Archives: June 2023

FIRST DISTRICT UPHOLDS EIR FOR UC BERKELEY’S WILDFIRE FUEL MANAGEMENT PLAN

In a partially published opinion Claremont Canyon Conservancy v. Regents of the University of California (2023) 92.Cal.App.5th 474, the First District Court of Appeal held that an EIR for wildfire-driven vegetation removal projects did not need to include a tree inventory or identify the number of or specific trees to be removed to comply with CEQA because the EIR contained sufficient information to analyze environmental impacts and preparing a tree inventory was not reasonably feasible.

Background

The Regents of the University of California, Berkeley worked with a wildland fire manager and fire ecologist to prepare a Wildland Vegetative Fuel Management Plan for an 800-acre fire-prone parcel of land on UC Berkeley’s campus, known as Hill Campus. Hill Campus is heavily forested and located in a “Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone,” and “has been plagued by wildfires;” beginning in 1905 and most recently in 2017 when the Grizzly Fire burned approximately 24 acres. The Plan proposed several vegetation removal projects, including one fire fuel break project and three fire hazard reduction projects, with the goal of reducing the wildfire risk on Hill Campus. In developing the Plan and selecting the project locations, the Regents relied on fuel models to predict fire behavior, which considered the different vegetation types across Hill Campus. The Plan proposed removing dead, unhealthy or structurally unsound trees; trees that would torch or burn with high fire intensity; and certain understory shrubs.

The Regents prepared an EIR for the Plan, containing both programmatic and project-level review, and certified the Final EIR in early 2021. The EIR identifies objective criteria for tree removal and proposes the principle of “variable density thinning,” which considers site-specific conditions to create gaps in canopy cover to reduce canopy fire spread. The number of and specific trees to be removed would be determined by a certified arborist and registered professional forester by applying these criteria and this principle.

Two organizations, the Claremont Canyon Conservancy and the Hills Conservation Network, filed petitions for writ of mandate challenging the adequacy of the EIR’s description of the vegetation removal projects. After consolidating the cases, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners, concluding that the EIR’s project descriptions were “not accurate, stable and finite” and only provided “conceptual criteria,” rendering the project descriptions “vague and ambiguous.” The Regents appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

On appeal, Hills and Claremont argued that CEQA required the EIR to identify the specific trees that would remain in the fuel break area and that the EIR’s failure to specify the number of trees that would be removed made it was impossible to evaluate the projects’ environmental impacts; thereby rendering the EIR project description “unclear and unstable” and preventing meaningful comparisons between the plan and the project alternatives. The court disagreed.

The court pointed out that CEQA Guidelines section 15124 requires a project description to include specific information—“the precise location and boundaries of the proposed project on a detailed map; a general description of the proposed project’s objectives, including the project’s underlying purpose; a general description of the project’s technical, economic, and environmental characteristics; and a brief description of the EIR’s intended uses.” The court found that the EIR contained all of the required information. The CEQA Guidelines, the court noted, do not require a project description to “supply extensive detail beyond that needed for evaluation and review of the environmental impact[.]”

The court then noted that, here, where “a project is subject to variable future conditions,” such as “unusual rainy weather, tree growth, impact of pests and diseases, [and] changing natural resources,” a project description must “be sufficiently flexible” to account for those conditions. Hills argued that conditions within the project area would not substantively change in any “unforeseen way.” But, the court found this argument unavailing given the substantial evidence in the record demonstrating otherwise. The court then concluded that as long as an EIR contains sufficient information to enable decision-makers and the public to understand the projects’ environmental consequences it satisfies CEQA’s requirements. Accordingly, the court determined that the EIR “need not specify, on a highly detailed level, the number of trees [to be] removed.” The absence of this information did not violate CEQA because the project’s’ basic characteristics were “accurate, stable and finite,” contrary to the trial court’s determination.

The Regents further contended that it was not reasonably feasible to prepare a tree inventory and so the EIR could not violate CEQA for omitting one. The court agreed, finding sufficient evidence in the record to support this conclusion (steep and rugged terrain of Hill Campus created impediments, high cost associated with an inventory). Because the project area was subject to variable environmental conditions, on-the-ground realities could significantly change between the EIR’s preparation and project implementation, making it impractical to identify specific trees to remove.

