Tag: Addendum

Fourth District Court of Appeal Declines Invitation to Invalidate CEQA Guidelines Section 15164, Affirming Agency’s Ability to Rely on Addendum to an EIR

The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the addendum process under CEQA Guidelines section 15164 fills a procedural gap in the statute and is not invalid. The court also ruled that Public Resources Code section 21081 findings are not required again with an addendum. (Save Our Heritage Organisation v. City of San Diego (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 656.

The City of San Diego certified an EIR and approved a project in 2012 to restore pedestrian and park uses to portions of Balboa Park. Save Our Heritage Organisation (SOHO) filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the project. The superior court granted the petition and directed the City to rescind the project approval. The Real Party in Interest and SOHO each appealed the judgment, and the court of appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment and upheld the EIR. The Real Party in Interest filed a motion seeking an award of attorney fees, which the trial court denied and the appellate court affirmed.

While the appeals were pending, several physical changes occurred to the project’s environmental setting. In 2016, the City adopted an addendum to the EIR to address modifications to the project. The addendum concluded that:

  1. There were no substantial changes to the project requiring major revisions to the EIR because of new or substantially increased significant environmental effects;
  2. There were no substantial changes in circumstances requiring major revisions to the EIR because of new or substantially increased significant environmental effects; and
  3. There was no new, previously unknown or unknowable, information of substantial importance showing: (a) the project will have significant effects not discussed in the EIR; (b) the project will have substantially more severe significant effects than shown in the EIR; (c) previously infeasible mitigation measures and project alternatives are now feasible and would substantially reduce significant environment effects; or (d) considerably different mitigation measures than analyzed in the EIR would substantially reduce significant environmental effects.

The City incorporated these findings into its resolution adopting the addendum.

CEQA Guidelines Section 15164

The court found that SOHO did not meet its burden of proof to show that CEQA Guidelines section 15164, which allows for preparation of addenda, is invalid. The court explained the difference between quasi-legislative rules (those in which the Legislature has delegated a portion of its lawmaking power) and interpretive rules (those in which an agency interprets a statute’s meaning and effect). Although the California Supreme Court has not ruled on which category applies to the CEQA Guidelines, the court explained that such a distinction was not necessary to make here because, either way, SOHO did not establish that section 15164 is invalid.

The court determined that Guidelines section 15164 is both (1) consistent and not in conflict with CEQA; and (2) reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of CEQA.

The court explained that the Resources Agency promulgated Guideline 15164 to implement Public Resources Code section 21166, which describes the circumstances under which an agency must conduct subsequent or supplemental review. That section, explained the court, creates a presumption against further environmental review once an EIR has been finalized. And, although section 21166 does not expressly authorize an “addendum,” the court explained that Guidelines section 15164 fills in the gap for CEQA projects where there is a previously certified EIR that should be revised, but the conditions that warrant preparation of a subsequent EIR under section 21166 are not met. Furthermore, the court said, Guidelines section 15164 is consistent with and furthers the objectives of section 21166 because it requires an agency to substantiate its reasons for determining why project revisions do not necessitate further environmental review.

The court also explained that the absence of a public review process for an addendum does not render Guidelines section 15164 inconsistent with CEQA. Instead, the absence of public review reflects the finality of adopted EIRs, and the proscription against further environmental review except in specified circumstances in section 21166. In addition, the court pointed to the analogous requirement that a Final EIR must be recirculated before certification only where revisions add significant new information. Finally, the court emphasized that the Resources Agency first promulgated Guidelines section 15164 in 1983, and the Legislature has not modified CEQA since then to eliminate the addendum process.

Findings Required Under Section 21081

SOHO argued that the City was required to make new findings under section 21081, but the court disagreed. Section 21081 provides that a public agency shall not approve or carry out a project for which an EIR has been certified unless the agency makes specific findings with respect to identified significant effects. The court explained that neither the Code nor the Guidelines suggests new findings are required when an addendum is prepared. And, the court explained, the only purpose of findings is to address new significant effects, but an addendum is only proper where no new significant environmental impacts are discovered. Where there are no new significant impacts, there is no need for findings. Therefore, the court held, findings are not required for an addendum.

