In Nassiri v. City of Lafayette (2024) (June 27, 2024, No. A165324) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, the First District Court of Appeal held that the City of Lafayette properly relied on the “Class 32” infill exemption under CEQA Guidelines section 15332 for a 12-unit condominium project located adjacent to commercial buildings and a creek that provided habitat for Bird Species of Conservation Concern by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The Court clarified the circumstances in which a species may be considered “rare” under CEQA for purposes of the infill exemption.

Background

In 2018, a developer applied to demolish a vacant building and construct a new 4-story, 12-unit condominium building on a 0.3-acre lot adjacent to commercial buildings and a creek. The City Council adopted a resolution approving the project and finding it exempt from CEQA pursuant to the infill exemption under CEQA Guidelines section 15332.

The owner of an office building adjacent to the project filed a petition for writ of mandate, alleging that the approval of the project violated CEQA. The trial court granted the petition based on its finding that substantial evidence did not support the City’s determination that the project site held no value as a habitat for endangered, rare or threatened species, but rejected the other CEQA claims.

The developer and the City filed a motion for new trial arguing that the only potential habitat for rare birds near the project was an area not part of the project site under CEQA Guidelines section 15332, subdivision (b) (citing Protect Tustin Ranch v. City of Tustin (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 951 (Tustin Ranch)). The trial court granted the motion for based on its finding that substantial evidence in the administrative record supported the developer’s and City’s position. The trial court subsequently entered judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate. Petitioner appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

Habitat for Rare Species

The Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was not known to have any value as habitat for rare species.

To qualify for the infill exemption, the project site must have no value as habitat for endangered, rare or threatened species. A species is considered “rare” under CEQA when it meets the criteria of CEQA Guidelines section 15380, subdivision (b)(2), and either: (A) “exist[s] in such small numbers throughout all or a significant portion of its range that it may become endangered if its environment worsens,” or (B) “is likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range and may be considered ‘threatened’ as that term is used in the Federal Endangered Species Act.”

The Court explained that while two bird species listed as Bird Species of Conservation Concern by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service were observed on the parcel near the proposed project, Petitioner provided no authority or legal analysis to support its claim that said species are “rare” under the CEQA Guidelines section 15380, subdivision (b)(2). The Court noted that Petitioner’s expert biologist never specifically addressed the definition of “rare” under the CEQA Guidelines, and only opined that the project site provided habitat value for “special-status species” without connecting this opinion to a conclusion that the species were therefore “rare.” The Court concluded that the City, on the other hand, provided substantial evidence in the form of expert reports explaining that the bird species were not “rare” based on the criteria listed under CEQA Guidelines section 15380. Moreover, the Court noted that even if Petitioner’s expert had provided an opinion that the bird species are rare, such a conclusion would only serve as evidence that the Court could weigh against evidence to the contrary.

While the Court did not reach the City’s argument that the “creek area” of the parcel where the bird species were observed was not part of the “project site” based on Tustin Ranch, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 951, it did distinguish that case. Tustin Ranch held that an agency can consider a project site to be only part of an existing parcel for purposes of calculating the required 5-acre maximum site size for the CEQA infill development exemption. Here, the court explained, nothing suggested that the City considered the project site to exclude the “creek area.”

Air Quality

The Court also rejected Petitioner’s argument that the City lacked substantial evidence to conclude that the project would not result in a significant effect on air quality, another one of the criteria that must be satisfied before an agency can rely on the infill exemption.  Specifically, the Court disagreed with Petitioner’s argument that evidence in the form of a consultant firm’s report submitted by Petitioner constituted evidence that the project “would” result in significant effects on air quality, because the report only concluded that the project “may” result in impacts on the surrounding environment and “could” result in a potentially significant impact on air quality. The Court emphasized this distinction because the infill exemption “depends on if [a project] will have a significant effect.” Moreover, the Court agreed with the City that the consultant’s report did not constitute substantial evidence because it did not accurately reflect the scope of construction for the project or provide an accurate estimate of the associated health risks.

In Save the Capitol, Save the Trees v. Department of General Services (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1237, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s discharge of a peremptory writ of mandate and found that on remand, the trial court must determine whether a revised Final EIR remedied the CEQA violations identified by the appellate court in its earlier opinion before discharging the writ. The court held that the matter could be brought by a challenge to the writ return because the court retained jurisdiction to address issues within the scope of the previous merits challenge.

