Tag: Exhaustion

SECOND DISTRICT UPHOLDS CLASS 1 EXEMPTION FOR PROJECT TO EXPAND SINGLE-FAMILY HOME

In Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of Arcadia (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 418, the Second District Court of Appeal upheld a finding by the City of Arcadia that a project to expand and add a second story to a single-family home was categorically exempt from CEQA. In doing so, the court concluded that petitioner failed to exhaust its administrative remedies regarding the scope of the exemption and failed to demonstrate that the city improperly relied on the exemption.

Background

Over a nearly two-year period beginning in June 2018, project applicant submitted, revised, and re-submitted an application to her homeowners’ association (HOA), seeking to expand the first floor of her single-family home and add a second floor. In April 2020, after the HOA’s architectural review board twice rejected her project, the applicant appealed the rejection to the city’s planning commission.

In May 2020, after a noticed hearing, the planning commission voted to conditionally approve the project, so long as various proposed changes were incorporated. The planning commission found that the project qualified for a Class 1 categorical exemption for modifications to existing structures.

The applicant’s neighbor appealed the planning commission’s approval to the city council. The city council upheld the planning commission’s decision.

The neighbor then formed the petitioner organization and filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the city’s compliance with CEQA. Shortly thereafter, the city filed a Notice of Exemption for the project. The trial court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

The court held that (1) petitioner failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on the issue of whether the project was within the scope of the Class 1 exemption, (2) the city did not abuse its discretion by impliedly determining that no exceptions to the categorical exemption applied, and (3) petitioner failed to demonstrate that the cumulative impacts exception precluded the city’s reliance on the Class 1 exemption.

Failure to Adequately Exhaust

Petitioner argued that the city erred in determining the Class 1 exemption applied and cited the neighbor’s comments during his administrative appeal as support that petitioner had adequately exhausted on this issue. The court disagreed, reasoning that the neighbor (or anyone else) failed to articulate why the Class 1 exemption was inapplicable. Instead, the court noted that the neighbor made only “general references to potential environmental impacts” that did not fairly apprise the city of petitioner’s specific objection that the exemption did not apply.

The court rejected petitioner’s argument that its member had impliedly objected to the city’s exemption finding by requesting an EIR. The court conceded that a request for an EIR suggests a belief that no exemption applies but explained that such a request nevertheless does not adequately notify the agency about the substance of the challenge.

The court acknowledged that CEQA’s exhaustion requirement may be excused if the agency provides no opportunity for public comment or fails to give notice; however, it concluded that petitioner’s failure to exhaust was not excused in this case. Although the city did not consistently identify the specific subdivision of the Class 1 exemption that it relied on, the court concluded that this discrepancy was immaterial.

Exceptions to the Exemption

The court next rejected petitioner’s argument that the city failed to proceed in a manner required by law by failing to expressly consider whether an exception precluded the application of the Class 1 exemption. The court explained that the city’s determination that the Class 1 exemption applied necessarily included an implied finding that no exception precluded its application. The court reasoned that, while the city could not ignore contrary record evidence when making its finding, the finding did not need to be express.

After noting that there was “some question” whether petitioner’s comments during the administrative appeal preserved an argument that the cumulative impacts exception precluded the application of the Class 1 exemption, the court concluded that, regardless, that the argument failed on its merits.

The court concluded that petitioner’s general reference to “cumulative environmental effects caused by multiple large-scale projects,” along with identification of various nearby projects, did not amount to evidence of actual impacts that would result from the project and other nearby projects. The court rejected petitioner’s evidence that the cumulative impacts exception applied as “pure speculation” that could not, without more, preclude application of the Class 1 exemption.

Louisa Rogers

First District Holds Petitioner Exhausted Its Remedies by Raising General Objections That the Project Site Should Be Preserved as Open Space, Finds “No Project” Alternative Analysis Defective

In the published portions of Save the Hill Group v. City of Livermore (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1092, the First District Court of Appeal held that Petitioner Save the Hill’s failure to specifically reference the recirculated EIR or the no-project alternative in its comments to the City Council did not bar its CEQA claims regarding preservation of the Project site.

Background

This case involves the City of Livermore’s approval of a development application for a housing development in the Garaventa Hills. The Project underwent multiple revisions, and the Project at issue is a scaled-down version of the original 76-unit residential development. The final Project is a 44-unit development with pedestrian across Altamont creek that also serves as a secondary emergency vehicle access road. The City published a Recirculated Final EIR (RFEIR) for this final revised Project.

Save the Hill filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the City’s approval of the Project and certification of the RFEIR for failure to consider significant environmental impacts, adequately investigate and evaluate the no-project alternative, and mitigate significant environmental impacts. The trial court denied the petition, determining that Save the Hill failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in challenging the RFEIR. Save the Hill appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

Exhaustion

The Court of Appeal held that Save the Hill did not fail to exhaust its administrative remedies before challenging the City’s failure to evaluate the no-project alternative. While Save the Hill did not mention the environmental documents or the lack of a no-project alternative specifically, it did express its desire to preserve the Project site as open space. The Court emphasized that CEQA does not require public interest groups such as Save the Hill—which are often unrepresented by counsel at administrative hearings—to do more than “fairly apprise” the agency of their complaints to preserve them for appeal.