Lastly, the court emphasized that “technical perfection, scientific certainty, and exhaustive analysis” are not required of an EIR; rather, it looks at whether the EIR is adequate, complete, and represents a good-faith effort at full disclosure. The court concluded that the EIR “provides sufficient information to understand the projects’ environmental impacts” and “sufficient detail to enable the public to understand the environmental impacts associated with the Regents’ plan to remove vegetation in specific locations on the Hill Campus to reduce wildfire risk.”

The remainder of the opinion disposing of other CEQA claims challenging the EIR’s methodology for wind speed modeling and its analysis of and visual impacts is unpublished.

– Alina Werth

SECOND DISTRICT UPHOLDS CITY OF POMONA’S RELIANCE ON CEQA GUIDELINES SECTION 15183 EXEMPTION FOR APPROVAL OF A ZONING OVERLAY DISTRICT ALLOWING COMMERCIAL CANNABIS ACTIVITIES

In Lucas v. City of Pomona (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 508, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the City of Pomona properly relied on the exemption provided in CEQA Guidelines section 15183 when approving a zoning overlay district allowing commercial cannabis activities on specific parcels located in certain areas within the City.

Background

In the years following the 2016 voter passage of the state’s Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act, which legalized the cultivation, manufacturing, distribution, and sale of nonmedical cannabis and cannabis products, the City of Pomona passed several ordinances in anticipation of allowing cannabis operations within City limits—(i) an ordinance implementing a cannabis business tax; (ii) an ordinance establishing a formal application process to obtain a cannabis business license; and (iii) specifically relevant to the case, an ordinance to develop a commercial cannabis permit program overlay district within existing zoning designations in the City.

To establish this overlay district, constituting a “project” under CEQA, the City underwent a multifaceted process that included the establishment of buffers from sensitive uses such as schools, conducting research and site visits to other cities with legally operating cannabis businesses, meeting with applicable state agencies and the local police department, holding a series of community meetings, and conducting a City-wide parcel-level analysis.

Based on this process, the City determined that a total of six types of commercial cannabis activity could occur with the City—(1) store front retail, (2) manufacturing, (3) cultivation (indoor), (4) testing, (5) distribution, and (6) micro-business. The City prepared a “Determination of Significance” demonstrating that the proposed land uses “are consistent with and similar to already existing land uses” in “the Pomona Zoning Ordinance and the General Plan Update.”  The City also prepared an initial draft overlay map showing 414 parcels where cannabis businesses could be established. The initial map included a parcel owned by petitioner Lucas (which he claimed to have spent two million dollars preparing for operation of a cannabis business), however, the final draft excluded this parcel.

The City then had a third-party consultant prepare a “Findings of Consistency” document, which demonstrated that the project would not “have new or increased significant environmental effects beyond those identified in the 2014 [General Plan Update] EIR” by addressing “each of the environmental issues studied in the 2014 EIR [and] comparing the effects of the proposed project to the effects of the adopted General Plan Update.”

As a result, the City determined that the project qualified for the CEQA streamlining and exemption allowable under CEQA Guidelines section 15183.

At an October 2019 Planning Commission hearing considering the project, Lucas requested that the City reconsider including his property in the overlay district. Other parties opposed the project for different reasons—the nearby cities of La Verne and Walnut requested increased buffers from their City boundaries, as they both prohibited commercial cannabis activity and, in the case of Walnut, questioned CEQA Guidelines section 15183 applicability to the project. The Planning Commission did not recommend project approval to City Council and requested changes to the project.

After the hearing, petitioner and adjacent cities (amongst other commenters) sent correspondence to the City again expressing opposition to the project and making specific requests for changes. The project was thusly amended to create a 600-foot buffer from City boundaries and further remove more than a hundred parcels, leaving 292 parcels eligible for commercial cannabis activities.

In November 2019, the Pomona City Council approved the modified project and adopted the Determination of Significance and Findings of Consistency, and concluded that the project met the requirements in CEQA Guidelines section 15183. The City then filed a Notice of Exemption with the county recorder. The Determination of Significance states that the public has ten days to appeal. No one appealed.

