In Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish and Wildlife (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 452, a partially published opinion on remand from the California Supreme Court (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish and Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal. 4th 204), the Second District reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s judgment.
In the non-published portions of the opinion, the Second District reversed the trial court’s decision where it was inconsistent with the opinion of the California Supreme Court. The Second District reversed on the issues of significance criteria selection and baseline calculation, and affirmed on the issues of cumulative greenhouse gas emission impacts and two mitigation measures that would violate Fish and Game Code section 5515. The Second District also reconsidered its previous ruling in the case on two issues in light of the California Supreme Court’s holding that comments filed after certification of the joint EIR/EIS were timely. The Second District considered comments and the responses thereto, but stuck to its original conclusion that the findings on Native American Cultural Resources and impacts of dissolved copper on steelhead smolt were supported by substantial evidence.
In the published portion of the opinion, the Second District considered whether it had the authority to, instead of remanding the matter to the trial court, issue its own writ of mandate to the Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) and supervise compliance. The developer/real party in interest requested that the court do so, and its motion was supported by DFW. The developer suggested that the California Supreme Court’s opinion in this case and the language of Public Resources Code section 21168.9 would allow the appellate court to do so. They also argued that the general principle of expedient resolution to CEQA litigation supported the appellate courts ability to issue its own writ of mandate.
The Second District looked first at the plain language of section 21168.9 and determined that there was some ambiguity in the statute’s use of the term “appellate court” because courts of appeal do have original mandate jurisdiction in some cases. But the court’s exploration of the legislative history of section 21168.9 found nothing to suggest that the legislature intended appellate courts on direct appeal to have the authority to issue writs of mandate.
The court then examined the lay of the land, in terms of CEQA and appellate practice, when section 21168.9 was adopted in 1984. According to the Second District, “the practice in 1984 … was for administrative mandate petitions to be filed in superior court,” and no statute provided appellate courts with authority to hear direct CEQA challenges at that time. Further, the Code of Civil Procedure—then and now—limits an appellate court to affirming or reversing and modifying the lower court’s judgment. And, after making its decision, the appellate court must remand the matter back to the trial court. The court found nothing to suggest that the legislature intended to alter this procedure when it enacted Public Resources Code section 21168.9. The court also stated that there is a presumption against repeal by implication, which applied to the Code of Civil Procedure sections governing appellate review.
The Second District concluded there was no authority for appellate courts on direct appeal to issue writs of mandate. Given that lack of authority, there was no way for appellate courts to supervise compliance either. Lastly, the court found that section 21168.9, subdivision (b) was clear in its requirement that trial courts retain jurisdiction over the lead agency to ensure compliance with the writ of mandate.