Tag: Alternatives

First District Holds Petitioner Exhausted Its Remedies by Raising General Objections That the Project Site Should Be Preserved as Open Space, Finds “No Project” Alternative Analysis Defective

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In the published portions of Save the Hill Group v. City of Livermore (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1092, the First District Court of Appeal held that Petitioner Save the Hill’s failure to specifically reference the recirculated EIR or the no-project alternative in its comments to the City Council did not bar its CEQA claims regarding preservation of the Project site.

Background

This case involves the City of Livermore’s approval of a development application for a housing development in the Garaventa Hills. The Project underwent multiple revisions, and the Project at issue is a scaled-down version of the original 76-unit residential development. The final Project is a 44-unit development with pedestrian across Altamont creek that also serves as a secondary emergency vehicle access road. The City published a Recirculated Final EIR (RFEIR) for this final revised Project.

Save the Hill filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the City’s approval of the Project and certification of the RFEIR for failure to consider significant environmental impacts, adequately investigate and evaluate the no-project alternative, and mitigate significant environmental impacts. The trial court denied the petition, determining that Save the Hill failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in challenging the RFEIR. Save the Hill appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

Exhaustion

The Court of Appeal held that Save the Hill did not fail to exhaust its administrative remedies before challenging the City’s failure to evaluate the no-project alternative. While Save the Hill did not mention the environmental documents or the lack of a no-project alternative specifically, it did express its desire to preserve the Project site as open space. The Court emphasized that CEQA does not require public interest groups such as Save the Hill—which are often unrepresented by counsel at administrative hearings—to do more than “fairly apprise” the agency of their complaints to preserve them for appeal.

Several Save the Hill representatives voiced support for preserving the Project site as open space in perpetuity at the City Council hearing for the RFEIR’s certification. These comments sparked questions from city councilmembers regarding the possibility of preserving the Project site and a discussion of available funding to purchase Garaventa Hills for conservation. This option was shut down by the City Attorney, who advised the City Council that its evaluation should be limited to the Project as set before them, and that if it were to change the zoning to permanent open space on the property, the City would likely face a takings lawsuit.

The Court determined that these comments and the ensuing discussion reflected the City Council’s consideration of a no-project alternative as a result of Save the Hill’s objections. It concluded that Save the Hill’s failure to specifically refer to the RFEIR’s Project alternatives evaluation was immaterial to the fact that it fairly appraised the City of its position. The court further explained that even if Save the Hill framed its arguments in the context of the RFEIR’s no-project alternative, “the evidence is overwhelmingly that, had it done so, the result would have been the same: [t]he City would have rejected the group’s proposal and certified the RFEIR” because it was improperly instructed to limit its focus to the presented Project.

Accordingly, the Court held that an exception to the exhaustion requirement applied because the aggrieved party—Save the Hill—could “positively state” what the lead agency’s decision would be in its particular case.

No Project Alternative Analysis

On the merits of Save the Hill’s alternative analysis claim, the Court held that the RFEIR failed to disclose and analyze information regarding the availability of funding sources that could have been used to purchase and permanently conserve the Project site. The Court explained that zoning changes are within the City’s police power, and the RFEIR accordingly should have discussed the feasibility of rezoning the site as permanent open space.

Mitigation Measures Adequacy

Save the Hill asserted that the mitigation measures for impacts to vernal pool fairy shrimp were inadequate because they would only be implemented if the fairy shrimp were detected at the site. The Court explained that CEQA allows deferred mitigation where the agency commits to achieving specific performance standards, which it did here, and that the mitigation measures were adequate because the RFEIR assumed that the fairy shrimp were present.

The Court also held that the preservation of an 85-acre compensatory mitigation site was adequate, despite Save the Hill’s contention that the City’s General Plan required the location to be preserved as open space. The Court concluded that the General Plan is “merely aspirational,” while the RFEIR’s mitigation measure created a “perpetual legal restraint on development” at the site, including requiring funding for upkeep and enforcement. Moreover, distinguishing this case from King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814 (“King”), the Court explained that this Project involved the loss of only 32 acres—as opposed to the loss of 6,450 acres in King—and CEQA does not require mitigation measures to “completely eliminate the environmental impacts of a project.”

Hydrological Impacts Adequacy

The Court held that the City’s finding of no significant hydrological impacts was supported by substantial evidence because Save the Hill failed to refute the City’s points in its reply brief. The Court refused to afford any weight to Save the Hill’s argument that the Project would degrade downstream water quality because a larger development project (which originally included this Project) would have a significant downstream water quality impact. The Court determined that impacts from a project almost 200 acres larger than this Project were not relevant.

Settlement Agreement Obligation Claims

Lastly, the Court held that that Save the Hill forfeited its claim that the City violated CEQA by failing to preserve the Project site to satisfy its obligations under two settlement agreements by failing to raise the issue prior to appeal. Moreover, Save the Hill was not a party to either settlement agreement and thus lacked standing to enforce those obligations.