Several Save the Hill representatives voiced support for preserving the Project site as open space in perpetuity at the City Council hearing for the RFEIR’s certification. These comments sparked questions from city councilmembers regarding the possibility of preserving the Project site and a discussion of available funding to purchase Garaventa Hills for conservation. This option was shut down by the City Attorney, who advised the City Council that its evaluation should be limited to the Project as set before them, and that if it were to change the zoning to permanent open space on the property, the City would likely face a takings lawsuit.

The Court determined that these comments and the ensuing discussion reflected the City Council’s consideration of a no-project alternative as a result of Save the Hill’s objections. It concluded that Save the Hill’s failure to specifically refer to the RFEIR’s Project alternatives evaluation was immaterial to the fact that it fairly appraised the City of its position. The court further explained that even if Save the Hill framed its arguments in the context of the RFEIR’s no-project alternative, “the evidence is overwhelmingly that, had it done so, the result would have been the same: [t]he City would have rejected the group’s proposal and certified the RFEIR” because it was improperly instructed to limit its focus to the presented Project.

Accordingly, the Court held that an exception to the exhaustion requirement applied because the aggrieved party—Save the Hill—could “positively state” what the lead agency’s decision would be in its particular case.

No Project Alternative Analysis

On the merits of Save the Hill’s alternative analysis claim, the Court held that the RFEIR failed to disclose and analyze information regarding the availability of funding sources that could have been used to purchase and permanently conserve the Project site. The Court explained that zoning changes are within the City’s police power, and the RFEIR accordingly should have discussed the feasibility of rezoning the site as permanent open space.

Mitigation Measures Adequacy

Save the Hill asserted that the mitigation measures for impacts to vernal pool fairy shrimp were inadequate because they would only be implemented if the fairy shrimp were detected at the site. The Court explained that CEQA allows deferred mitigation where the agency commits to achieving specific performance standards, which it did here, and that the mitigation measures were adequate because the RFEIR assumed that the fairy shrimp were present.

The Court also held that the preservation of an 85-acre compensatory mitigation site was adequate, despite Save the Hill’s contention that the City’s General Plan required the location to be preserved as open space. The Court concluded that the General Plan is “merely aspirational,” while the RFEIR’s mitigation measure created a “perpetual legal restraint on development” at the site, including requiring funding for upkeep and enforcement. Moreover, distinguishing this case from King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814 (“King”), the Court explained that this Project involved the loss of only 32 acres—as opposed to the loss of 6,450 acres in King—and CEQA does not require mitigation measures to “completely eliminate the environmental impacts of a project.”

Hydrological Impacts Adequacy

The Court held that the City’s finding of no significant hydrological impacts was supported by substantial evidence because Save the Hill failed to refute the City’s points in its reply brief. The Court refused to afford any weight to Save the Hill’s argument that the Project would degrade downstream water quality because a larger development project (which originally included this Project) would have a significant downstream water quality impact. The Court determined that impacts from a project almost 200 acres larger than this Project were not relevant.

Settlement Agreement Obligation Claims

Lastly, the Court held that that Save the Hill forfeited its claim that the City violated CEQA by failing to preserve the Project site to satisfy its obligations under two settlement agreements by failing to raise the issue prior to appeal. Moreover, Save the Hill was not a party to either settlement agreement and thus lacked standing to enforce those obligations.

First District Court of Appeal Rejects CEQA Claims for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies and Finds General Plan Arguments Not a CEQA Issue

In Stop Syar Expansion v. County of Napa (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 444, a partially published opinion, the First District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s denial of a writ petition challenging the EIR for an expansion of Syar Industries, Inc.’s aggregate operation in Napa County. The court concluded that the petitioner, Stop Syar Expansion (SSE), failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because it did not comply with Napa County’s local appellate procedures. In addition, the court held that SSE’s argument that the project is inconsistent with the County’s General Plan was not a CEQA issue and SSE therefore failed to properly raise the issue. Further, the court determined that SSE’s argument lacked merit because the County had adequately addressed potential inconsistency issues and reached a reasonable conclusion that the project was consistent with the General Plan.

Exhaustion Doctrine

Citing Tahoe Vista Concerned Citizens v. County of Placer (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 577 (“Tahoe Vista”), the court emphasized that the burden is on the petitioner in a CEQA case to demonstrate that it exhausted its administrative remedies prior to filing suit by complying with the procedures applicable to the public agency in question. SSE was therefore required to demonstrate that it complied with the procedures in chapter 2.88 of the Napa County Code of Ordinances by timely filing a notice of intent to appeal and timely submitting an appeal packet which specifically identified the grounds it raises in its petition. The court noted that a list of string-cites to the administrative record without explanation as to how each citation supports the assertion the public agency was fairly apprised of the asserted noncompliance with CEQA, is not sufficient to meet the petitioner’s burden.

Consistency with the County’s General Plan

The court also addressed SSE’s contention that the EIR failed to consider whether the project was consistent with the County’s General Plan. The court held that the issue, as presented by SSE, was not a CEQA issue. Thus, the mandate procedures provided for CEQA violations under Public Resources Code section 21168.9 did not apply. SSE was therefore required to assert this cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 for ordinary mandamus. SSE failed to ask for leave to amend its writ petition to add a cause of action under section 1085 in the trial court, and therefore, the claim was not properly before the court.

