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Third District Declines to Exercise Original Jurisdiction over CEQA Claims and Upholds Lower Court’s Decision Denying Motion to Dismiss Claims Due to Failure to Join Necessary Party

Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758

In a lengthy opinion focusing on the legality of agreements concerning the allocation of Colorado River water, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled (1) it was appropriate to remand the petitioners’ CEQA claims to the trial court, rather than for the Court of Appeal to exercise its original jurisdiction over those claims, and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to dismiss the CEQA claims by virtue of the petitioners’ failure to name as real parties in interest all of the parties to one of the challenged agreements.

In 2003, the Imperial Irrigation District (“IID”), the Coachella Valley Water District (“Coachella”), and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (Metropolitan) entered a “Quantification Settlement Agreement” and (along with numerous other parties) various related agreements.  The agreements served to apportion California’s share of Colorado River water, and to provide a framework for conservation measures and water transfers among the parties.  IID filed a validation action.  Various entities filed answers in opposition to the validation action, as well as separate lawsuits challenging the agreements on various grounds.  The cases were consolidated and coordinated.  In January 2010, the trial court found that a key agreement implementing the Quantification Settlement Agreement was unconstitutional.  In light of this finding, the trial court dismissed CEQA challenges as moot, since the agreements had to be rescinded for reasons other than CEQA.  Various appeals and cross-appeals followed.

In the validation action, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s conclusion that the agreement was unconstitutional.  The Court of Appeal rejected other challenges to the validity of the agreement as well.  The Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary adjudication of an allegation that the parties had failed to comply with the “wheeling statutes.”  (Wat. Code, §§ 1810-1814.)

CEQA challenges remained.  As noted above, the trial court had dismissed those claims as moot based on its (erroneous) conclusion that the agreements were invalid on constitutional grounds.  With the agreements revived, two of the petitioners – Imperial County and an environmental group – urged the Court of Appeal to reach the merits of their CEQA claims, rather than remanding them to the trial court.  The Court of Appeal declined.  Although the Courts of Appeal do have original jurisdiction to hear CEQA claims, the Court concluded the circumstances did not justify a departure from the normal practice of having the trial court consider CEQA claims in the first instance.

Coachella, Metropolitan, and the San Diego County Water Authority argued the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a pretrial motion to dismiss Imperial County’s CEQA lawsuit because the County had failed to name the United States and certain Native American Tribes as real parties in interest.  The trial court ruled the United States and tribes, as parties to certain agreements, were “recipients of approval” for purposes of subdivision (a) of Public Resources Code section 21167.6.5, and therefore “necessary parties.”  The trial court also ruled, however, that they were not “indispensable parties.”

The threshold issue was whether the United States and Tribes were “recipients of approval” under section 21167.6.5.  They were parties to an “allocation agreement” – one of 12 agreements implementing the overall QSA.  The EIR challenged by the County was intended to cover not merely the QSA, but also its implementing agreements, including the allocation agreement to which the United States and Tribes were a party.  The Court of Appeal therefore agreed with the trial court that the United States and Tribes were “recipients of an approval.”

Next, the Court of Appeal considered whether the trial court had abused its discretion in determining that the United States and Tribes were not “indispensable parties” under the factors set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (b).  The Court concluded the trial court had weighed those factors reasonably in denying the motion to dismiss.

Fourth District Rules CSU Has Obligation to Consider Alternative Funding Sources to State Appropriation to Pay Fair Share of Mitigation Costs

City of San Diego v. Board of Trustees of the California State University
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1134

(April 18, 2012, Petition for Review granted; CA Supreme Court Case No. 199557)

The Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled the California State University violated CEQA by considering an appropriation from the State Legislature as the only means of making “fair share” payments for off-site traffic improvements.  The Court ruled CSU had an obligation under CEQA to consider other ways of raising the money necessary to pay its fair share for these improvements.

In 2005, the CSU Board of Trustees certified an EIR and approved a master plan to expand San Diego State University to increase its enrollment from 25,000 to 35,000 students.  While litigation was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341.  The trial court granted the petition and remanded the matter back to CSU.  CSU circulated a revised EIR and, in November 2007, certified the revised EIR and re-approved the master plan.  In December 2007, various local agencies sued.  In March 2010, the trial court concluded CSU had complied with Marina and entered judgment denying the petitions.  The local agencies appealed.