THIRD DISTRICT UPHOLDS EIR FOR EL DORADO IRRIGATION DISTRICT’S “UPPER MAIN DITCH” WATER TRANSMISSION PIPELINE PROJECT

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In a February 16, 2022 decision, the Third District Court of Appeal in Save the El Dorado Canal v. El Dorado Irrigation District (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 239, upheld the District’s approval of the Blair Road Alternative for the Upper Main Ditch piping project by finding that substantial evidence supported the District’s determination that the project and alternative would have less-than-significant impacts, and rejected petitioner challenges to the EIR’s project description, hydrological, biological, and wildfire impact analyses.

Background

The El Dorado Irrigation District operates a primarily surface-water system in El Dorado County, with more than 1,250 miles of pipe and 27 miles of earthen ditches that connect the system’s facilities and treatment plants. The Upper Main Ditch (UMD) is the system’s main conveyance feature consisting of a three-mile open and unlined ditch that connects the system’s Forebay Reservoir to its Reservoir 1 Water Treatment Plant (WTP). In June 2015, the District proposed to convert the UMD to a buried 42-inch pipeline that spanned the length of the existing ditch. The upstream end of the new pipeline would connect to the Reservoir and the downstream end would connect to a new metering and inlet structure at the WTP. The District would backfill around the pipe and reshape the ditch to allow for the passage of stormwater flows up to the current 10-year storm event capacity. Ultimately, the project would conserve more water by reducing seepage and evaporation, and improve water quality by reducing contaminant infiltration.

The District considered three alternatives, and ultimately approved the Blair Road Alternative, which would also convert the UMD into a buried pipeline but would instead place the pipe across District-owned property from the Reservoir to Blair Road, where it would continue until it reached the UMD crossing, then travel across private property to the WTP. The Blair Road Alternative would involve less construction activity near residents that the project and require the removal of fewer trees. It would also reduce the number of easements across private property.

In June 2018, the District circulated the draft EIR, which described the location of the UMD and the Blair Road Alternative’s setting and noted that, should it be adopted, the District would no longer use the existing ditch—instead reverting the land back to private landowners. After an extended public comment period, the District issued the final EIR in January 2019. After which, in April 2019, the Board of Directors certified the final EIR and approved the Blair Road Alternative. The Boar determined that, although the original project would achieve the desired objectives, it would have greater potential impacts to residents along the ditch from the resulting construction and eminent domain proceedings than the Alternative.

Thereafter, Save the El Dorado Canal filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging the approval and certification violated CEQA. The trial court denied each of Petitioner’s ten contentions. Petitioner timely appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

On appeal, Petitioner re-alleged that the action violated CEQA because the EIR contained an inaccurate project description and failed to adequately analyze potential impacts to hydrology, biological resources, and wildfire hazards. Under an abuse of discretion standard, the Third District Court of Appeal rejected each claim, finding that substantial evidence supported the District’s determination and Petitioner failed to demonstrate otherwise.

Petitioner first alleged the EIR failed to adequately describe the project by omitting the “crucial fact” that the ditch that would soon be abandoned was the “only drainage system” for the watershed. Notwithstanding Petitioner’s “problematic” briefing errors, the court rejected this argument and found instead that the EIR provided a detailed description of the UMD’s size, history, and location, and explained how the UMD passively intercepts stormwater runoff that would otherwise naturally flow down slope. For the Blair Road Alternative, the EIR explained that the ditch would continue to passively receive and convey stormwater flows during storm events, even after the District abandoned its maintenance easement over it. The court concluded this was an adequate, complete, and good faith effort at full disclosure about the ditch and its relationship to the watershed’s drainage system, as well as the District’s intent to abandon the ditch should it adopt the Blair Road Alternative.

Petitioner then claimed the EIR inappropriately concluded that the Blair Road Alternative would not significantly impact watershed drainage because abandonment would permit “the underlying property owners to do with [the ditch] as they please.” Citing a comment letter submitted by the County, Petitioner claimed the EIR failed to mitigate foreseeable impacts to watershed drainage that would result from vegetation and debris clogging the abandoned ditch. The court disagreed. It found that the final EIR’s response explained that private action or inaction will ensure the abandoned ditch retains its current capacity to convey stormwater across private property thereby reducing any risk of significant flooding. Moreover, unlike the District, the County can regulate private fill activities via administrative and civil penalties to ensure such activities do not yield significant environmental effects. Thus, it would be too speculative to predict landowners’ particular actions or inactions and the ensuing potential effects to the ditch’s stormwater conveyance capacity.