Further, the court noted, the standard of review for an agency’s consistency determination with its own General Plan is highly deferential to the agency. Such a decision can only be reversed if it is based on evidence from which no reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion. The court concluded that SSE did not make any General Plan inconsistency arguments based on this applicable standard of review. The court rejected SSE’s contention that it was not challenging the County’s substantive consistency determination and that a different standard of review should apply because SSE had argued that the EIR failed to disclose inconsistencies with the General Plan.

Finally, even if SSE had made its arguments under the proper standard—which the court reiterated it did not—the court held that the County addressed the project’s consistency with the General Plan at length in both the EIR and in a “General Plan Consistency Analysis.” The court concluded by noting that it is not the court’s place to “micromanage” the County’s determination whether a project is consistent with its own General Plan.

First District Holds that Deficiencies in Notice Did Not Excuse CEQA Litigants from Exhausting Available Administrative Remedies

The First District Court of Appeal in Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco (Feb. 1, 2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470, held that Appellants’ CEQA claims were barred by their failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, even where deficiencies in the notice excused the litigants from satisfying the exhaustion requirements under Public Resources Code section 21177.

BACKGROUND

The “Early Days” statue, located in San Francisco’s Civic Center, is part of the “Pioneer Monument”—a series of five bronze sculptures memorializing the pioneer era when California was founded. The statue depicts three figures, including a reclining Native American over whom bends a Catholic priest. Public criticism has surrounded the statue since its installation in 1894.  

In 2018, after charges of the statue’s racial insensitivity resurfaced, the San Francisco Arts Commission and the San Francisco Historic Preservation Commission (HPC) granted a Certificate of Appropriateness (COA) to remove the statue and place it in storage. In granting that approval, the HPC determined the removal of the statue was categorically exempt from CEQA. There were no issues raised at the HPC hearing about a perceived need for environmental review. Nor were there any appeals of HPC’s CEQA determination to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. 

Appellants, two opponents of the statue’s removal, appealed the HPC’s adoption of the COA to the San Francisco Board of Appeals. The Board of Appeals initially voted to overturn the COA, but later had it reinstated. After the Board of Appeals approved the COA, the City immediately removed the statue the following morning. 

Appellants filed suit seeking to overturn the Board of Appeals’ order authorizing removal of the statue. They alleged violations of constitutional and statutory law, including CEQA. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend. On the CEQA claims, the trial court found Appellants failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. Appellants appealed.

COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Court of Appeal explained that CEQA litigants must comply with two exhaustion requirements. First, Public Resources Code section 21177 requires that a would-be CEQA petitioner must object during the administrative process and that all allegations raised in the litigation must have been presented to the agency before the challenged decision is made. Second, a would-be CEQA petitioner must exhaust all remedies that are available at the administrative level, including any available administrative appeals. Under Public Resources Code section 21151, a CEQA determination made by a nonelected decision-making body of a local agency may be appealed to the agency’s elected decision-making body, if any. The CEQA Guidelines encourage local agencies to establish procedures for such appeals. As relevant here, the San Francisco Administrative Code requires that appeals of CEQA determinations must be made to the Board of Supervisors, as the body of elected officials responsible for making final CEQA determinations.

The Court of Appeal found Appellants failed to comply with both exhaustion requirements. They did not object to the HCP’s determination that the project was categorically exempt from CEQA during the administrative process and they did exhaust administrative appeals available under the San Francisco Administrative Code. Specifically, on the second point, although Appellants appealed the HPC’s decision to the Board of Appeals, they failed to exhaust available remedies because they did not separately appeal the HPC’s CEQA determination to the Board of Supervisors, as required under the City’s Code.

Appellants argued they were excused from both exhaustion requirements because the City failed to provide adequate notice. The court agreed with Appellants in part, finding that Appellants were not required to comply with the statutory exhaustion requirements in section 21177 because there was no notice in advance of the HPC meeting that a categorical exemption might be on the agenda. But, the court explained, the inadequate CEQA notice did not excuse Appellants from complying with the requirement in the City’s Code that CEQA determinations must be appealed to the Board of Supervisors. The court also noted that Appellants had notice of the HPC’s CEQA determination because they appealed it, improperly, to the Board of Appeals. Because Appellants failed to appeal the CEQA determination to the appropriate body, they forfeited their right to bring a CEQA action.

Futility Argument
Appellants also argued they should be excused from exhausting their administrative remedies because doing so would have been futile. Citing a Board of Supervisors resolution that was not in the record, Appellants argued that an appeal to the proper board would have been futile because the Board of Supervisors already adopted a definitive position that the statue should be taken down. The court rejected this argument, stating that even if the Board of Supervisors held this view as a policy matter, it still could have disagreed with the process of removal and opted for an EIR. In addition, the Court concluded that the Board of Supervisors was never presented with any arguments concerning the appropriateness of a categorical exemption, and thus any argument regarding how the Board of Supervisors would have responded was pure speculation.

– Veronika Morrison 

Second District Court of Appeal Upholds EIR for Refinery Project

The Second District Court of Appeal upheld an Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) for a South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) permit for operational changes to two existing refinery facilities. (Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 588.) Praising both the lead agency and the EIR, the Second District Court of Appeal considered and rejected four arguments made by petitioner. One justice dissented on the issue of baseline.

Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company proposed the Los Angeles Refinery Integration and Compliance Project (“project”), which would integrate two of Tesoro’s oil refining facilities so that Tesoro could more flexibly alter outputs of gasoline and jet fuel, and reduce emissions in order to reduce air pollution and increase compliance. The SCAQMD was required to issue a permit, which allowed the facility to generate more heat, for the project. The court described three key points about the permit: (i) it was a paper change only and did not allow for any physical changes to the heater or other hardware; (ii) it imposed new limitations on emissions; and (iii) it allowed the facility to either process a heavier blend of crude or increase throughput by 6,000 barrels per day, but not both. The project would also shut down a catalytic cracking unit, a major source of emissions.

The SCAQMD prepared and certified an EIR which determined that the project would reduce emissions by 36 percent. The court explained that the analysis of emissions was conservative, in part because the EIR assumed the heater had never operated above 252 million BTUs per hour, when in fact it had. The project also imposed limitations on emissions that did not exist before the project. Although, the project could increase throughput or weight of the crude blend, the facility could have no new emissions under the new permit.

The court cited the following facts as pertinent—the draft EIR included over 1,700 pages; the SCAQMD circulated the EIR for 49 days more than required, for a total of 94 days; the final EIR responded to 1,112 pages of comments with 5,700 pages of responses; the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) reviewed the EIR and indicated it had no objection to issuing the permit; and the EIR was “many thousands of pages” with the index alone being 180 pages.

Communities for a Better Environment (“CBE”) challenged the project alleging the EIR was inadequate. The trial court rejected CBE’s arguments and upheld the EIR. On appeal, CBE made four arguments.

Baseline

The court rejected CBE’s argument that the baseline was insufficient under CEQA. The EIR relied on a near-peak 98% baseline, based on an average of the refinery’s worst air pollution emissions during the two years leading up to the project, excluding the top two percent of the data in order to leave out extreme outliers. The EIR compared this 98th percentile analysis with impacts from the project and determined the project would reduce air pollution. CBE argued that CEQA requires an average-value baseline, but the court disagreed. The court emphasized that both peak and average can measure actual situations that truly exist, and there is no one “normal” way to measure the baseline. The court concluded that it was rational, and not “sinister or wrong,” to care most about the worst effects of air pollution, which occur when emissions hit their highest levels. Because EPA relies on a similar approach to regulate air pollution at the federal level, the court concluded the use of the 98th percentile baseline was supported by substantial evidence. One justice, however, dissented because federal custom and practice, which “appear[] to be the only substantial evidence found by the majority,” are not enough to support use of the 98th percentile as the baseline.

Pre-Project Crude Oil Composition

The court also rejected CBE’s argument that the EIR was required to provide the information regarding the existing composition of crude oil at the facility. The EIR explained that in order for the refinery to process a different blend of crude oil, the entire system would need to be changed. The EIR clarified that the project would not make these changes, so the court agreed there was no need to include information regarding the composition of crude oil. The project included a fixed crude operating envelope that would be the same before and after the project, and therefore the court agreed that baseline crude oil data was not necessary.

Failure to Exhaust

CBE argued that the SCAQMD was required to explain how it calculated the amount of additional oil that could be processed with the project. But, the court concluded, neither CBE nor anyone else had raised that exact issue before the SCAQMD, and therefore the issue could not be raised on appeal. The court emphasized that “[m]aking ‘broad’ requests that ‘encompass’ an issue raised on appeal is not raising the ‘exact issue’ during the administrative process.”

Existing Volume of Crude and Refinery’s Unused Capacity

Finally, the court concluded the EIR was not required to disclose the existing volume of crude or the refinery’s unused capacity because this data was immaterial to evaluating the project’s air pollution impact. The EIR explained that in order to increase the crude oil processing rate, the facility would need bigger pipes and stronger pumps. Because the project would not make these changes, it would not increase the refinery’s overall throughput. Data about the existing volume of crude processed and the refinery’s unused capacity, therefore, was not necessary.

Second District Court of Appeal Upholds Ruling that Mitigation Measures are Inadequate and EIR is Required for Mixed-Use Development Project in Agoura Hills

On February 24, 2020, the Second Appellate District in Save the Agoura Cornell Knoll et al. v. City of Agoura Hills et al. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 665 affirmed the trial court’s decision to require an EIR instead of an MND for a mixed-use development on 8.2 acres because the adopted mitigation measures deferred action, lacked performance criteria, and/or were otherwise inadequate.

Background

The “Cornerstone Mixed-Use Project,” proposed by Agoura and Cornell Roads, LP, and Doron Gelfand (“Appellants”), consists of 8.2 acres of development, including 35 residential apartment units, retail, a restaurant, and office space on an undeveloped hillside in the City of Agoura Hills. The project site is covered mostly by the Agoura Village Specific Plan (adopted in 2008 after its final EIR was certified) with a small portion located within a Significant Ecological Area. After Appellants submitted applications for a development permit, conditional use permit, oak tree permit, and tentative parcel map, the City prepared and finalized an MND for the project in November 2016. The Planning Commission voted to approve the project and adopt the MND. The local chapter of the California Native Plant Society (CNPS) appealed the Planning Commission’s decision, but the City Council approved the project and adopted the MND. The City Council found “no substantial evidence that the project would have a significant effect on the environment” because the project included feasible mitigation measures, reducing all effects to less than significant.