Second District Finds that CEQA’s Supplemental Review Provisions Applied to Modification of Commercial Development Project adding a Specific Plan Amendment and that the Amendment was not Impermissible “Spot Zoning”

In Citizens Coalition Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 561, the Second District Court of Appeal overturned the trial court’s decision that revisions to a commercial development project to include a specific plan amendment constituted a “new project” under CEQA, and found that supplemental review under Public Resources Code section 21166 applied instead. Additionally, the Court determined that, while the specific plan amendment created a “spot zone,” substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the amendment was in the public interest, and thus not impermissible under the test announced in Foothill Communities Coalition v. County of Orange (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1302.

Target Corporation (Target) applied to build a Super Target retail store at the intersection of Sunset Boulevard and Western Avenue in Hollywood. The project contemplated a nearly 75-foot tall, three-story building with the Target store occupying the third floor, parking on the second, and the first floor containing several smaller retail stores, a transit kiosk, and a pedestrian plaza. The City of Los Angeles certified the environmental impact report (EIR) prepared for the project, and granted eight variances from the Vermont/Western Transit Oriented District Specific Plan (SNAP) allowing the project to be built as proposed. Target began construction of the project. Several community associations (plaintiffs) filed separate petitions for writ of mandate challenging the City’s approval of the project, alleging violations of CEQA, and that the grant of the variances were not supported by substantial evidence in violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. The trial court upheld the EIR, but found that six of the eight variances were not supported by substantial evidence and ordered construction to cease.

While that case was pending on appeal, the City amended the SNAP to create a new subarea (Subarea F) that would allow projects similar to Target’s to be built in certain parts of the specific plan area without the need for variances, and designated the project site as Subarea F. There were two other locations in the specific plan area that could qualify for the Subarea F designation, but no projects meeting the requirements of Subarea F were proposed to the City at those locations. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot, leaving the trial court’s decision intact. The City prepared and approved an addendum to the Target project EIR, defining the revised project as the SNAP amendment and the completion of construction for the Target project. The same plaintiffs challenged the revised project approval, alleging that the City violated CEQA by relying on an addendum rather than a new, subsequent, or supplemental EIR, and that the City impermissibly “spot-zoned” by amending the SNAP for the project. The trial court found that the SNAP amendment was a new project, making the addendum improper but did not reach the “spot zoning” issue. The City and Target appealed.

The court of appeal, in analyzing whether the addendum violated CEQA asked three questions: what did the SNAP amendment do? Do CEQA’s supplemental or initial project review provisions apply? And, did the City comply with the applicable CEQA provisions? The court answered each question in turn. First, the court found that SNAP amendment, though it created a new subarea, only placed the project location into that subarea. While two other locations in the SNAP area could meet the proximity to transit and acreage requirements, they did not meet the commercial square footage requirement and no projects meeting that requirement had been proposed to the City. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ “haphazard” development argument, finding that the amendment was consistent with the SNAP’s policies and that the City could rationally take planning and development “one step at a time.”

In determining whether CEQA’s supplemental review provisions applied, the court found that there had been prior CEQA review of the Target project. Thus, the question was “whether the previous environmental document retains any relevance in light of the proposed changes.” (Citing Friends of College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 937, 944.) The court found that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the previous EIR retained relevance for the revised project. The court rejected the argument that, because the previous EIR was limited to a specific development “project” and the SNAP amendment involved more general policy considerations, the “project” EIR was insufficient. The court found that the label placed on the EIR said little about its sufficiency as an informational document. The proper question is whether the EIR retains any value in addressing the impacts associated with the revised project.