Petitioner next alleged the EIR failed to mitigate impacts to riparian habitats and sensitive natural communities and conflicted with local resource protection ordinances. The court noted that the Blair Road Alternative would yield fewer potential impacts to biological resources because the pipeline would be laid in an existing road corridor that is devoid of natural riparian habitat. Because the affected waterbody is not naturally occurring, plant and wildlife species are not dependent on water in the current ditch. Nevertheless, any impacts to vegetation communities—including those resulting from tree removal—would be mitigated to less than significant levels through permit compliance. The Alternative would therefore be consistent with the General Plan’s biological resources management plan, the County’s tree mortality removal plan, and CALFIRE’s tree removal procedures.

The court was also unpersuaded by Petitioner’s claim that the EIR failed to adequately analyze and mitigate impacts to tree mortality. Relying on facts and expert opinion, the EIR explained that trees surrounding the project site are not native riparian species, and thus, not dependent on water conveyed through the ditch. To the contrary, most of the adjacent tree species are stress-tolerant and can withstand climatic variation and changes in water seepage. The court also found that because both the project and Alternative were specifically designed to avoid Waters of the U.S. (WOTUS), and that, in any event, mitigation would alleviate any impacts, regulatory requirements associated with WOTUS were met.

Lastly, the court rejected Petitioner’s contention that the EIR failed to adequately consider the project’s fire risks by only considering construction-related impacts. Petitioner asserted the project would have potentially significant impacts by removing a water source that could be used as a firefighting tool. The court disagreed by noting that the EIR specifically debunked Petitioner’s claim—the ditch supplies potable drinking water only, and water from the ditch has never been used to fight fires. Indeed, CAL FIRE’s Strategic Fire Plan did not identify the UMD as a potential firefighting resource.

– Bridget McDonald

Second District Court of Appeal Holds That Reduced Parking at National Monument is not a Direct Environmental Impact and Upholds Alternatives Analysis with Only a “No Project” Alternative.

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In Save Our Access—San Gabriel Mountains v. Watershed Conservation Authority (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 8, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff failed to show that reduced parking within the San Gabriel Mountains National Monument would cause any adverse physical changes in the environment, that the lead agency did not abuse its discretion in setting the baseline for parking based on aerial photography that was not included in the record, and that, based on the project’s purpose, analyzing only a “no project” alternative was a reasonable range of alternatives.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The San Gabriel Mountains National Monument was designated in 2014. The project site includes 198 acres along two and a half miles of the East fork of the San Gabriel River, including public roads, recreational facilities, and the riverbed itself. The site is significantly degraded due to heavy public use and a lack of adequate facilities. The project was proposed to improve and better manage recreation facilities along with ecological restoration and reducing environmental impacts associated with recreational use at the site.

The EIR discussed existing issues associated with parking, including the small number of designated parking spaces and the widespread practice of parking in undesignated areas, which created public safety and traffic issues throughout the site. In total, the EIR estimated that there was a total of 417 parking spaces throughout the site, of which only 48 were designated parking spaces. The estimates were based on aerial photography that was included in the EIR. The EIR also included survey data that found that average weekend use at the site from Memorial Day to Labor Day was 273 vehicles per weekend day. To address the parking and related issues, the project proposed to create a total of 270 designated car spaces and three bus spaces, and to reduce undesignated parking with a combination of signage and physical barriers.

The EIR analyzed the project’s potential impacts to recreation and concluded, based on survey data, that impacts would be less than significant because many users of the site would choose to recreate in other nearby areas if parking or other facilities were unavailable, and, given the number and variety of recreation opportunities in proximity to the site, the impacts of those users going elsewhere would be disbursed and would not be cumulatively considerable. The EIR concluded that all impacts associated with the project would be less than significant with mitigation. The alternatives analysis compared the proposed project to a “no project” alternative but did not analyze any other alternatives.

The plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Watershed Conservation Authority’s certification of the EIR and approval of the project. The trial court granted the petition, in part, based on the court’s conclusion that (1) the parking baseline lacked substantial evidence support because the aerial photography the baseline relied on was not in the record; (2) the agency failed to disclose the exact number of parking spaces available in each area of the site; (3) the parking survey was unsupported by substantial evidence because of the time of day when the surveys took place; and (4) without an accurate parking baseline, the EIR failed as an informational documents because the proposed parking reduction could be significant and require mitigation.

THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION

Reversing the trail court’s decision, the Court of Appeal determined that the EIR adequately discussed the project’s proposed reduction in total parking spaces and that the alleged discrepancy in total parking spaces (plaintiff alleged that there were 473 available spaces, rather than 417) was immaterial because plaintiff failed to identify any adverse physical impacts on the environment resulting from the reduced parking. The court noted that, in fact, the purpose of reducing and formalizing parking at the site was to protect and restore the environment.

The court went on to analyze two CEQA cases addressing parking issues. First, the court considered San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656, which held that the inconvenience associated with “hunting” for scarce parking was not an environmental impact, but secondary effects, like traffic and air quality are. Accordingly, the court determined that an EIR need only address the adverse secondary effects of limited parking, not the social impact itself. The court also reviewed Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond Spending v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1013, which rejected the school district’s argument that a parking shortage is “never” a direct physical environmental impact. The court reasoned that each case must be decided on its facts, and that while, in some cases parking deficits may have direct physical impacts on the environment, plaintiff had not shown that the project’s parking reduction would result in direct or secondary physical impacts on the environment.