The EIR included an analysis of the master plan’s traffic impacts.  The EIR identified 34 separate traffic impacts.  The EIR also identified improvements that would avoid 30 of the 34 traffic impacts; the other four impacts were identified as significant and unavoidable.  With respect to the other 30 impacts, the EIR calculated CSU’s “fair share” for the cost of the improvements.  The EIR stated payment of fair-share funding was conditioned on requesting and obtaining funds from the California Legislature; if the Legislature did not appropriate the money, then the impacts would be significant and unavoidable.  The City of San Diego submitted comments criticizing this approach as based on dictum from the Marina decision.  In the Final EIR, CSU responded by stating that, under Marina, CSU was obliged to request funding from the Legislature, but could not assure the appropriation of funds.  In its findings, CSU committed to ask for the fair-share funding, but because funding could not be assured, CSU found that the traffic impacts were significant and unavoidable.  CSU conditioned the commitment to pay on State appropriation of the money.  The findings also noted that, even if fair-share payments were made, there was no way to ensure the underlying improvements would be constructed, because the improvements were within the jurisdiction of other agencies (e.g., the City of San Diego and Caltrans).

CSU based its position on the following statement in the Marina decision:  “[A] state agency’s power to mitigate its project’s effects through voluntary mitigation payments is ultimately subject to legislative control; if the Legislature does not appropriate the money, the power does not exist.”  (39 Cal.4th at p. 367.)  According to CSU, absent a legislative appropriation, fair-share payments for off-site infrastructure were infeasible.  The City and other local agencies argued CSU’s rejection of fair-share funding as “infeasible” was based on a misreading of Marina.  They also argued the EIR was inadequate because it did not discuss alternative approaches to making fair-share payments, other than by means of an appropriation by the Legislature.  The Court agreed.  The Marina Court’s statement was dictum, and the Court declined to follow it.  According to the Court, “neither CEQA nor any provision of the Education Code or other statute precludes CSU (or any other state agency) from using nonlegislatively appropriated funding for making voluntary payments to third parties for mitigation of the off-site significant environmental effects of its projects. . . .  The availability of potential sources of funding other than the Legislature for off-site mitigation measures should have been addressed in the DEIR and FEIR and all of those potential sources should not be deemed ‘infeasible’ sources for CSU’s ‘fair-share’ funding of off-site mitigation measures without a comprehensive discussion of those sources and compelling reasons showing those sources cannot, as a matter of law, be used to pay for mitigation of the significant off-site environmental effects of the [p]roject.”  Because the EIR’s discussion of traffic mitigation, and CSU’s corresponding findings, were premised on CSU’s misreading of its legal obligations, they had to be set aside.  Moreover, the EIR did not contain an adequate discussion of alternatives – such as down-sizing the project – as a means of avoiding the need for off-campus traffic improvements.

CSU argued the Court ought not to reach the “fair-share” issue because the proper interpretation of the Marina decision was never presented to CSU during the administrative process.  The Court disagreed, citing letters and testimony stating or implying that CSU had a duty to mitigate the project’s offsite impacts, even if the Legislature did not appropriate money and other funding sources had to be considered.

Appellants San Diego Association of Governments (“SANDAG”) and San Diego Metropolitan Transit System (“MTS”) argued the EIR’s traffic analysis was inadequate because it miscalculated the “average daily trips” (“ADT”) that would be generated by new resident and commuter students.  The Court disagreed, finding that substantial evidence supported CSU’s methodology.  In particular, the EIR had not double-counted reductions in trips from transit use, or resulting from former commuter students moving on-campus.  CSU also acted within its discretion in relying on projections of increased transit use in the future.  Because substantial evidence supported the EIR’s ADT estimates, the EIR’s “fair share” estimates were similarly supported.

In response to comments, CSU adopted a mitigation measure committing to develop a campus-wide “Transportation Demand Management” program, in consultation with SANDAG and MTS, to encourage alternative modes of transit.  SANDAG and MTS attacked this measure as improper deferral of mitigation.  The Court agreed, finding that the measure committed CSU only to consult with SANDAG and MTS, and then developer a TDM at a future date.  The measure did not identify specific actions to be taken, or performance standards to be achieved.