Save the Agoura Cornell Knoll filed a petition for writ of mandate followed by a first amended petition on August 10, 2017, adding CNPS as a petitioner (“Petitioners”), alleging multiple CEQA violations, a violation of planning and zoning law, and a violation of the City’s oak tree ordinance. The trial court granted the petition as to the CEQA and oak tree ordinance claims, denied the planning and zoning law claim, and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the City to set aside its project and permit approvals, and to set aside the MND to make way for preparation of an EIR. The project applicants appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s CEQA Decision

The Court reviewed Appellants’ claims under the “fair argument” standard, which requires finding that a lead agency abused their discretion if substantial evidence in the record supports a fair argument that that the project may have a significant effect on the environment. This standard creates a relatively low threshold for requiring an EIR pursuant to “‘legislative preference for resolving doubts in favor of environmental review.’” Three CEQA resource areas were litigated—cultural, biological, and aesthetic. Appellants asserted, repeatedly, that mitigation was adequate and an EIR was not required, and the Court repeatedly disagreed. Overall, the Court found that certain mitigation measures set forth in the MND were “not feasible,” “improperly defer[] mitigation,” or were “inadequate to mitigate the project’s potentially significant impacts.” Affected resource areas are briefly discussed below.

Cultural Resources

The project site contains an identified prehistoric archaeological site that was previously determined to be eligible for inclusion in the California Register of Historical Resources. Three mitigation measures were included in the MND to address potential impacts to the site: (1) construction monitoring, notification of finds, and preservation in place of any resources (i.e., avoidance); (2) notification if human remains are encountered; and (3) a data-recovery excavation program if the site cannot be avoided. The Court found this mitigation constituted improper deferral because, pursuant to an expert opinion on the record, the site could not be avoided as prescribed in the first measure without a project redesign and therefore the third measure would be necessary. The Court also found that the third measure delayed “formulation of several components of the data recovery plan until some future time.” For example, the third measure called for the preparation of a Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Plan (MMRP), yet did not explain how this MMRP would actually mitigate impacts, and there was no evidence in the record that inclusion of such information was impractical or infeasible prior to project approval. Appellants challenged the “evidentiary value” of the expert opinion, but the Court noted that any “conflict in the evidence” should be resolved in an EIR and that there was no debate as to whether the project would have a significant effect on a cultural resource, just on how it might be mitigated.

Biological Resources

The project site contains three special-status plant species that could be significantly impacted by project grading, landscaping, and fuel modification activities: Agoura Hills Dudley, Lyon’s pentachaeta, and Ojai navarretia. Again, three mitigation measures were included in the MND to reduce impact significance: (1) avoidance if feasible for two of the species, but if not, preparation of a restoration plan that includes plant surveys, onsite restoration, and offsite preservation; (2) the same measure for the third species; and (3) locating and flagging of all three species within the fuel modification zone and the use of buffers, other protocols, and monitoring for protection. The Court found the first two measures inadequately mitigated impacts and were infeasible, largely because of statements on the record asserting that restoration of “‘rare plants is next to impossible’” and “‘experimental’” and because the City relied on outdated surveys conducted during the drought in adopting the measure. The measures called for updated surveys but the record provided no evidence as to why such surveys could not be conducted prior to project approval. The measures also failed to provide performance criteria for determining the feasibility of avoidance or in the alternative, maintenance plans. The third measure was found to be inadequate because it did not properly consider the full expanse of fuel modification zones nor did it account for ongoing fuel modification activities, as it applied only to construction.

The project site also contains native oak trees, 35 of which would be removed by the project. Two mitigation measures were included in the MND to reduce significant impacts: (1) replacement of oak trees either onsite or via in-lieu fees paid to the City to acquire land for new tress; and (2) submittal of an oak tree survey, report, and preservation program to the City for approval. The Court found the first measure to be inadequate because mass grading required for the project would cause a loss of subsurface water to any onsite replacement trees, which could result in failure; yet this water deficit was not addressed in the measure. Also, substantial evidence existed showing that oak woodlands are “‘impossible to recreate’” or at least “‘often unsuccessful.’” Lastly this measure was inadequate because the in-lieu fees to be paid to the City would not be not part of a program that has undergone its own CEQA review, which is required “‘to provide a lawful substitute for the “traditional” method of mitigating CEQA impacts.’” The second mitigation measure was found to potentially lack effectiveness because that same subsurface water deficit was not considered, thereby calling into question any claims of long-term survival of preserved oak trees.