Background

In an earlier case, Save Our Capitol! v. Department of General Services (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 655, 711 (Save Our Capitol), the Court of Appeal determined that an EIR analyzing alterations to the California State Capitol violated CEQA. The court remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to issue a writ “directing [the Department of General Services] (DGS) to partially vacate its certification of the EIR and to revise and recirculate the deficient portions of the EIR consistent with this opinion before it considers recertifying the EIR.” On remand, the trial court ordered: (1) partial EIR decertification and vacation of the project approvals “consistent with the Opinion of the Court of Appeal”; (2) suspension of activities that would physically alter the capitol and no further discretionary approvals in reliance on the decertified EIR; and (3) for DGS to file a final return to the writ “upon certification of a revised EIR.”

DGS partially vacated its certification of the EIR and the associated project approvals and revised, recirculated, and certified the Final EIR. DGS then partially reapproved the project without a visitor center component that was part of the originally approved project. DGS then filed a final return, requesting that the court discharge the writ. The trial court discharged the writ, over plaintiff Save the Capitol’s objection, without determining whether the revised Final EIR remedied the CEQA violations identified by the appellate court.

The Court of Appeal’s Opinion

Remedial Action Ordered

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court could not discharge the writ without determining whether the revised EIR remedied the CEQA deficiencies identified earlier in Save Our Capitol. The trial court’s peremptory writ issued all three types of mandates authorized by Public Resources Code section 21168.9: (1) to void the action or decision by the agency under subdivision (a)(1); (2) to suspend project activities that affect the physical environment until action is taken to bring the situation into compliance under subdivision (a)(2); and (3) to take specific action to bring the determination into compliance under subdivision (a)(3). The court emphasized that the third directive required DGS to remedy the CEQA deficiencies consistent with the appellate court’s earlier opinion. In addition, section 21168.9, subdivision (b), required the trial court to retain jurisdiction, pending compliance with CEQA. The court noted that “ensur[ing] CEQA compliance after violations have been identified” is the “manifest purpose of a peremptory writ in this context.”

The court distinguished McCann v. City of San Diego (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 284, as an instance where the appellate court’s prior direction to the trial court did not order remedial action in compliance with CEQA.

Writ Return Challenge

The parties disagreed whether Save the Capitol was permitted to challenge the sufficiency of the discharge of the writ by writ return or whether it was required to file a new action. The court held that it was acceptable for Save the Capitol to proceed by writ return challenge because the court retained jurisdiction under Public Resources Code section 21168.9, subdivision (b), as expressly stated in the writ.

The court rejected DGS’s argument that Save the Capitol should have used clearer language in the writ to make its preferred interpretation explicit, finding instead that the writ properly encompassed applicable law, the purpose of the writ, and the court’s order. The court also rejected DGS’s argument that requiring remedial action could result in inconsistent adjudications of the same issue if one plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the revised EIR via a new writ, while another does so by objection to the writ return. The court explained that such a result could be eliminated through a consolidation order. The court was similarly unpersuaded by DGS’s argument that allowing Save the Capitol to challenge the revised EIR via objection to the writ return would open the door to new merits challenges because no new issues are permitted to be raised in this manner.

Lastly, the court disagreed with Save the Capitol’s argument that discharge of the writ was premature because one component of the project was not yet reapproved. The court held that that because that component was not reapproved, it was no longer part of the project, and any later approval of that component would trigger a new deadline to challenge the action under CEQA.

In Make UC a Good Neighbor v. The Regents of the University of California (2024) 16 Cal.5th 43, the California Supreme Court held that the EIR for UC Berkeley’s Long-Range Development Plan (LRDP) and the People’s Park housing project complied with CEQA, reversing an earlier decision by the First District Court of Appeal. In doing so, the Court relied on new CEQA amendments (“AB 1307”) enacted by the Legislature for the purpose of abrogating the Court of Appeal’s decision. Pursuant to AB 1307, the Court held that: (1) the EIR was not required to analyze potential impacts related to student noise that could result from either the LRDP or the People’s Park housing project, and (2) the EIR was not required to analyze alternative locations for the People’s Park housing project.