Turning to the EIR’s analysis of recreation impacts, the court found that the EIR’s analysis of nearby recreational facilities and likely impacts was adequate and that the EIR’s assumptions, based on survey data, were reasonable. The court rejected plaintiff’s speculation that, instead of leaving to recreate elsewhere, visitors to the project site would “circle and idle” until a parking space became available. Thus, the EIR’s conclusion that recreation impacts would be less than significant was supported by substantial evidence.

Regarding alternatives, the court focused on the EIR’s discussion of alternatives that were considered, but not analyzed in the EIR. The EIR explained that, through a series of workshops, three project design concepts were proposed and assessed for their ability to achieve the purposes of the project, but only one (the project), was selected for study in the EIR, along with the required “no project” alternative. The agency also considered an alternative proposed by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife but decided not to analyze it in the EIR either. The plaintiff argued that, as a matter of law, analyzing only one alternative was inadequate. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument, finding that, although CEQA and the Guidelines use the term “alternatives” (i.e., the plural form), the law is clear that the range of alternatives is subject to a rule of reason, and that each case must be evaluated on its facts. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that several feasible alternatives were proposed to the agency by a nearby business owner who was concerned that reduced parking at the site would impact his business. The court concluded that plaintiff had failed to show how the proposed alternatives would attain most of the basic project objectives or feasibly avoid or lessen one or more of the project’s significant impacts. The court found, on the facts of this case, that the inclusion of only a “no project” alternative was reasonable, given the purpose of the project and that the project, with mitigation, would not result in any significant impacts.

Lastly, plaintiff argued that the project was inconsistent with the Angeles National Forest Land Management Plan (LMP) and the designation creating the San Gabriel Mountains National Monument. Plaintiff’s argument centered around the reduction in parking and claimed that the corresponding reduction in access to the National Monument created inconsistencies. The court rejected this argument, finding that it elevated public access above all the other objectives and policies in the declaration. The court reasoned that the agency was required, under the proclamation and LMP, to balance public access with other concerns, including protection of the environment, and that the project did so.

– Nathan O. George

First District Court of Appeal Upholds EIR for Mixed-Use Development Project

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In the first published decision to apply the standard of review articulated by the Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (Friant Ranch), the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision upholding an EIR for a mixed-use development project in South of Market Community Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321.

The project at issue is a mixed-use development that covers four acres of downtown San Francisco and seeks to provide office, retail, cultural, educational, and open-space uses for the property, to support the region’s technology industry and offer spaces for coworking, media, arts, and small-scale urban manufacturing. The city certified an EIR, which described two options for the project—an “office scheme” and a “residential scheme.” The office scheme had a larger building envelope and higher density than the residential scheme but all other project components were the same and the overall square footage was substantially similar. Several community organizations raised a variety of claims challenging the environmental review. The trial court denied relief and the petitioners appealed.

Applying the three “basic principles” set forth by the Supreme Court in Friant Ranch regarding the standard of review for the adequacy of an EIR, the First District held the EIR was legally adequate.

The court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the project description was inadequate because it presented multiple possible projects. The court found that the EIR described one project—a mixed use development involving retention or demolition of existing buildings and construction of new buildings—with two options for different allocations of residential and office units. The court also rejected petitioners’ argument that the final EIR adopted a “revised” project that was a variant of another alternative identified in the draft EIR—emphasizing that the CEQA reporting process is not designed to freeze the ultimate proposal in the precise mold of the initial project, but to allow consideration of other options that may be less harmful to the environment.

Petitioners alleged that the cumulative impacts analysis was flawed because the EIR used an outdated 2012 project list, developed during the “Great Recession,” which did not reflect a more recent increase in development. The court noted the petitioners did not point to any evidence to establish that the project list was defective or misleading or that the city had ignored foreseeable projects. Accordingly, the court held that the petitioners had not met their burden of proving the EIR’s cumulative impacts analysis was not supported by substantial evidence.

With respect to traffic, the petitioners argued the EIR was inadequate because it failed to (1) include all impacted intersections, (2) consider the impact of the Safer Market Street Plan (SMSP), and (3) adequately evaluate community-proposed mitigation measures and alternatives. The court rejected each argument in turn. First, the court found that the EIR’s explanation for selecting certain intersections and excluding others and the related analysis was supported by substantial evidence. The court further held that the city did not need to include the SMSP in the EIR because it was not reasonably foreseeable when the city initiated the EIR, nor was there evidence that the SMSP would have an adverse impact on traffic and circulation related to the project. Lastly, the court deferred to the city’s selection of alternatives because the petitioners had failed to meet their burden to show the nine alternatives evaluated in the EIR were “manifestly unreasonable.” Similarly, the court found the petitioners had failed to meet their burden to demonstrate their proposed alternatives were feasible and met most of the project objectives.

