacts to wildlife. The proposed regulations would essentially shut out non-rancher members of the public from BLM’s decision-making process. The court also found the BLM failed to address concerns by the FWS and state agencies that the regulations would weaken the ability to manage rangelands in a timely fashion and that the Final EIS failed to address consequences of privatizing water rights on public land. The court further held the BLM failed to consider the combined effects of the proposed amendments and that the Final EIS gave no reasoned explanation for the BLM’s change in policy from the prior regulations before decreasing its regulatory authority as well as public participation. In short, the court found the changes were “discordant with the lessons learned from the history of rangeland management in the west, which has been moving towards multiple use management and increased public participation.”

The plaintiffs next argued the BLM violated the ESA by failing to consult with FWS before approving the regulations. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding the BLM’s no effect finding and failure to consult with FWS were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the ESA. The court noted that the minimum threshold for an agency action to trigger consultation with the FWS was low. With that in mind, the court questioned the BLM’s conclusion that the regulations, which would affect approximately 160 million acres of public lands in the West, would not affect so much as one of the 300 special status species identified in the Final EIS. The court found it significant that the FWS, an agency that is tasked with protecting endangered species, concluded the regulations would affect special status species and their habitats. The court also based its conclusion on the declarations of the BLM’s own scientists who advised that an ESA section 7 consultation was necessary.

In the plaintiffs’ final claim, they alleged the BLM violated the mandate of the FLPMA in approving the regulations. The FLPMA requires the BLM to provide avenues for public input in the planning and management of public lands. In response to the plaintiffs’ contention, the intervenors argued that it is not clear whether the BLM’s proposed amendments were in direct and unreasonable disregard of the FLPMA’s mandate when it approved the amendments. The intervenors argued the regulations did not eliminate public participation, but that they merely changed the circumstances of public participation. Thus, the intervenors argued, the district court was required to afford the deference established in Chevron to the BLM’s interpretation of its authority and obligations under the FLPMA as expressed in the proposed amendments.

Under Chevron, where a statute is ambiguous, and where Congress has not directly spoken on the matter at issue, the court must determine whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is permissible. Here, the court concluded that the district court failed to apply the principles in Chevron to answer whether the limitation of public participation in the proposed amendments was in disregard of the FLPMA, or alternatively, whether the FLPMA’s public participation requirement was ambiguous and the BLM’s interpretation reasonable. With regard to these questions, the court of appeal remanded the FLPMA claim to the district court for further consideration.

On August 31, 2010, the California Senate rejected Assembly Bill 1998, which would have placed a ban on plastic shopping bags. The bill called for the ban to take effect in supermarkets and large retail stores in 2012 and in smaller stores by 2013. The cost of recycled grocery bags, which is approximately 6 to 10 cents per bag, is currently absorbed by retailers. With this bill, however, larger retailers would be allowed to charge consumers for recycled paper bags starting in 2012. Lawmakers rejected the ban by a vote of 20 to 14.

Opponents of the bill called it a “job killer” and argued that it would be an extra financial burden on consumers and businesses. Lawmakers also debated whether the State would be going too far in regulating personal choice if they passed the bill. On the other hand, supporters noted that the approximately 19 billion plastic bags used by Californians per year harms the environment and costs the State $25 million annually to collect and transport to landfills.

Some cities in California already ban plastic shopping bags, including San Francisco, Palo Alto, Malibu, and Fairfax. Assembly Bill 1998 proposed the first statewide ban on plastic shopping bags, however.

Read more at: http://www.sacbee.com/2010/08/31/2995819/calif-bill-seeks-to-ban-plastic.html

Suisun Alliance v. Suisun City* (Aug. 20, 2010, A125042)
*The opinion has not been certified for publication.

In an unpublished decision, the First District Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief against Suisun City for failure to comply with the State Aeronautics Act (SAA) and CEQA when it approved a proposed commercial development known as the Walters Road West Project. The project consists of 227,019 square-feet of retail development, including a Wal-Mart Supercenter, restaurant, and a gas station. The project site is located in Suisun City, near Travis Air Force Base.

In 2007, the City released a nearly 1,600-page draft EIR for the project. Pursuant to the SAA, the draft EIR also analyzed the project’s consistency with the Travis Air Force Base Land Use Compatibility Plan (TALUCP). The TALUCP established criteria for noise, public safety, and airspace protection in the vicinity of the airport. The TALUCP also established the maximum population site usage intensity for development in the project area. In response to data provided by the City, the Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (ALUC) staff recommended the ALUC find the project was consistent with the TALUCP. The ALUC rejected the recommendation and found the project was partially inconsistent with the TALUCP’s safety criteria.

The City released a final EIR (FEIR) in 2008, for the project. The City also released an addendum to the FEIR to respond to late comments. The City Council overruled the ALUC’s determination, certified the FEIR, and approved the project. To support its decision to overrule the ALUC, the City prepared a resolution of decision and findings, stating the project was consistent with the TALUCP and the public interest purposes of the SAA pursuant to Public Utilities Code section 21670. Suisun Alliance filed suit. The trial court ruled in favor of the City, and Suisun Alliance subsequently filed an appeal.

Suisun Alliance’s first major claim was that the City’s violated the SAA because the project was inconsistent with the purposes and procedural mandates of the SAA in addition to the TALUCP’s population density restrictions. The court disagreed with Suisun Alliance. The City found the project would not pose any unacceptable safety risk from aviation activities at Travis because aircraft do not regularly fly over the project site. Over the past 57 years, there were only five aviation mishaps, none of which occurred in airspace over the project site. The court found these facts to be relevant.