Aesthetic Resources

The project site contains a “distinct” knoll of oak trees that likely would be removed for project development. The MND acknowledged the potential loss of this scenic resource but claimed mitigation reduced the impact to less than significant. This mitigation included some avoidance measures and also pointed to the oak tree measures (discussed above) for restoration and preservation. The trial court found this mitigation to be inadequate. Although Appellants claimed the Petitioners failed to properly exhaust this issue (discussed below), the Court found that evidence in the record demonstrated that the knoll may not be preserved under project design and that, even if it were, the subsurface water deficit would jeopardize its continued existence, and no in-lieu fee could “reduce the impacts on aesthetic resources” of this loss.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision on Appellants’ Other Claims

Administrative Remedies Were Exhausted

Appellants repeatedly contended that Petitioners did not exhaust their administrative remedies and therefore forfeited their claims. They also contended that Petitioners did not address the issue of exhaustion in their first opening brief, and therefore could not submit supporting evidence. Addressing the second claim first, the Court found that Petitioners did preserve the general issue of exhaustion because there is no requirement that the issue must be argued in an opening brief and, nevertheless, their opening brief cited evidence that was later used in Petitioners’ reply brief to show exhaustion. This evidence demonstrated that exhaustion was “not a new legal theory raised for the first time” on reply. The Court also found that Petitioners expressly alleged exhaustion in their petition and “lodged the complete administrative record” as part of the writ proceedings. Further, the trial court’s rejection of Appellants’ supplemental brief on this issue was warranted because in filing it they had directly violated a court order stating that “the issue of exhaustion was thoroughly argued.”
As to the first contention, appellants raised exhaustion as a defense to each of Petitioners’ CEQA claims. The Court considered “the totality of [the] record” by looking to various portions demonstrating that most of Petitioners’ claims were preserved. It looked specifically to public comments, City Council hearing transcripts, other correspondence from environmental groups and experts, and documentation from the City’s own consultants to find again and again that the City was “‘fairly apprised’” of the “underlying concerns behind Petitioners’’ claims and thereby had the “‘opportunity to decide matters [], respond to objections, and correct any errors before the courts intervene.’”

Court Rejected Standing and Statute of Limitations Defenses

Appellants asserted both that Petitioner Save the Agoura Cornell Knoll lacked standing because Petitioners failed to show that they timely objected to project approval and that Petitioner CNPS was barred from the action because they joined the suit after the statute of limitations had run. The Court declined to consider the merits of either claim. It found that Appellants had forfeited their statute of limitations argument by not properly asserting it “‘in a general demurrer or pleaded in answer’” and, therefore, without a statute of limitation violation, CNPS remained a petitioner with uncontested standing. The Court was quick to point out that Appellants claims on these points were made for the first time in their appellate reply brief “[n]otwithstanding their [own] arguments on forfeiture.”

Attorney’s Fees Are Recoverable and Appellants Are Jointly and Severally Liable

The trial court awarded attorneys’ fees to Petitioners and assigned joint and several liability to both the developer Agoura and Cornell Road and its representative Doron Gelfand. Appellants first argued against the award by asserting that Petitioners did not provide notice of the CEQA action to the Attorney General “in accordance with section 21167.7 [of the Public Resources Code] and Code of Civil Procedure section 388” that requires notice be served within 10 days of filing a pleading. On this point, the Court found that, although Petitioners did not serve the Attorney General notice of the first amended petition, they did properly notice their original petition, which was not materially different than the first amended, thereby giving the Attorney General “ample time to intervene.” The Court further pointed to case law emphasizing that a lack of strict compliance with the 10-day notice rule “was not an absolute bar to attorney’s fees.” It further concluded that a declaration from Petitioners’ attorney attesting to notice could stand as evidence in lieu of formal proofs of service of that notice. Appellants then argued that Gelfand could not be held personally liable because he was neither the applicant nor the property owner. But, in utilizing the test articulated in Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1181, the Court found that Gelfand was a “real party who pursued a direct interest in the project that gave rise to the CEQA action and actively participated in the litigation” and, therefore, was liable. The record contained ample evidence showing that Gelfand was, at one time, “‘the owner of the property’” and had personally made several requests to the City regarding the project, and was listed “as the sole project applicant” on City resolutions approving project entitlements.

Oak Tree Ordinance Was Violated

The City’s oak tree ordinance allows the cutting of oak trees with a permit but disallows removal of more than 10 percent of a subject property’s total estimated canopy or root structure. The project would result in removal of up to 36 percent of oak trees on site in violation of this ordinance. Appellants did not argue against that fact but did assert Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies on this claim. The Court addressed both the merits of the claim and exhaustion (see above) and agreed with the trial court in finding that, in approving the oak tree permit for the project, the City violated its own “‘duly adopted law’” and therefore the permit must be vacated.

Casey Shorrock

Fourth District Court of Appeal Upholds Reliance on Mitigated Negative Declaration and Approval of Construction of School

The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s decision denying a challenge to the City of San Diego’s approval of construction of a secondary school and associated adoption of a mitigated negative declaration. (Clews Land and Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 161.)