Factual and Procedural History

The Regents approved UC Berkeley’s LRDP in July 2021. The LRDP identifies campus space, housing, and parking needs and describes development strategies generally intended to assist the university in addressing these needs. Among other things, the LRDP proposed the development of 11,073 student beds and 549 faculty and staff beds, in anticipation of enrollment increases.

Shortly after, in September 2021, the Regents approved the People’s Park housing project. Consistent with the LRDP, the People’s Park housing project sought to redevelop the People’s Park site near the UC Berkeley campus to provide 1,113 new student beds, 125 affordable and supporting housing beds, and 1.7 acres of open landscape.

In the summer of 2021, ahead of these approvals, the Regents certified an EIR that analyzed the environmental impacts of both the LRDP (on a programmatic level) and the People’s Park housing project (on a project level).

CEQA Litigation

Petitioners Make UC a Good Neighbor and People’s Park Historic District Advocacy Group (together, “Good Neighbor”) filed a petition for writ of mandate in October 2021, seeking to void the certification of the EIR and overturn the approvals of the LRDP and the People’s Park housing project. The trial court denied the petition. Good Neighbor appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the EIR violated CEQA in two ways: (1) by failing to study the noise impacts resulting from an increase in loud student parties, and (2) by failing to consider a reasonable range of alternative sites for the People’s Park housing project.

Both Good Neighbor and the Regents petitioned for review. The Supreme Court granted the Regents’ petition and denied Good Neighbor’s petition.

AB 1307

While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, and in response to the appellate court’s decision, the Legislature passed AB 1307. Under CEQA, as amended by AB 1307, (1) “for residential projects, the effects of noise generated by project occupants and their guests on human beings is not a significant effect on the environment” and (2) “institutions of public higher education shall not be required, in an environmental impact report prepared for a residential or mixed-use housing project, to consider alternatives to the location [if certain requirements are met].”

The Supreme Court’s Decision

Applying AB 1307, the Supreme Court held that none of Good Neighbors’ claims had merit.

Good Neighbor conceded—and the Court agreed—that under AB 1307, social noise could not be considered an impact of the People’s Park housing project, and the Regents were not required to analyze alternative locations for the People’s Park housing project.

Good Neighbor argued, however, that the EIR was still required to consider social noise impacts resulting from the LRDP because, unlike the People’s Park housing project, the LRDP was not a “residential project” for purposes of AB 1307. The Court disagreed. After finding the meaning of the statutory term “residential projects” to be ambiguous and acknowledging the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the appellate court’s interpretation that CEQA covered social noise from students and their guests, the Court determined that the Legislature intended for AB 1307 to apply to the residential aspects of the LRDP as well as the People’s Park housing project.

Additionally, Good Neighbor argued that the Court should decide its “moot” claim regarding the need to consider alternative locations because it raised issues that involved the public interest and were likely to recur. The Court declined. The Court explained that the mootness doctrine only applies where it is impossible for a court to provide effective relief—not where, as in this case, a petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Accordingly, the Court found that Good Neighbor’s request to consider AB 1307’s application to future projects constituted an impermissible request for an advisory opinion.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court’s opinion and held that judgment should be entered in favor of the Regents.

-Louisa Rogers

In AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Bonta (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 73, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment that Senate Bill 10 (SB 10), which allows local legislative bodies to supersede local housing density caps on a parcel-by-parcel basis, did not unconstitutionally interfere with the initiative power.

Background

Article II, section 11, of the California Constitution authorizes city and county voters to enact local laws through the voter initiative process. Generally, unlike laws enacted by a legislative body, laws enacted by voter initiative may only be altered by another vote of the electorate or in a manner specified in the text of the initiative measure.

SB 10, which the Legislature enacted in response to a “severe shortage of housing at all income levels in this state,” grants counties and cities discretion to supersede local housing density caps—even those adopted via the voter initiative process—on a parcel-by-parcel basis. For qualifying parcels, local legislative bodies may supersede density caps enacted by a local ordinance with a simple majority vote, and those enacted by a voter initiative with a supermajority, two-thirds vote.

Petitioners AIDS Healthcare Foundation and City of Redondo Beach filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an injunction compelling the State of California to cease enforcement of SB 10 and a declaration that SB 10, on its face, unconstitutionally “eviscerates the fundamental protection against subsequent legislative amendment of initiatives without a vote of the people.”

The trial court concluded that SB 10 did not unconstitutionally impair the initiative power and, accordingly, denied the petition. Petitioners appealed.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

Employing a multi-step analysis, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision.