Next, the court asked whether the City complied with CEQA’s supplemental review requirements, and found that substantial evidence supported the City’s decision to rely on an addendum for the revised project. Plaintiffs made four arguments, all of which the court rejected. First, petitioners argued that the addendum did not discuss the SNAP amendment, which the court stated was factually inaccurate. Second, they argued that the City intended further development in the SNAP area through the new subarea because of some of the language the City used in describing the requirements of the new subarea. The court found that the cited language did not negate the substantial evidence supporting the City’s finding that no additional development was foreseeable. Third, plaintiffs argued that additional development projects at the two locations that could qualify for the new subarea, and any other locations that could be “cobbled together” were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the SNAP amendment that required a subsequent or supplemental EIR. The court found that whatever incentive for development the amendment created, evidence of that incentive did not overcome the substantial evidence supporting the City’s determination. Lastly, plaintiffs argued that de novo review should apply because the challenge to the amendment required the court to construe its meaning. The court found that the issue before it involved the amendment’s environmental impact, not its meaning, and thus review was for substantial evidence.

Though the trial court did not address the “spot zoning” issue, the court of appeal did, finding that it was important enough to resolve the fully briefed, longstanding issue. Under the analysis in Foothill Communities, the court found that the SNAP amendment did create a zoning “island,” though it was unclear whether the zoning was less or more stringent than the surrounding parcels because of the specific requirements for the new subarea. Regardless, the question was whether the zoning decision creating the “island” was arbitrary, irrational or unreasonable. The court found that, under that standard, the spot zone was valid. Further, the City’s determination that the amendment was in the public interest was supported by substantial evidence, and the SNAP, as amended, remained compatible with the City’s general plan. The court rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the City’s alleged motive in amending the SNAP, and plaintiffs’ questioning of whether the SNAP amendment represented good policy, as neither issue was appropriate for the court’s inquiry. The court also found that even if future projects proposed to use the new subarea, the City retained its power to determine whether each project is in the public interest. Lastly, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the amendment to the SNAP was “incompatible” with it because the amendment would “alter” the SNAP.  The court found that the law unambiguously allows specific plan amendments.

Nathan O. George

First District Applies Fair Argument Standard of Review to Addendum to Negative Declaration on Remand from Supreme Court in Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens

On remand from the Supreme Court’s holding in Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College (2016) 1 Cal.5th 926 (San Mateo I ), the First District interpreted the Supreme Court’s direction as requiring the application of the fair argument standard of review to claims challenging an addendum to a negative declaration in Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College District (2017) 11 Cal. App.5th 596.

The Supreme Court’s holding in San Mateo I

The San Mateo cases concern the San Mateo County Community College District’s campus renovation project, approved with a mitigated negative declaration (MND) in 2006. In 2011, the College decided to demolish an area of the campus (the Building 20 Complex) that was planned for renovation under the 2006 plan, and construct a parking lot in its place. The updated plan was analyzed in an addendum to the 2006 MND. The suit in San Mateo I followed, with the petitioner alleging that the updated plan was a “new project” under CEQA, and not a modified project subject to CEQA’s subsequent review provisions (Pub. Resources Code, § 21166; CEQA Guidelines, § 15162.). Both the trial court and the First District held that it was a new project, and therefore, the District was not entitled to rely on an addendum.

The Supreme Court reversed, noting first that the proper inquiry under CEQA was not whether or not a project is new or modified, but whether or not the initial environmental document retains informational value in light of the proposed modifications, or if it had become irrelevant.  This is a factual determination to be made by the agency and reviewed for substantial evidence.

If the agency’s decision to proceed under CEQA’s subsequent review provisions is supported by substantial evidence, a court may consider the type of subsequent document prepared by the agency. The standard of review applied by the court in reviewing that decision turns on the nature of the original documents. The agency must first determine if there are substantial changes to the project that require “major revisions” in the original environmental analysis. This determination is reviewed for substantial evidence. When the project was previously reviewed in an EIR, there are no “major revisions” if the initial EIR has already adequately addressed any additional environmental effects expected to result from the proposed modifications. In contrast, when a project is initially approved with a negative declaration, a “major revision” to the negative declaration will necessarily be required if the proposed modification may produce a new or previously unstudied significant environmental effect. If there is no major revision required, the agency can issue a subsequent mitigated negative declaration, addendum, or no further documentation.