In addressing wind impacts, an argument petitioners failed to exhaust, the court found such impacts were appropriately addressed in the EIR. The court reasoned an alternative configuration was not required under the city’s comfort criterion for wind speed impacts because the exceedance of the comfort criterion did not establish significant impacts for CEQA purposes.

The court also rejected an argument that the project failed to provide onsite open space because the EIR explained that the project provided more space than the city code required and the impact related to demand on existing parks and open spaces would be less than significant.

The court further upheld the EIR’s shade and shadow analysis, finding no evidence in the record to support that sunlight on a park is not a “special and rare resource” warranting “special emphasis” under CEQA Guidelines section 15125.

The court also held that the city had made a good faith effort to discuss inconsistencies with the applicable general plans, noting that CEQA does not “mandate perfection.”

Finally, the petitioners claimed that the statement of overriding considerations was invalid because the city improperly considered the benefits of the project before considering feasible mitigation measures or alternatives. The court disagreed, emphasizing that the project was modified to substantially conform to the identified environmentally superior alternative and stating that the revised project would not have been adopted if there had been no consideration of mitigation measures or alternatives.

First District Court of Appeal upholds EIR for San Francisco’s Housing Element

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On August 22, 2018, the First District issued its decision in San Franciscans for Livable Neighborhoods v. City and County of San Francisco (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 596. The appellate court upheld an EIR that San Francisco prepared for its 2004 and 2009 Housing Elements, notably rejecting a challenge to the use in the EIR of a future-conditions baseline for the plan’s traffic and water supply impacts.

In an earlier appeal involving San Francisco’s 2004 Housing Element, the First District concluded that the City should have prepared an EIR rather than a negative declaration. By the time the trial court issued an amended writ in April 2009 requiring the preparation of an EIR for the 2004 Housing Element, the City was already in the process of preparing its 2009 Housing Element. Consequently, the City combined the environmental review of the two versions and prepared one EIR for both the 2004 and 2009 Housing Elements. After the City adopted the 2009 Housing Element in June 2011, San Franciscans for Livable Neighborhoods (SFLN) filed a new suit and this appeal followed.

For traffic and water supply impacts, the EIR used a baseline of 2025 conditions based on population projections from the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). The court concluded that the City was “within its discretion to adopt a baseline calculation forecasting traffic and water impacts in 2025” rather than “comparing the existing conditions with and without the Housing Element.” Citing POET, LLC v. State Air Resources Board (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 52 (“POET II”), SFLN argued that the City took an improperly narrow view of the Housing Element and “sidestepped review of the reasonably foreseeable indirect physical changes in the environment.” The court was unpersuaded because the Housing Element consisted of growth-accommodating policies but did not induce or lead to population growth. Discussing the rule described in Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, the court found that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that an existing-conditions baseline would be misleading as to traffic and water supply impacts. The court also rejected SFLN’s corollary argument about the baseline for land use and visual resources impacts, noting that the EIR did compare the changes in the Housing Element to the existing environment.

Second, the court tackled SFLN’s challenges to the EIR’s analysis of various impacts. It found that substantial evidence supported the EIR’s analysis, explaining that: (1) the EIR reasonably concluded that the 2009 Housing Element would not result in significant impacts on visual resources or neighborhood character because there would be no changes to allowable land uses or building heights, and residential growth would be directed to areas with existing residential uses; (2) the EIR for the Housing Element was not required to study traffic impacts of specific development projects in the pipeline because those projects were proceeding under their own EIRs or CEQA documents; (3) the EIR for the Housing Element was not required to establish a likely source of water and satisfied CEQA by acknowledging the possibility of a post-2030 water supply shortfall during a multiple-dry-year event and discussing the water rationing plan that would balance supply and demand; and (4) the City did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Housing Element was consistent with ABAG’s Land Use Policy Framework because policies would further the goals of the Framework by placing housing near transit and encouraging infill development.

Third, the court turned to SFLN’s argument that the EIR failed to consider feasible reduced-density alternatives. The EIR analyzed three alternatives, including a No Project Alternative, a 2004 Housing Element Alternative, and an Intensified 2009 Housing Element Alternative. The 2004 Housing Element Alternative was identified as the environmentally superior alternative because it would reduce the sole significant and unavoidable impact (cumulative impact on transit) even though it would not reduce the impact to a less than significant level. The court concluded that this was a reasonable range of alternatives. In particular, the court approved of the City’s explanation in responses to comments that the reduced density alternatives suggested by SFLN would not add any meaningful analysis to the EIR because they would not reduce the project’s potential cumulative transit impacts. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the EIR’s conclusion that the SFLN-proposed alternative dubbed the No Additional Rezoning Alternative was infeasible because increasing the density of two major projects within existing neighborhoods as suggested would require rezoning.