SANDAG and MTS argued the EIR did not provide an adequate analysis of the project’s impact on transit.  The EIR’s traffic analysis estimated that, in the future, the percentage of students relying on the region’s trolley system would increase.  The EIR did not, however, analyze the impacts of increased trolley use.  SANDAG submitted a letter stating CSU had to analyze the trolley system’s capacity to handle the projected increases in use, to identify system capacity constraints, and to describe and adopt measures that CSU would take to increase that capacity.  MTS stated the bus and trolley systems had inadequate capacity to handle projected increases in student use, and that MTS had inadequate funds to support expanded use.  CSU responded that, for CEQA purposes, increased transit use was not an “impact”; moreover, no criteria were available to determine whether the project’s impact on the transit system was “significant,” triggering the need for mitigation.  The Court held that, although CSU estimated the anticipated increase in transit use, CSU did not analyze adequately the impacts of such use.  Once SANDAG and MTS raised the issue, CSU had an obligation to investigate the transit capacity issue.  The record did not contain substantial evidence supporting CSU’s conclusion that the project would not adversely affect the transit system.

First District Upholds State Lands Commission’s Use of Environmental Baseline for Renewal of Existing Marine Terminal Operations

Citizens for East Shore Parks v. California State Lands Commission
(2011) – Cal.App.4th – [2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 1645]

The First District Court of Appeal ruled that an EIR prepared by the State Lands Commission for the renewal of an existing marine terminal used a proper environmental baseline in assuming the continued existence and operation of the terminal; thus, the EIR did not need to assume the terminal would discontinue operations, even though that would occur if the Commission did not renew the lease.

In 1998, Chevron applied to the State Lands Commission to renew the lease for an existing wharf serving Chevron’s refinery located in the City of Richmond.  The Commission embarked on the CEQA process.  Initially, the Commission decided to prepare the EIR assuming that the physical wharf would remain in place, but that operations there would cease.  Over time, the Commission’s position evolved, such that the “baseline” would consist not merely of the physical wharf, but also of ongoing operations.  Using this baseline, the Commission determined the lease renewal could result in significant environmental impacts associated with the risk of oil spills.  In 2007, the Commission released the Final EIR.  In 2009, the Commission certified the EIR, approved the lease renewal, and adopted a statement of overriding considerations.  The “Citizens” sued.  The trial court denied the petition.  The Citizens appealed.

First, the Citizens argued the Commission’s EIR used the wrong baseline, claiming the baseline should have excluded use of the marine terminal.  In this case, the baseline consisted of “existing conditions” at the time the Commission prepared the EIR.  Those conditions included an operating marine terminal.  The Citizens argued, however, that a different rule applied in the context of a permit renewal, since the agency could cause operations to cease simply by declining to renew the lease.  Moreover, because the construction and operation of the terminal predated CEQA, they had never undergone environmental review.  The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that, under the California Supreme Court’s decision in Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 310, the Commission properly focused on existing conditions, not conditions that may have existed decades in the past.  The record showed the Commission’s approach was consistent with permit renewals elsewhere in the Bay Area, and accurately reflected actual operations at the terminal.  Nor was the Commission bound by its initial determination regarding the proper baseline:  “Administrative agencies not only can, but should, make appropriate adjustments, including to the baseline, as the environmental review process unfolds.”

Second, the Citizens argued the EIR should have analyzed an alternative consisting of removing the causeway connecting the terminal to the refinery, and instead burying pipelines.  According to the Citizens, such an alternative would have avoided the project’s impacts on recreation by removing an obstruction to a bay trail.  The Court disagreed, noting that because the causeway was part of the baseline, the EIR properly concluded the lease renewal would not have significant impacts on recreation.  Similarly, the Final EIR’s responses to comments on recreational impacts were adequate, since the lease renewal did not involve new construction that would impact recreation.

Third, the Citizens argued the EIR’s project description should have encompassed the entire refinery, rather than just continued use of the marine terminal.  The evidence showed, however, that the lease renewal was the only action before the Commission, and the Commission had not “chopped up” the project as a means of evading CEQA review.