Suisun Alliance also argued that the City’s findings failed to explain how project approval was consistent with the SAA purpose of protecting the public health, safety, and welfare by ensuring the orderly expansion of Travis over the next 20 years. Looking at the City’s findings, the court concluded the City adequately supported its finding that the project was consistent with the stated SAA purpose. The City stated that it would apply the City’s zoning code to regulate airport flight obstruction areas and limit the number of people and development within any aircraft flight pattern. The court also found that the zoning code and general plan included provisions to protect runway approaches and the future development of Travis.

Suisun Alliance next argued that the City violated the SAA’s review and comment procedures because the final resolution of decision and findings included content that was not included in the proposed decision and findings. Generally, the City is required to provide the ALUC and Caltrans’s Division of Aeronautics the proposed decision and findings 45 days before the City’s decision to overrule the ALUC. The ALUC and Caltrans may then provide the City with comments. The City must respond to these comments and include the responses in the final decision. The court concluded that the law does not prohibit the City from revising or expanding its proposed findings and the City was not required to provide another 45-day notice and comment period.

With respect to the City’s finding that the project was consistent with the TALUCP, Suisun Alliance argued the City used an incorrect method to estimate the number of people likely to use the facilities at the project site. The court disagreed with Suisun Alliance and concluded the TALUCP did not mandate the use of any particular methodology. The court held the City adequately supported its rationale for selecting the methodology that it used. Furthermore, the court noted that although the City concluded that its methodology was more appropriate, the City found the project was consistent with the TALUCP under either methodology. The court found that substantial evidence supported this determination.

After addressing the SAA claims, the court turned to Suisun Alliance’s CEQA claims. First, Suisun Alliance argued the City violated CEQA by failing to revise and recirculate the DEIR to include significant new information discovered during the public comment period concerning the presence of an underground jet fuel pipeline beneath a right-of-way north of the project site. The court held the City’s conclusion that the project would not have significant impacts on the pipeline to be supported by substantial evidence. No jet fuel pipelines were actually on the project site and a title search did not reveal any pipeline easements. The City also stated that any construction near the pipeline north of the site would comply with all regulations.

Second, Suisun Alliance argued the City did a “bait-and-switch” with regard to its position on riparian habitat on the project site. By doing so, Suisun Alliance alleged the City violated CEQA’s public participation and informed decision-making mandates. The DEIR stated the project site contained a drainage ditch with vegetative cover for wildlife and classified the ditch as a perennial wetland. The FEIR, however, explained the DEIR incorrectly characterized the ditch and that biological evaluations revealed the low quality vegetation did not qualify as riparian habitat. Nonetheless, the FEIR stated that the loss of the drainage ditch would be mitigated by applying wetland mitigation measures. The Regional Water Quality Control Board submitted letters on the DEIR and FEIR, stating the ditch provided riparian habitat. The court disagreed with Suisun Alliance and concluded the City did not violate the mandates of CEQA because the public still had notice of the loss of the drainage ditch as stated in the FEIR. The court also concluded the City was not required to recirculate a revised EIR. The alleged “new information” that would otherwise require recirculation, i.e., the ditch was more accurately characterized as a wetland rather than riparian habitat, was not truly “new information” or a substantial increase in the severity of an impact.

Finally, Suisun Alliance argued the City’s conclusion that the project will have no economic impacts that may result in urban decay is unsupported. In particular, Suisun Alliance contended the project would adversely impact a Rite Aid store in the city and a Food Maxx store in the City of Fairfield, such that urban decay would result. With respect to the Rite Aid store, the court disagreed. The court found the City’s conclusions were supported in part by the fact that the Rite Aid store was the most convenient general merchandise store for many residents. The shopping center where Rite Aid was located was also well-maintained making it less likely that potential closure of the Rite Aid would lead to urban decay. The court also disagreed with Suisun Alliance’s contention regarding the Food Maxx store. In view of the entire record, the court concluded that the City considered the cumulative impacts of the Wal-Mart Supercenter in Fairfield and the project on Fairfield retailers, including the Food Maxx. Any business closures would be short term and would not result in an urban decay impact.

Officials in San Francisco are currently racing to acquire an exemption from CEQA in time to submit a proposal in 6 weeks to host the next America’s Cup. The Cup would be held in either 2013 or 2014. Being selected would require the city to construct shoreside facilities, which would require a discretionary approval subject to CEQA. San Francisco hopes to secure a one-time exemption from the State in lieu of preparing an EIR. The exemption, however, faces potential opposition from environmental groups, including the Planning and Conservation League. Environmental groups are particularly wary of the exemption in light of the Legislature’s recent approval in 2009 of a one-time exemption for a developer to build a football stadium in Los Angeles County. Environmental groups caution the approval of a one-time exemption for the Cup could set a dangerous precedent for other discretionary approvals requiring CEQA review. In addition to the 2009 exemption for the football stadium, the Legislature has enacted similar one-time exemptions in the past for other sporting and special events, such as CEQA Guidelines section 15272, a partial exemption for the Olympic Games.

Hosting the America’s Cup would reportedly bring in approximately $1.4 billion in economic stimulus and almost 9,000 jobs—a boon for the San Francisco Bay Area. Spain and Italy are also submitting proposals, while San Francisco is the only U.S. city vying to be the next host.

Additional details are available in the San Francisco Chronicle at: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/08/19/MNJD1EUS0G.DTL