Finally, the court rejected SFLN’s argument that the City should have considered additional mitigation measures to reduce transit impacts. The EIR explained that the only way to eliminate the significant transit impacts would be to increase the number of transit vehicles or reduce transit travel time. Since funding for these measures is uncertain and cannot be guaranteed, the EIR deemed them infeasible. Although SFLN suggested two mitigation measures, one was simply a permutation of the No Project Alternative and the other was infeasible because it involved imposing transit impact fees that the City had already decided would be infeasible because they cannot be guaranteed.

Elizabeth Sarine

Second District Finds for Respondents on All Counts, Upholding EIR for “Iconic Gateway” Project in West Hollywood

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In Los Angeles Conservancy v. City of West Hollywood (2017) ­18 Cal.App.5th 1031, the Second Appellate District upheld the trial court’s denial of a petition for writ of mandate, finding that the EIR’s treatment of alternatives was sufficient and that the city adequately responded to comments.

In 2014, the city certified an EIR for a mixed–use development in the Melrose Triangle section of West Hollywood. The project was the product of city incentives to redevelop the area in order to create a unified site design with open space, pedestrian access, and an iconic “gateway” building to welcome visitors and promote economic development. The EIR concluded that a significant and unavoidable impact would result from the demolition of a building eligible for listing as a California historic resource.

One alternative would have preserved the building in its entirety, by reducing and redesigning the project. The preservation alternative was ultimately rejected as infeasible because it was inconsistent with project objectives, and would eliminate or disrupt the project’s critical design elements.

After circulating the draft EIR, the project’s architects developed a site design which incorporated the building’s façade and mandated this design as a condition of approval. Furthermore, a subsequent fire destroyed 25 percent of the building, but left the façade intact. The final EIR and conditions were approved in 2014. Petitioners immediately filed suit.

In the court below, petitioner argued that the EIR’s analysis of the preservation alternative was inadequate, the city did not respond to public comments, and that the city’s finding that the alternative was infeasible was not supported by substantial evidence. The respondents prevailed on all claims and petitioner appealed.

Finding for respondents, the court reiterated the Laurel Heights standard that an analysis of alternatives does not require perfection, only that the EIR provide sufficient information to support a reasonable range of alternatives. The court rejected petitioner’s contention that the EIR was required to include a conceptual drawing of the preservation alternative. Furthermore, the EIR’s statement that preservation of the building would preclude construction of other parts of the project was self-explanatory and did not require additional analysis. The EIR’s use of estimates to calculate how the preservation alternative would reduce the project’s footprint did not create ambiguities that would confuse the public. Such imprecision is simply inherent in the use of estimates.

The court also found that the city’s responses to the three comments cited by the petitioner were made in good faith and demonstrated reasoned analysis.  The court reiterated that a response is not insufficient when it cross-references relevant sections of the draft EIR, and that the level of detail required in a response can vary. Here, the West Hollywood Preservation Alliance and the President of the Art Deco Society of Los Angeles opined in comments that the building could be preserved while achieving the project’s objectives. The city adequately responded to these comments by referencing, and expanding upon, the EIR’s analysis of the preservation alternative, where this option was considered. The last comment was of a general nature, so the city’s brief, general response was appropriate.

Finally, the court found sufficient evidence to support the city’s finding that the preservation alternative was infeasible. An alternative is infeasible when it cannot meet project objectives or when policy considerations render it impractical or undesirable. An agency’s determination of infeasibility is presumed correct and entitled to deference, if supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court found that the city’s conclusion that the alternative is infeasible was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Development plans, photographs, and testimony from senior planning staff support the city’s conclusion that retaining the building and reducing the project would not fulfill the project objectives of creating a unified site design, promoting pedestrian uses, and encouraging regional economic development.  That another conclusion could have be reached did not render the city’s decision flawed.

A consistent theme underlying the court’s decision was the city’s clear goal of revitalizing the entire site, in order to create a functional and attractive gateway for West Hollywood. Critical to the project’s success was removing the specific building that the petitioner sought to preserve. The court appeared reluctant to overcome such a strong mandate by flyspecking the EIR’s analysis of this acknowledged significant impact.

On Remand, Fourth District Determines that Case Challenging SANDAG’s RTP Is Not Mooted by Later EIR and Resolves CEQA Issues on the Merits

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On November 11, 2017, the Fourth District, Division One in Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association of Governments (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 413 (Cleveland II), resolved the remaining issues on remand from California Supreme Court’s decision earlier this year.

SANDAG certified a programmatic EIR for its 2050 Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy in 2011. Petitioners challenged that EIR, alleging multiple deficiencies under CEQA, including the EIR’s analysis of greenhouse gas (GHG) impacts, mitigation measures, alternatives, and impacts to air quality and agricultural land. The Court of Appeal held that the EIR failed to comply with CEQA in all identified respects.  The Supreme Court granted review on the sole issue of whether SANDAG was required to use the GHG emission reduction goals in Governor Schwarzenegger’s Executive Order S-3-05 as a threshold of significance. Finding for SANDAG, the Court left all other issues to be resolved on remand.