Lucas filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging a CEQA violation for the City’s use of the Guidelines section 15183 exemption for the project. Three weeks before the hearing on the merits, at which the trial court found against petitioner, City voters passed Measure PO, “which adopted a cannabis permit overlay identical to the Project.” A few weeks later, the City Council adopted and ratified Measure PO. Lucas appealed the trial court’s decision, but did not file an appeal or request a court-ordered stay of Measure PO.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

The court bypassed the City’s standing and exhaustion of administrative remedies claims by assuming for sake of argument Lucas prevailed on these procedural issues, and therefore only reviewed the merits of the challenge to the City’s reliance on the CEQA Guidelines section 15183 exemption. The court reviewed this claim under the substantial evidence standard, which, per prevailing caselaw, is proper where an agency determines a project’s consistency with a prior program EIR.

To use the Guideline section 15183 exemption, as noted by the court, a project must be “consistent with the development density established by existing zoning, community plan, or general plan policies for which an EIR was certified,” whereas “consistent” means “the density of the proposed project is the same or less than the standard expressed for the involved parcel in the general plan, community plan or zoning action for which an EIR has been certified, and that the project complies with the density-related standards contained in that plan or zoning.”

As to density, Lucas argued that, because the existing zoning contains no density-related standards, there was no way for the project to be deemed consistent. The court disagreed with this “literal approach” and instead concluded that the omission of the “the exact word ‘density’ or exact phrase “density-related standards’” in a zoning ordinance “does not necessarily mean that those topics were not discussed with different verbiage.” Although the court did not illuminate what verbiage in the applicable zoning ordinance might demonstrate density, it did note that the 2014 General Plan Update EIR, the project’s Determination of Similarity, and the project’s Findings of Consistency all addressed land use and/or density. And, importantly, Lucas did not file an appeal of the Determination of Similarity conclusions. Therefore, he was “foreclosed from challenging any of [its] commercial cannabis activities/land findings.”

On the need for additional environmental review, the court again rebuked Lucas’ “literal approach.” The City’s Determination of Similarity deemed the six types of proposed cannabis land uses “similar to already existing land uses, and as such…covered by the uses contemplated by the 2014 EIR and 2013 General Plan Update.” Thus, just because the 2014 General Plan Update EIR did not contain the explicit words “marijuana” or “cannabis” did not mean it did not address that land use. The court likewise denounced Lucas’ argument that the project presents “unique and peculiar impacts associated with cannabis-related business” because, as it noted, the project itself “does not guarantee anyone the automatic right to establish a cannabis-related business,” it merely “imposes an overlay use on existing zoning” that only provides an opportunity to apply for a business permit. The court again relied on the findings in the Determination of Similarity “that cannabis uses were sufficiently similar to existing uses allowed by the underlying zonig” as substantial evidence supporting the City’s determination.

Lastly, Lucas argued that the project’s impacts on “traffic, air quality, greenhouse gas emissions, land use/planning, noise, and public services” did not fall within the scope of the less-than-significant conclusions made in the 2014 General Plan Update EIR. The court addressed each impact area, ultimately concluding that substantial evidence demonstrated that the project would not generate impacts beyond those identified in the 2014 EIR, and that existing mitigation measures and uniform standards applied to the project would reduce or manage any impacts.

Notably, the court found that Lucas’ concern with cannabis cultivation odor was addressed by the City’s municipal code regulating odor control devices. It also found that cultivation-related energy use, which petitioner claimed would result in “‘extraordinary [greenhouse gas emissions] impacts,’” could be dealt with through development standards, similarly to “other uses that could be developed in the Overlay District subareas.” On noise emitted by backup generators used in cannabis operations, the court opined that “[s]urely back-up generators are also utilized by other retail stores or manufacturers in times of a power outage.” And, in response to Lucas’ claim that the project would result in a greater impact on police services than analyzed in the 2014 General Plan Update EIR, the court noted in particular that “[t]he project would not result in the need for additional police protection facilities.”

– Casey Shorrock

SECOND DISTRICT UPHOLDS CITY OF VENTURA’S DETERMINATION THAT A 1989 BRONZE STATUE OF FATHER JUNÍPERO SERRA IS NOT A HISTORIC LANDMARK AND THEREFORE ITS RELOCATION WAS NOT SUBJECT TO CEQA

In Coalition for Historical Integrity v. City of San Buenaventura (2023) 92.Cal.App.5th 430, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s determination that the City of San Buenaventura, colloquially known as Ventura, acted appropriately and did not violate CEQA when it relocated a statue of Father Junípero Serra.