First, the court considered the circumstances in which the Legislature can supersede local zoning and land use laws. The court explained that, generally, state laws generally have supremacy over conflicting local ordinances enacted by non-charter cities and counties. With respect to charter cities, however, any state laws concerning “municipal affairs” supersede conflicting ordinances enacted by charter cities only if the state law (1) pertains to subject matter of regional or statewide concern and (2) is reasonably related to resolving that concern. The court concluded that, given the statewide housing crisis and the reasonable connection between housing shortages and restrictive housing density caps, the circumstances permitted the Legislature to displace local zoning and land use laws by enacting SB 10.

Second, the court determined that SB 10 did in fact displace local laws that set housing density caps. The court explained that local housing density caps expressly prohibited actions authorized by SB 10 (i.e., exceeding the cap), and moreover, that density caps frustrated SB 10’s purpose of promoting higher density housing projects. With respect to local density caps enacted through the voter initiative process, the court explained that statutes may preempt local initiative measures so long as the Legislature clearly intended such an outcome. Accordingly, because SB 10 expressly granted local governments the authority to supersede both legislatively enacted and initiative-based density caps, the court held that SB 10 preempted both types of housing density cap.

Third, the court held that the Legislature’s approach of providing local legislative bodies the power to supersede local housing density caps on a parcel-by-parcel basis—as opposed to outright nullifying these caps statewide—was constitutional. In so holding, the court first pointed out earlier case law in which the California Supreme Court held that the Legislature may grant local legislative bodies discretion regarding local decisions while simultaneously preventing initiatives and local ordinances from impairing that discretion. Additionally, the court reasoned that SB 10’s parcel-by-parcel approach was more protective of the local initiative process than a statewide invalidation of all local housing density caps, especially because it did not prevent voters from passing housing density caps that would require a two-thirds vote by the local legislative body to exceed.

Fourth, the court held that SB 10 did not apply differently to housing density caps already in existence. The court pointed out the SB 10 did not include any exemption for existing density caps, and further reasoned that such an exemption would frustrate the legislative intent behind SB 10’s enactment by substantially limiting local legislative bodies’ discretion to supersede housing density caps.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the Legislature’s enactment of SB 10 did not violate the California Constitution.

– Adam Nir

In Vichy Springs Resort, Inc. v. City of Ukiah (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 46, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment sustaining a demurrer to claims that a project to demolish an existing shooting range, and construct a new one, should have been subjected to CEQA review. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that the claim raised by Petitioner Vichy Springs Resort, Inc. that Mendocino County improperly declined to exercise its regulatory authority over the project, was sufficient to state a CEQA cause of action. The court also held that completion of the project did not moot the CEQA claims.

Background

Ukiah Rifle and Pistol Club operates a shooting range in an unincorporated area of the County, on land that it leases from the City of Ukiah. When the Club sought to demolish the existing range and construct a new range, Vichy sued the City and County, alleging that both entities violated CEQA. According to Vichy’s petition for writ of mandate, the County erroneously determined that it had no regulatory authority over the project, and therefore improperly allowed the project to proceed without first completing CEQA review. Vichy similarly alleged that the City improperly determined that the project was not subject to CEQA. Vichy did not seek a preliminary injunction and the Club completed the project while the case was pending in the trial court.

The County demurred to Vichy’s CEQA cause of action, arguing that the County’s alleged failure to exercise its regulatory authority was not a “project” subject to CEQA. Additionally, the Club and the City demurred to the CEQA cause of action, arguing that it became moot when the Club completed the project. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. Vichy appealed.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment. In the published portion of its opinion, the court held that the Petition properly alleged a violation of CEQA by the County and that the Project’s completion did not render Vichy’s CEQA cause of action moot.

CEQA claim was not moot after project completion

As a threshold matter, the court held that the CEQA claims were not moot because the petition alleged that some of the project’s environmental impacts could still be alleviated. The court noted that the petition included examples of post-completion measures that could mitigate the project’s alleged significant environmental impacts, such as developing a lead removal program, implementing a pollution prevention plan, limiting the hours and scope of shooting range operations, and requiring lead-free ammunition. Additionally, while acknowledging that it would have been preferable for Vichy to seek a preliminary injunction to halt the project, the court nevertheless concluded that Vichy’s failure to do so did not require a finding that the CEQA claims were moot.