First, the Court of Appeal ruled that the case was not moot, although the 2011 EIR had been superseded by a new EIR certified in 2015, because the 2011 version had never been decertified and thus could be relied upon. The court also found that petitioners did not forfeit arguments from their original cross-appeal by not seeking a ruling on them. And, even if failing to raise the arguments was a basis for forfeiture, the rule is not automatic, and the court has discretion to resolve important legal issues, including compliance with CEQA.

Second, the court reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding, that SANDAG’s choice of GHG thresholds of significance was adequate for this EIR, but may not be sufficient going forward. Turning to SANDAG’s selection of GHG mitigation measures, the court found that SANDAG’s analysis was not supported by substantial evidence, because the measures selected were either ineffective (“assuring little to no concrete steps toward emissions reductions”) or infeasible and thus “illusory.”

Third, also under the substantial evidence standard of review, the court determined that the EIR failed to describe a reasonable range of alternatives that would plan for the region’s transportation needs, while lessening the plan’s impacts to climate change. The EIR was deficient because none of the alternatives would have reduced regional vehicles miles traveled (VMT). This deficiency was particularly inexplicable given that SANDAG’s Climate Action Strategy expressly calls for VMT reduction. The measures, policies, and strategies in the Climate Action Strategy could have formed an acceptable basis for identifying project alternatives in this EIR.

Fourth, the EIR’s description of the environmental baseline, description of adverse health impacts, and analysis of mitigation measures for air quality, improperly deferred analysis from the programmatic EIR to later environmental review, and were not based on substantial evidence.  Despite acknowledging potential impacts from particulate matter and toxic air contaminants on sensitive receptors (children, the elderly, and certain communities), the EIR did not provide a “reasoned estimate” of pollutant levels or the location and population of sensitive receptors. The EIR’s discussion of the project’s adverse health impacts was impermissibly generalized. The court explained that a programmatic EIR improperly defers mitigation measures when it does not formulate them or fails to specify the performance criteria to be met in the later environmental review. Because this issue was at least partially moot given the court’s conclusions regarding defects in the EIR’s air quality analysis, the court simply concurred with the petitioners’ contention that all but one of EIR’s mitigation measures had been improperly deferred.

The court made two rulings regarding impacts to agricultural land. In finding for the petitioners, the court held that SANDAG impermissibly relied on a methodology with “known data gaps” to describe the agricultural baseline, as the database did not contain records of agricultural parcels of less than 10 acres nor was there any record of agricultural land that was taken out of production in the last twenty years.  This resulted in unreliable estimates of both the baseline and impacts. However, under de novo review, the court found that the petitioners had failed to exhaust their remedies as to impacts on small farms and the EIR’s assumption that land converted to rural residential zoning would remain farmland. While the petitioners’ comment letter generally discussed impacts to agriculture, it was not sufficiently specific so as to “fairly apprise” SANDAG of their concerns.

Justice Benke made a detailed dissent. Under Benke’s view, the superseded 2011 EIR is “most likely moot” and in any event, that determination should have been left to the trial court on remand. This conclusion is strengthened, when, as here, the remaining issues concern factual contentions. As a court of review, their record is insufficient to resolve those issues.

In a Case of First Impression, First District Court of Appeal Holds That Presentation of Five Alternatives in EIR, Without Designation of One as the ‘Project,’ Does Not Satisfy CEQA’s Requirement for a Stable Project Description

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In Washoe Meadows Community v. Department of Parks and Recreation (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 277, the First District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s decision directing the Department of Parks and Recreation and the State Park and Recreation Commission to set aside project approvals where the draft EIR analyzed five alternative projects in detail, but did not identify one preferred alternative.

In 1984, the Department of Parks and Recreation acquired 777 acres of land in the Lake Tahoe Basin—608 acres of the property were designated as Washoe Meadows State Park and the remainder contained an existing golf course. Studies conducted in the early 2000s indicated that the layout of the golf course was contributing to sediment running into Lake Tahoe, which contributed to deterioration of habitat and water quality in the lake.

In 2010, the Department circulated a draft EIR to address the concerns about the golf course. The draft EIR analyzed five alternatives in equal detail, with the stated purpose of “improv[ing] geomorphic processes, ecological functions, and habitat values of the Upper Truckee River within the study area, helping to reduce the river’s discharge of nutrients and sediment that diminish Lake Tahoe’s clarity while providing access to public recreation opportunities ….” The draft EIR did not identify one preferred alternative. In the final EIR, the Department identified the preferred alternative as a refined version of the original alternative 2, which provided for river restoration and reconfiguration of the golf course. In 2012, the Department certified the EIR and approved the preferred alternative.