Background

In the summer of 2020, a bronze statue of Father Junípero Serra, located in downtown Ventura, was the subject of protests and vandalism. In response, the City Council voted to relocate the statue to the San Buenaventura Mission. The bronze statue, which was dedicated in 1989, had replaced a 1936-era concrete statue of Father Junípero Serra that had cracked and was in danger of falling apart.

A citizen’s group, the Coalition for Historical Integrity, challenged the City’s decision to relocate the statue and sought an injunction and restraining order to prevent the removal of the statue. The Coalition argued that the bronze statue was a historic landmark and therefore environmental review under CEQA was necessary. The trial court denied the Coalition’s request for relief and the City subsequently relocated the bronze statue to the mission. The Coalition appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

On appeal, the court held that removal of the bronze statue did not require CEQA review under Public Resources Code section 21084.1 because the “preponderance of the evidence” demonstrated that the statue was not “historically…significant” and likely did not match any definition of historical resources set forth in section 5020.1.

The Coalition first argued that the statue qualified as a historic resource because it was designated as such by the City in 1974. However, as the City countered and the court agreed, it was the original circa 1936 concrete statue that received a historic designation, and not the circa 1989 bronze statue. The Coalition then argued that the City’s historical resources report prepared by a third-party consultant, which found the statue to not be historically significant, did not constitute substantial evidence because it does not provide “participant testimony” and contained no evidence that its author was a qualified expert. The court again disagreed, because “municipal agencies can properly consider and base decisions on evidence that would not be admissible in a court of law” and because the report appeared sufficient. The court further rejected the Coalition’s argument “that section 21084.1 requires the City to find that the statue is ‘no longer’ culturally or historically significant,” noting that “there is no reason why the presumption cannot be rebutted by a finding that the statue was never culturally or historically significant.” Accordingly, the City appropriately determined that the bronze statue was not a historic landmark and thus not subject to CEQA review.

In affirming the City’s decision, the court noted that there is a “40-year-old threshold required for local designation as a historic landmark,” which the bronze statue did not meet. The court also disagreed with the Coalition’s argument that removal of the statue was quasi-judicial and that City Council unlawfully acted with bias and prejudice when deciding to relocate the statue. The court found that City Council was instead acting in a quasi-legislative manner, making a policy decision based on the statue being offensive to some members of the community, rather than a decision based on the criteria of a statute or ordinance. Because the statue was not considered a historic landmark, the court held that code provisions for removing a historic landmark status did not apply.

–  Alina Werth

SECOND DISTRICT HOLDS REGIONAL WATER BOARDS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO EVALUATE UNREASONABLE USE OF WATER OR MAKE FINDINGS OF SIGNIFICANCE WHEN ISSUING WASTEWATER DISCHARGE PERMITS

UPDATE:

On June 2, 2023, the Second District Court of Appeal vacated their prior opinion and issued a revised opinion in Los Angeles Waterkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Board (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 230, following a request for modification from the State Water Resources Control Board and the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board (collectively, the Boards). The Boards sought clarification about the Regional Board’s authority to regulate the unreasonable use of water under article X section 2 of the California Constitution and Water Code sections 100 and 275, and the scope of the CEQA exemption in Water Code section 13389. The court’s revised opinion maintains the original holdings but clarifies their scope.

The revised opinion makes clear that nothing in the holding was meant to limit a regional water quality control board’s authority to regulate the unreasonable use of water. According to the court, its decision expresses “no opinion as to whether the State Board may direct or authorize the regional water quality control boards to take actions related to preventing the waste or unreasonable use of water in coordination with the State Board’s efforts in this regard.” As noted by the court, this clarification is important to ensure that coordination between the regional water quality control boards and the State Board regarding issues of waste and unreasonable use of water can continue and is not undermined by language in the opinion.

The revised opinion also clarifies that, because the instant case only deals with NPDES-equivalent permits that are subject to the Water Code section 13389 CEQA exemption, the court did not decide whether the exemption applies to other types of waste discharge permits not at issue in this case.

– Alina Werth

 

In Los Angeles Waterkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Board (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 874, rehearing granted March 27, 2023, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the Regional Water Quality Control Board does not have a duty to evaluate whether discharges of treated wastewater are an unreasonable use of water under article X, section 2 of the California Constitution and Water Code sections 100 and 275. The court also held that under CEQA, Regional Water Quality Control Boards are not required make findings of significance under Public Resources Code section 21002 when issuing wastewater discharge permits, which are exempt from CEQA pursuant to Water Code section 13389.