Fourth, the Citizens argued the EIR’s analysis of cumulative water discharge impacts was flawed.  The Court disagreed, noting that water discharges were part of the existing wharf operation, and therefore part of the baseline.  For the same reason, the EIR did not need to analyze whether the lease renewal was consistent with State legislation calling for establishing a “water trail” around San Francisco Bay.  Moreover, the EIR noted plans to establish a land-trail around the Bay, passing through upland areas adjacent to the terminal.  The Commission urged discussions to establish a route through the refinery for this trail, and Chevron designated a site and committed $2 million to this effort.  Given that the Commission had no jurisdiction over upland areas, the Commission’s efforts sufficed.  The record also showed the Commission consulted with trustee agencies by sending the agencies copies of the Draft EIR.

Finally, the Citizens argued that, under the Public Trust Doctrine, the Commission was required, to undertake an additional review process and impose additional mitigation conditions.  The Court disagreed, holding that, where the Commission’s decision “continued a permissible and long-standing trust use” and the Commission performed an adequate analysis under CEQA, “there was no violation of the public trust doctrine.”

Sacramento Superior Court grants petition in challenge to common-sense exemption for bottling plant

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Sierra Colina Village Project prevails in federal environmental challenge

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First District Court of Appeal Finds County’s Failure to Give Air Quality District Notice of Intent to Issue Mitigated Negative Declaration Was Not Prejudicial

Schenck v. County of Sonoma (Aug. 26, 2011) __Cal.App.4th__ (Case No. A129646) involves an appeal from a challenge to the County of Sonoma’s adoption of a mitigated negative declaration (MND) for a beverage distribution facility. The trial court held the County failed to furnish proper notice of its intent to adopt the MND to the Bay Area Air Quality Control District (BAAQCD). The trial court did not find any other violations of CEQA, including with respect to the County’s adoption of an MND, rather than an environmental impact report (EIR), for the project. Following the County’s filing of a return to the writ and the trial court’s entry of final judgment, petitioner appealed, arguing the County violated CEQA’s notice requirements and that an EIR should have been prepared for the project. The Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claims. Continue reading

Sixth District Court of Appeal Finds City’s Residential Development Restriction Did Not Violate Developer’s Right to Equal Protection and Was Not “Spot Zoning”

On August 5, 2011, the Sixth District Court of Appeal in Arcadia Development Co. v. City of Morgan Hill (2011) __Cal.App.4th__, affirmed a judgment denying the property owner’s challenge to a city ordinance restricting residential development. The appellate court held the ordinance was valid because the city had conceivable rational reasons for the restriction, even if the ordinance only applied to one property within the city’s urban service area. Therefore, the city had not violated the developer’s right to equal protection and had not engaged in discriminatory spot zoning. Continue reading

Sixth District Court of Appeal Allows Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees for Participation in Administrative Process; A Party May Not Be Disqualified From Receiving Attorney’s Fees Because of Personal Stake in the Litigation

On August 2, 2011, in Edna Valley Watch v. County of San Luis Obispo (2011) ___Cal.App.4th___ (Case No. B223653), the Sixth District Court of Appeal overturned a trial court’s ruling that a petitioner is not entitled to attorneys’ fees for work performed in an administrative hearing. The Court of Appeal also overturned the trial court’s determination that a petitioner may be disqualified from receiving fees based on his personal stake in the litigation. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the amount of fees that should be awarded consistent with the court’s opinion. Continue reading

Fourth District Court of Appeal Finds Adverse Effects of Preexisting Environmental Conditions on Residents of Future Developments Do Not Trigger Requirement to Complete an EIR

On June 30, 2011, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in South Orange County Wastewater Authority v. City of Dana Point (2011) __Cal.App.4th__, affirmed a decision denying a petition for writ of mandate under CEQA. The court found that the City of Dana Point (City) had properly adopted a Mitigated Negative Declaration (MND), and an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) was not required in order to address the impact of odor from an existing sewage treatment plant on residents of future developments. The court concluded that the CEQA objections were precluded by the legislative intent and statutory language of CEQA because the petition sought to challenge the project on the basis of preexisting environmental conditions and not the project’s adverse effects on the environment. Continue reading