Application in San Mateo II

The court applied the two-part test of San Mateo I to the College’s decision to rely on an addendum to the 2006 MND. First, the court conceded that the agency determination—that the MND retained informational value in light of the revised campus plan—was supported by substantial evidence. It retained informational value because the revised plan considered in the addendum did not affect plans to demolish 14 buildings cited in the original plan. The revised plan added one more building complex to the demolish list, but the College had previously removed two others, deciding to renovate them instead. The mitigation measures adopted with the original plan remained in place.

Applying the second prong of the Supreme Court’s test, however, the court held that the College violated CEQA’s subsequent review provisions by preparing an addendum to the MND, because the removal of gardens in the Building 20 Complex could result in a significant aesthetic impact, under the fair argument standard of review.

Interpreting this second prong of the San Mateo I test, the San Mateo II court stated that when the initial environmental review document is an negative declaration, the court must apply the more exacting standard applicable to negative declarations—whether there is substantial evidence to support a fair argument that the proposed changes to the project might have a significant effect on the environment. The court acknowledged that aesthetic impacts are necessarily subjective, but agreed with the petitioner that substantial evidence of a fair argument could be found in the opinions based on direct observation. The impact is not determined by the size of the area, but measured in light of the context in which it occurs, and this can vary by setting.

Here, the court relied on the opinions of campus employees and students regarding the garden’s aesthetic value and quality. Although not a significant portion of the campus’ open space (less than one-third of one percent), the garden’s vegetation and landscaping were alleged by its admirers to be unique. The garden’s social value as a gathering space was also considered. Because the court determined that this lay testimony qualified as substantial evidence to support a fair argument of a potentially significant aesthetic impact, the College’s decision to rely on an addendum violated CEQA’s subsequent review provisions, as an addendum is only appropriate if there are no new or more severe significant impacts than were previously analyzed.  However, the court declined to order the preparation of an EIR, stating that the College could choose to prepare a subsequent MND if the impacts to the garden could be mitigated to a less-than-significant level.

Fourth District Court of Appeals Finds an Addendum Cannot Cure an Inadequate Certified EIR

In Ukiah Citizens for Safety First v. City of Ukiah (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 256, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the city’s environmental impact report (EIR) failed to sufficiently analyze potential energy impacts and that the adoption of an addendum subsequent to EIR approval could not be considered in determining the EIR’s adequacy because it was not part of the administrative record. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the EIR was adequate when analyzed in tandem with the addendum.

The project at issue was a Costco warehouse store and gas station. The EIR concluded the project would have significant traffic impacts but the city certified it and adopted a statement of overriding conditions.  CEQA requires that EIRs propose mitigation measures to reduce the wasteful, inefficient, and unnecessary consumption of energy. Although the certified EIR mentioned energy impacts throughout, it did not contain a separate section devoted to energy impacts analysis. One section stated that since the project would comply with the California Code of Regulations Title 24 energy conservation standards, it would not result in wasteful, inefficient, and unnecessary consumption of energy.

Project opponents filed a petition asserting that the EIR failed to include adequate information regarding the project’s energy use. After the writ petition was filed, the Third District Court of Appeal issued an opinion finding that the analysis of energy impacts in an EIR substantially similar to the one at issue in this case was inadequate. In California Clean Energy Committee v. City of Woodland (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 173 (CCEC) the Third District held that the energy analysis was insufficient for three reasons: (1) the EIR concluded the project would generate new trips without calculating the impacts of those trips; (2) the EIR improperly relied on compliance with the building code to mitigate energy impacts without analyzing the additional considerations required by appendix F; and (3) reliance on mitigation measures designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was misplaced because though there may be a correlation between the two, air quality mitigation is not a substitute for energy analysis. Ukiah’s EIR had all three of these problems. The city addressed these deficiencies by adopting an addendum to the EIR, and the trial court read the two documents together and concluded the energy analysis was adequate.

The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s decision upholding the EIR and found that subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 the addendum was not part of the administrative record and therefore could not be considered in deciding whether the city abused its discretion in certifying the EIR. CEQA Guidelines section 15164, which allows the preparation of addendums, assumes the EIR previously certified was adequate and does not allow retroactive correction of inadequate EIRs. Thus, the court directed the city to set aside its project approval and certification of the EIR until recirculation of the energy analysis and consideration of public comments took place. The court did not offer any opinion on the adequacy of the addendum.