Framing the issue as a question of law, the court found that the draft EIR did not “provide the public with an accurate, stable and finite description of the project,” because it did not identify a preferred alternative. The court found that by describing a range of possible projects, the Department had presented the public with “a moving target,” which required the public to comment on all of the alternatives rather than just one project. The court determined that this presented an undue burden on the public.

The court compared the draft EIR to County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185, where the court found an EIR insufficient because the project description described a much smaller project than was analyzed in other sections of the EIR. The court in Washoe Meadows found that rather than providing inconsistent descriptions like in County of Inyo, the draft EIR had not described a project at all. Thus, the court directed the Department to set aside the project approvals.

First Circuit Finds Environmental Review Under Certified Regulatory Program Inadequate

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In Pesticide Action Network North America v. California Department of Pesticide Regulation (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 224 (republished as modified) the First Appellate District reversed the Alameda Superior Court and found that environmental documents prepared by the California Department of Pesticide Regulation, regarding amended labelling for two pesticides, inadequately analyzed potential impacts on honeybees. The court held that the Department was required to analyze the environmental baseline, alternatives, and cumulative impacts in documents promulgated under CEQA’s exemption for certified regulatory programs (CRP).

The Department of Pesticide Regulation registers all pesticides in California, after evaluating their efficiency and potential for impacts to human health and the environment. The Department has a continuing obligation to reevaluate pesticides, and may cancel a prior registration. Since 2006, there has been a documented widespread collapse of honey bee colonies in the United States. One suspected factor is exposure to pesticides such as dinotefuran, the active ingredient in pesticides sold by the real parties. For this reason, in 2009, the Department initiated the still-ongoing process of reevaluating dinotefuran’s registration. Simultaneously, in 2014, the Department issued public reports for a proposal to amend labels for pesticides containing dinotefuron. The amended labels would allow the pesticides to be used on fruit trees, and in increased quantities. The reports concluded that the use of each pesticide in a manner consistent with the new labels would have no direct or indirect significant adverse environmental impacts, and therefore the Department did not propose alternatives or mitigation measures. The Department issued a final approval of the label amendments in June 2014. Pesticide Action Network filed a petition for writ of mandate in Alameda Superior Court and after a lower court finding for the Department, this appeal followed.

The Department’s pesticide program falls under the CEQA section 21080.5 exemption for CRPs. This exemption permits a state agency to rely on abbreviated environmental review documents, which are the functional equivalent of CEQA documents. Here, the Department issued the functional equivalent of a negative declaration. The standard of review is whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion, which is established if the agency did not proceed in a manner required by law, or if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence.

First, the court rejected the Department’s assertion that because it operates a CRP, its functionally-equivalent environmental review documents are otherwise exempt from CEQA’s substantive requirements. The court found that section 21080.5 is a “limited” exemption, and environmental review must otherwise comply with CEQA’s policy goals, substantive requirements, content requirements stated in section 21080.5, and any other CEQA provisions, as well as the Department’s own regulations.

Second, the court found that the Department’s report was inadequate under CEQA because it failed to analyze alternatives and cumulative impacts, and did not describe the environmental baseline. With respect to alternatives, contrary to the Department’s assertion, a functionally-equivalent document prepared under a CRP must consider alternatives, as required by both CEQA and the Department’s own regulations. The Department argued that it did not need to consider alternatives because it concluded there would be no significant environmental impacts. The court explained that the standard for a CRP for determining whether an adverse impact may occur is the same as the “fair argument” standard under CEQA. Furthermore, the content requirements for environmental review under a CRP require that a state agency provide proof–either a checklist or other report–that there will not be adverse effects. The court found that the Department did not produce or consider such evidence.

The court also held that the substantive requirements and broad policy goals of CEQA require assessment of baseline conditions. The Department argued that it had acknowledged and assessed baseline conditions, but the court disagreed. The Department’s baseline discussion was based on one statement that “the uses are already present on the labels of a number of currently registered neonicotinoid containing products.” The court found that this general statement was not sufficient.

The court found that the Department also abused its discretion when it failed to consider cumulative impacts. In its report, the Department simply stated that the cumulative analysis would be put off until the reevaluation was complete. The court found that this one-sentence discussion lacked facts and failed to provide even a brief explanation about how the Department reached its conclusion.

Finally, the court found that the Department is required to recirculate its analysis. Recirculation is required when significant new information is added to an environmental review document, after notice and public comment has occurred, but before the document is certified. The court explained that, in light of the Department’s required reevaluation, its initial public reports on the amended labeling were so “inadequate and conclusory” that public comment on them was “effectively meaningless.”

Pesticide Action Network provides important guidance regarding environmental compliance under a CEQA-exempt CRP. The court emphasized that unless specifically exempt from a CEQA provision, even functionally-equivalent CRP documents must comply with CEQA’s substantive requirements and broad policy goals. Also notable was the court’s application of the “fair argument standard” to the analysis of whether an impact would be significant under the functional equivalent of a negative declaration.

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