Background

The Regional Board renewed permits allowing four publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) to discharge millions of gallons of treated wastewater daily into the Los Angeles River and Pacific Ocean.

Petitioner requested review of the permits to the State Water Resources Control Board, which declined review. Petitioner then filed petitions for writs of mandate against the State Board and the Regional Board (collectively, the Boards), claiming violations of the Water Code and CEQA.

The Boards demurred to the petitions. The trial court sustained the demurrer as to the Regional Board, but overruled the demurrer as to the State Board, finding that the State Board had a constitutional and statutory duty to prevent the waste of water. The trial court also ruled that the Regional Board did not have to comply with CEQA when issuing wastewater discharge permits, pursuant to an exemption under the Water Code.

The trial court held that the State Board failed to fulfill its duty with regard to the four POTWs and accordingly issued four judgments and four writs of mandate against the State Board. The State Board appealed the four judgments. Real Party in Interest appealed the judgment against the State Board pertaining to its POTW. Petitioner appealed the trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer in favor of the Regional Board. The appellate court consolidated the appeals.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

California Constitution & Water Code

The Court of Appeal held that the Regional Board does not have a duty to evaluate whether discharges of treated wastewater are an unreasonable use of water under article X, section 2 of the California Constitution and Water Code sections 100 and 275. The court determined that the Legislature did not design or empower the Regional Board to enforce the mandates of article X, section 2 when issuing wastewater discharge permits. Moreover, it explained that the Regional Board’s role in state water law is to regulate water quality by ensuring the state’s waters are sufficiently free of pollutants to be safe for their intended uses—a role which does not include regulation of wasteful or unreasonable use of water. The court stated that nothing in the Water Code delegates the Regional Board powers to adjudicate and regulate functions of the state in the field of water resources or to take all appropriate proceedings or actions to prevent waste and unreasonable use of water, as it delegates to the State Board.

The court rejected petitioner’s argument that article X, section 2 applies to all government actors, including the Regional Board. It explained that while an action could be brought against anybody for wasting water, petitioner’s claims did not allege that the Regional Board was wasting water, but rather, failed to prevent the POTWs from wasting water, and nothing in article X, section 2 or the Water Code empowers the Regional Board to prevent unreasonable use of water.

The Court of Appeal did not need to reach the issue of whether the State Board has a duty to prevent unreasonable use of water because it concluded that petitioner failed to adequately plead a cause of action against the State Board. It nonetheless explained that the provisions in the California Constitution and the Water Code requiring the State Board to prevent the waste of water are highly discretionary and do not require the State Board to prevent all waste, nor do they dictate how to prevent waste. Therefore, these provisions cannot be read to restrict the State Board’s discretion as to whether to direct its resources towards one method of conservation in its portfolio over another.

CEQA

The Court of Appeal held that Public Resources Code section 21002 does not apply to wastewater discharge permits and, accordingly, the Regional Board is not required to make findings as to whether a project has significant and unavoidable impacts, and whether there are feasible alternatives or mitigation measures that would substantially lessen those impacts.

The appellate court rejected petitioner’s argument that section 21002 imposes environmental review requirements independent of CEQA’s environmental impact report (EIR) procedures from which the wastewater discharge permits are exempt under Water Code section 13389. The court explained that section 21002 does not impose requirements separate from the EIR process; it only has force to the extent an entity is otherwise obligated to prepare an EIR. The court based its reasoning in the language of sections 21002, 21002.1, and 21082, all of which confirm that the EIR is the means by which the agency satisfies the policies articulated in 21002.

The appellate court also rejected petitioner’s argument that an agency can comply with section 21002 by means other than an EIR, and that the Regional Board can comply with this section by using the information and analysis it collects and performs in the normal course of permit approvals. The court explained that it will not read section 21002 to impose such requirements when the Legislature has not specified any means to carry out those requirements apart from an EIR, as there would be no way for a court to evaluate whether the Regional Board’s efforts were sufficient. The court concluded that the Legislature has opted to govern environmental review in this context through the wastewater discharging process by exempting the Regional Board from an EIR requirement.

The court accordingly did not need to reach the broader question of whether Water Code section 13389 provides a complete exemption from CEQA.

– Veronika S. Morrison