The court distinguished other cases holding that completion of the project rendered CEQA claims moot, explaining that the petitioners in those cases did not adequately allege or demonstrate that post-completion modifications or mitigation measures could remedy the claimed CEQA violations.

County’s failure to exercise its regulatory authority could give rise to a CEQA violation

The court also held that the petition properly alleged a CEQA violation by the County. The County argued that its decision to not regulate the project did not rest on any provision of CEQA such that Vichy could properly sue the County “on the grounds of noncompliance” with CEQA’s statutory requirements. The court, however, concluded that the County’s proposed interpretation of CEQA was “overly formalistic,” as Vichy’s ultimate contention was that the County would have been required to comply with CEQA had it properly exercised its authority.

The court similarly rejected the County’s arguments that the petition did not describe a “project” for purposes of CEQA and that CEQA applies only to project approvals but not to governmental inaction. The court explained that the “project” at issue in the litigation was the shooting range demolition and construction—not the County’s alleged failure to regulate. Thus, because the County’s inaction allowed the project to proceed without environmental review that might have otherwise been required had the County exercised its authority over the project, Vichy properly alleged a CEQA violation by the County.

– Natasha Roland

In Delia Guerrero v. City of Los Angeles (2024) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, finding the petition for writ of mandate untimely under CEQA.

Background

Real estate developers submitted an application to the City of Los Angeles to subdivide a parcel and build 42 single-family homes in Northeast Los Angeles. The City prepared an Initial Study/Mitigated Negative Declaration (MND) in June 2016. The applicants later redesigned the project, and the revised project required zoning changes and approvals for retaining walls. The City updated the MND to reflect the changes.

In March, 2017, after a noticed public hearing, the Department of City Planning adopted the MND and approved a vesting tentative tract map for the project. The Department issued a 30-page letter of determination which summarized the applicable conditions. The City filed a Notice of Determination (NOD) on March 25, 2020.

Two months later, on May 13, 2020, the East Los Angeles Area Planning Commission adopted the MND and made zoning determinations and adjustments necessary for the applicant to construct retaining walls. The Planning Commission also recommended that the City Council adopt the necessary zone change. The Commission issued a letter of determination and filed a second NOD on February 4, 2021.

On June 8, 2021, the City Council adopted the MND and the zone change. The City filed a third NOD on June 18, 2021.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

Delia Guerrero filed a petition for writ of mandate on July 16, 2021, and a first amended petition on August 13, 2021, alleging violations of CEQA, Planning and Zoning Law, and the Subdivision Map Act. The City and the project applicants demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer as to the Planning and Zoning Law and Subdivision Map Act causes of action. As to the CEQA cause of action, the trial court concluded that the petition was timely because it was filed within thirty days of the final, June 18, 2021, NOD, and overruled the demurrer. After a hearing on the merits of the CEQA claim, the trial court granted the petition. The City and the applicants appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the CEQA claims were also untimely.  According to the court, the petitioners were required to challenge the MND within 30 days of the first NOD, which was filed on March 25, 2020.

The court raised four key points in reaching its conclusion. First, the court said, CEQA requires public agencies to conduct environmental review as early as feasible. The City did that here when it prepared and adopted the MND prior to the initial March 2020 approval. Second, for projects that are subject to multiple discretionary approvals, the first approval triggers the statute of limitations and later approvals do not restart the clock. Here, the first approval occurred in March of 2020, which triggered the statute of limitations. Third, the purpose of a NOD is to trigger the statute of limitations. Fourth, the petitioners did not identify any changes to the project that might have triggered a requirement for subsequent or supplemental review.

Because Ms. Guerrero filed the petition over a year after the City filed the first NOD, the court dismissed the lawsuit as untimely.

In Santa Rita Union School Dist. v. City of Salinas (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 298, the Sixth District Court of Appeal found indirect impacts resulting from inadequate funding to construct new schools included in specific plan to be speculative and therefore did not need to be evaluated under CEQA.

Background

The project at issue was a specific plan for a 797-acre site in Salinas. The project included 4,340 housing units with up to 15,928 residents at full buildout, and was anticipated to occur over 20 to 30 years.

The City of Salinas prepared an EIR for the specific plan, which provided a very high level of design detail for certain project components. Where sufficient detail was available, the EIR also provided a full project-level analysis. The EIR stated that the design of school facilities and other public facilities was not known at the time of EIR preparation and so could not be analyzed at the project-level.