The City of San Diego adopted an MND and approved a project to build the 5,340-square-foot Cal Coast Academy, a for-profit secondary school, on property adjacent to the plaintiffs’ (Clews Land and Livestock, LLC, et al. [“CLL”]) commercial horse ranch and equestrian facility. CLL filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint alleging the project would cause significant environmental impacts relating to fire hazards, traffic and transportation, noise, recreation, and historical resources. CLL also argued that CEQA required recirculation of the MND, that the project was inconsistent with the applicable community land use plan, and that the City did not follow historical resource provisions of the San Diego Municipal Code. The trial court determined that CLL had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and ruled in favor of the City on the merits. CLL appealed and the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s determinations.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The court first held that CLL failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The San Diego Municipal Code appeal process provides for two separate procedures—one for appeal of a hearing officer’s decision to the Planning Commission, and one for appeal of an environmental determination to the City Council. Because CLL filed only an appeal of the hearing officer’s decision, the court determined that CLL failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with respect to adoption of the MND. CLL argued that the City’s bifurcated appeal process violated CEQA, but the court found the process was valid. CLL also argued that the City had not provided proper notice of the appeal procedures under Public Resources Code section 21177, subdivision (a), thereby excusing CLL’s failure to appeal the environmental determination. The court explained, however, that section 21177 did not apply because CLL’s failure to appeal was not a failure to raise a noncompliance issue under that section. Where, like here, a public agency has accurately provided notice of a public hearing, but it misstates the applicable procedures to appeal the decision made at that hearing, the only available remedy is to prevent the public agency from invoking an administrative exhaustion defense through equitable estoppel. CLL had pursued a claim for equitable estoppel in the trial court and was unsuccessful, and CLL did not challenge that determination with the Court of Appeal. Therefore, the court found, CLL’s failure to exhaust could not be excused on an equitable estoppel basis.

Adoption of the MND

Notwithstanding its determination that CLL failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, the court also considered the merits of CLL’s claims. The court determined that CLL did not make a showing that substantial evidence supported a fair argument that the project may have a significant effect on the environment. In making its determination, the court emphasized that the project is “relatively modest” and located on already-developed land.

CLL argued that the City was required to prepare an EIR due to potentially significant impacts on fire hazards, traffic and transportation, noise, recreation, and historical resources. The court rejected each of CLL’s arguments. In part, the court was unpersuaded by CLL’s expert’s comments because they were “general” and did not have a specific nexus with the project, they focused on the effects of the environment on the students and faculty at the school rather than on the effects of the school on the environment, and they were conclusory and speculative. In addition, quoting Joshua Tree Downtown Business Alliance v. County of San Bernardino (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 684, the court noted that “dire predictions by nonexperts regarding the consequences of a project do not constitute substantial evidence.” The court also found that a possibility that noise from the project would impact the adjacent business’s operations was insufficient to require an EIR under CEQA. The court explained that the question is not whether the project would affect particular persons, but whether the project would affect the environment in general. In addition, the court explained that the fact that a project may affect another business’s economic viability is not an effect that must be analyzed under CEQA unless the project may result in a change in the physical environment, such as by causing urban decay.

Recirculation of MND

CLL argued that by adding a shuttle bus plan and describing the school’s intent to close on red flag fire warning days after circulation of the MND, the City substantially revised the MND and was required to recirculate the draft prior to certification. The court rejected these contentions, explaining that the added plans were purely voluntary, and thus could not constitute mitigation measures. In addition, the court explained, CLL did not show that the plans were added to the project to reduce significant effects on the environment. According to the court, all revisions to the MND were clarifying and amplifying in nature and did not make substantial revisions to the project, and therefore, did not warrant recirculation.

Historical Resource Regulations

CLL argued that City did not follow its historical resource regulations and guidelines. The court explained that the City relied on an exemption contained within the regulations, but CLL did not address the substance of that exemption, nor did CLL show that the City was actually required to apply the specific procedures contained in the regulations. Instead, CLL simply critiqued the City’s reliance on the exemption as a post hoc rationalization; the court found this was not enough to meet CLL’s burden to show failure on the part of the City.

Consistency with Neighborhood Plan

CLL argued that the project conflicted with the Carmel Valley Neighborhood 8 Precise Plan because the plan designates the site as open space. CLL’s argument was two-fold. First, CLL argued the site could not be developed because of the plan’s open space designation. Second, CLL argued the plan’s designation was in conflict with the multifamily residential zoning at the project site.

With respect to the plan’s open space designation, the court held that CLL failed to meet its burden to show that the City’s consistency finding was an abuse of discretion. The court explained that the standard is whether no reasonable person could have reached the conclusion made by the City. In making its determination, the City relied on the fact that the property was already developed—the school would be sited at the location of a previously-capped swimming pool, and the project would not impact or be developed on undisturbed open space. The court found that the City’s determination was reasonable, and that CLL did not address the City’s reasoning or explain how the City abused its discretion. With respect to the site’s zoning, the court explained that consistency of the zoning ordinance with the plan was not at issue—instead, the issue was whether the project is consistent with the Precise Plan’s open space designation.

The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court and upheld the City’s determinations regarding the project and the associated MND.

Elizabeth Pollock

On Remand, Fourth District Determines that Case Challenging SANDAG’s RTP Is Not Mooted by Later EIR and Resolves CEQA Issues on the Merits

On November 11, 2017, the Fourth District, Division One in Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association of Governments (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 413 (Cleveland II), resolved the remaining issues on remand from California Supreme Court’s decision earlier this year.

SANDAG certified a programmatic EIR for its 2050 Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy in 2011. Petitioners challenged that EIR, alleging multiple deficiencies under CEQA, including the EIR’s analysis of greenhouse gas (GHG) impacts, mitigation measures, alternatives, and impacts to air quality and agricultural land. The Court of Appeal held that the EIR failed to comply with CEQA in all identified respects.  The Supreme Court granted review on the sole issue of whether SANDAG was required to use the GHG emission reduction goals in Governor Schwarzenegger’s Executive Order S-3-05 as a threshold of significance. Finding for SANDAG, the Court left all other issues to be resolved on remand.