In the unpublished portion of the opinion the court rejected the rest of the project opponent’s arguments. First, the impacts from an interchange improvement discussed in the traffic section of the EIR did not need to be analyzed because it was a longstanding proposal that was needed regardless of the project. Second, the population estimates used in the traffic study were supported by substantial evidence. Third, the court held that the noise study was sufficient and that the impacts to nearby hotel guests were insignificant because nighttime deliveries already occurred for existing commercial uses. Lastly, the court found that the Airport Industrial Park specific plan, with which the project was inconsistent, did not apply because it was effectively superseded.

Written by Sabrina S. Eshaghi

Court of Appeal Upholds San Jose’s Eighth Addendum to Airport Master Plan EIR

The First District Court of Appeal held that changes to the City of San Jose’s Airport Master Plan did not constitute a new project as a matter of law and did not require supplemental review under Public Resources Code section 21166. The court ordered publication of the opinion – Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose (June 6, 2014, Case No. H038781) – on July 2, 2014.

The center of the dispute was an addendum to the City of San Jose’s 1997 EIR prepared for its International Airport Master Plan. The city had also prepared a Supplemental EIR for the plan in 2003. The addendum, which was the city’s eighth addendum to the 1997 EIR, assessed the impacts of proposed amendments to the Airport Master Plan, including changes to the size and location of future air cargo facilities, the replacement of air cargo facilities with 44 acres of general aviation facilities, and the modification of two taxiways to provide better access for corporate jets.

Petitioner Citizens Against Airport Pollution’s (CAAP) primary argument was that the amendments to the Airport Master Plan addressed in the eighth addendum constituted a new project as a matter of law, and therefore, an EIR addendum was barred under CEQA. Alternatively, CAAP argued that an EIR addendum could not be used to analyze the environmental impacts of the plan changes, since those changes were substantial and required major revisions to the EIR with respect to noise, greenhouse gas emissions, toxic air contaminants, and biological resources.

The Court of Appeal was not persuaded by CAAP’s argument that the changes to the Airport Master Plan constituted a new project as a matter of law, and that the city was therefore required to prepare a new EIR. The court confirmed that the an agency’s determination on whether supplemental environmental review is required is review under the substantial evidence test, distinguishing previous cases that applied the “fair argument” standard to the question of whether a subsequent approval was “within the scope” of a previous approval.

The court next turned to CAAP’s alternative argument that the city was required to prepare a supplemental EIR for the plan amendments because they were “substantial changes” requiring “major revisions” in the EIR. CAAP claimed that there would be new or more severe impacts in several areas including noise, greenhouse gas emissions, air quality, and biological resources.

Notably, the court rejected CAAP’s argument that the city was required to analyze Greenhouse Gas Emissions for the project since CEQA Guidelines section 15064.5, which requires analysis of GHG impacts in EIRs, was added to the Guidelines after the 1997 and 2003 EIRs were prepared. Relying on CREED v. City of San Diego (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 515, the court held that the potential for GHG impacts was not substantial new information triggering the need for a supplemental EIR. Rather, the potential for GHG impacts have been known since well before the first EIR for the Master Plan was adopted.

The court also held that there was substantial evidence demonstrating that there would be no new or more severe impacts to biological resources. The addendum acknowledged that the project changes would result in the loss of four acres of burrowing owl habitat and included mitigation measures to mitigate the impact. The court explained that mitigation measures can be modified in an addendum if there is a legitimate reason and the changes are supported by substantial evidence. The mitigation measures in the addendum met that standard because they completely offset the loss of the four acres by establishing new permanent habitat. Moreover, the mitigation measure was only a change in the location of habitual preserved under a burrowing owl mitigation plan that as established for the 1997 EIR and it would be managed within the parameters of the established plan.

The court also upheld the city’s determination that potential changes in noise and air quality impacts did not trigger a supplemental environmental review because jet engines of today and the future are quieter and cleaner than the engines of 1997.