The EIR disclosed that the project was expected to generate between approximately 1,927 and 2,354 additional students in the neighborhood. To accommodate these new students, the project included three elementary schools, one of which was already operational, and one middle school, all located within the Santa Rita Union School District, and one high school which was already under construction in the Salinas Union High School District. Throughout the administrative proceedings, the two school districts sent comment letters raising concerns that sufficient funding may not be available for construction of the new schools. The districts argued that the EIR was therefore required to consider the possibility that the districts would need to accommodate the new students at existing schools and evaluate the associated environmental effects. In responses to comments, the city concluded that the information provided by the districts was “too speculative, uncertain, and vague” to give rise to meaningful environmental evaluation, and the city declined to conduct any additional analysis.

In December 2019, the city council approved the specific plan. The districts filed a petition for writ of mandate on the grounds that the EIR was inadequate because it did not evaluate the project’s impacts associated with enrolling new students at existing school sites. The districts also alleged the city failed to provide adequate responses to the districts’ comments.

The trial court granted the petition, finding the EIR inadequate for failing to address potential impacts arising from expansion of existing school facilities and concluding the city failed to adequately respond to the districts’ comments. The trial court delineated between indirect off-site impacts related to modification of existing facilities and direct impacts on those facilities.

On June 23, 2021, the trial court entered a written order ruling on the merits. On August 24, 2021, the trial court entered a stipulated order staying entry of judgment to allow time for settlement discussions and indicating that any appeal would be from the later judgment and not the June 23, 2021 written order. On December 27, 2021, the trial court held a hearing to clarify the judgment and orders. At the hearing, the trial court found that severance of portions of the project under Public Resources Code section 21168.9, whereby the court did not set aside project approvals and only required narrow relief related specifically to the analysis of impacts on schools, was appropriate. The court entered judgment on January 18, 2022. Real parties, but not the city, filed a notice of appeal on February 8, 2022.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

Appealability

Initially, the court held that real parties’ appeal was not moot even though the city chose not to appeal and instead comply with the trial court’s judgment. Compliance by the lead agency does not eliminate real parties’ right to appeal where that party is exposed to an award of attorney fees.

Next, the court considered whether the appeal was timely. Specifically, the court considered whether the June 23, 2021, order constituted an appealable final judgment. The court explained that an order is final where it disposes of all issues and does not contemplate any further action. In contrast, where further judicial action is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, an order is interlocutory. As applied to this matter, the court concluded that the January 2022 judgment began the appeal period because not only did the earlier merits order contemplate and direct later preparation of a judgment and a separate writ, but that order also did not articulate the narrow statutory remedies the court ultimately directed in granting the petition.

School Facilities and Funding under CEQA

Reaching the merits of the case, the court explained that pursuant to the Government Code, including Senate Bill (SB 50), and relevant case law, payment of school impact fees “provide[s] full and complete mitigation” under CEQA for a project’s impacts on school facilities due to increased student enrollment. A project’s indirect impacts on the non-school physical environment and reasonably foreseeable impacts on the environment due to construction necessary to accommodate increased enrollment, however, must still be considered. Nevertheless, the court underscored that for an EIR to be required to analyze such indirect impacts, those impacts must be reasonably foreseeable.

Here, the court observed, the parties did not dispute that the EIR complied with CEQA in providing project-level mitigation measures for non-school physical impacts from construction of school facilities, and the city imposed the required developer impact fees.

The parties disagreed, though, regarding whether the city was required to conduct additional environmental review based on the districts’ assertion that there might be insufficient funding in the future to construct new schools. The court held that under CEQA, the city was not required to: (1) ensure additional school-funding mechanisms beyond school impact fees; (2) resolve the districts’ concerns regarding insufficient funding; or (3) analyze speculative, vague scenarios to accommodate increased enrollment at existing school sites as an alternative to the project.

Responses to Comments

The court characterized the districts’ comments as “non-specific, uncertain, and vague” information that identified only generally potential indirect and off-site impacts related to existing school facilities. The comments were based on decisions the districts might make in the future, and did not describe reasonably foreseeable indirect impacts that the EIR was required to analyze. The city’s response that the analysis requested by the districts was speculative, the court held, was therefore adequate under CEQA.