First, the Court of Appeal ruled that the case was not moot, although the 2011 EIR had been superseded by a new EIR certified in 2015, because the 2011 version had never been decertified and thus could be relied upon. The court also found that petitioners did not forfeit arguments from their original cross-appeal by not seeking a ruling on them. And, even if failing to raise the arguments was a basis for forfeiture, the rule is not automatic, and the court has discretion to resolve important legal issues, including compliance with CEQA.

Second, the court reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding, that SANDAG’s choice of GHG thresholds of significance was adequate for this EIR, but may not be sufficient going forward. Turning to SANDAG’s selection of GHG mitigation measures, the court found that SANDAG’s analysis was not supported by substantial evidence, because the measures selected were either ineffective (“assuring little to no concrete steps toward emissions reductions”) or infeasible and thus “illusory.”

Third, also under the substantial evidence standard of review, the court determined that the EIR failed to describe a reasonable range of alternatives that would plan for the region’s transportation needs, while lessening the plan’s impacts to climate change. The EIR was deficient because none of the alternatives would have reduced regional vehicles miles traveled (VMT). This deficiency was particularly inexplicable given that SANDAG’s Climate Action Strategy expressly calls for VMT reduction. The measures, policies, and strategies in the Climate Action Strategy could have formed an acceptable basis for identifying project alternatives in this EIR.

Fourth, the EIR’s description of the environmental baseline, description of adverse health impacts, and analysis of mitigation measures for air quality, improperly deferred analysis from the programmatic EIR to later environmental review, and were not based on substantial evidence.  Despite acknowledging potential impacts from particulate matter and toxic air contaminants on sensitive receptors (children, the elderly, and certain communities), the EIR did not provide a “reasoned estimate” of pollutant levels or the location and population of sensitive receptors. The EIR’s discussion of the project’s adverse health impacts was impermissibly generalized. The court explained that a programmatic EIR improperly defers mitigation measures when it does not formulate them or fails to specify the performance criteria to be met in the later environmental review. Because this issue was at least partially moot given the court’s conclusions regarding defects in the EIR’s air quality analysis, the court simply concurred with the petitioners’ contention that all but one of EIR’s mitigation measures had been improperly deferred.

The court made two rulings regarding impacts to agricultural land. In finding for the petitioners, the court held that SANDAG impermissibly relied on a methodology with “known data gaps” to describe the agricultural baseline, as the database did not contain records of agricultural parcels of less than 10 acres nor was there any record of agricultural land that was taken out of production in the last twenty years.  This resulted in unreliable estimates of both the baseline and impacts. However, under de novo review, the court found that the petitioners had failed to exhaust their remedies as to impacts on small farms and the EIR’s assumption that land converted to rural residential zoning would remain farmland. While the petitioners’ comment letter generally discussed impacts to agriculture, it was not sufficiently specific so as to “fairly apprise” SANDAG of their concerns.

Justice Benke made a detailed dissent. Under Benke’s view, the superseded 2011 EIR is “most likely moot” and in any event, that determination should have been left to the trial court on remand. This conclusion is strengthened, when, as here, the remaining issues concern factual contentions. As a court of review, their record is insufficient to resolve those issues.

Sixth District Court of Appeal Holds Breach of Public Trust Doctrine Claim Not Ripe for Adjudication in the Absence of Petitioner’s Exhaustion of its Administrative Remedies

In Monterey Coastkeeper v. Monterey Water Resources Agency (2017) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ (Case No. H042623), the Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment granting Monterey Coastkeeper’s petition for writ of mandate for violation of section 13260 of the Porter-Cologne Act (failure to file a report of waste discharge), holding that the petitioner had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

The Monterey County Water Resources Agency (MCWRA) is a flood control and water agency responsible for operation of the Reclamation Ditch and the Blanco Drain, which collects agricultural wastewater and eventually discharges into surface waters that are subject to the Porter-Cologne Act. Petitioner Monterey Coastkeeper alleged that the MCWRA was in violation of section 13260 of the Porter-Cologne Act for failing to submit a report of waste discharge to the Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB) as required under Porter-Cologne.

Petitioner claimed that it did not have an administrative remedy because the Porter-Cologne Act did not have a defined procedure to administratively pursue grievances for failure to file a report of waste discharge. The court disagreed. It stated that the Porter-Cologne Act expressly gives the RWQCB the authority to require a report of waste discharge, and to hold a discharger civilly liable for failure to do so. The Porter-Cologne Act further provides that the RWQCB may be requested to act, and their decision is appealable to the State Water Resources Control Board. The State Water Resources Control Board decision or order is then subject to judicial review by a writ of mandate. The court found that petitioner could have followed these statutory procedures—but it had not done so. The court held that petitioner had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

Due to its failure to exhaust, the court further found that petitioner’s claim for breach of duty under the public trust doctrine was unripe. The court held that because petitioner had not initiated the administrative review process, there was no administrative record upon which to base a decision as to whether the public trust doctrine had been violated.