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Fourth District Court of Appeal Upholds Trial Court’s Ruling that Enactment of Medical Marijuana Ordinance was Not a ‘Project’ Under CEQA

In Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 103, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a challenge to the City of San Diego’s enactment of a medical marijuana ordinance. The court found the ordinance was not a ‘project’ under CEQA.

Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc., in another challenge to a City’s medical marijuana ordinance, filed a petition for writ of mandate against the City of San Diego’s adoption of an ordinance allowing medical marijuana facilities. The ordinance amends the city’s municipal code to regulate the establishment and location of medical marijuana consumer cooperatives. The city did not conduct CEQA review prior to adopting the ordinance.

UMMP argued that the ordinance was a ‘project’ subject to CEQA, and therefore the city was required to comply with CEQA before adopting the ordinance. The court analyzed whether, as a matter of law, enactment of the ordinance was an activity “undertaken by a public agency” that “may cause either a direct physical change in the environment or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment.” Because an ordinance passed by a city is clearly “undertaken by a public agency,” and UMMP did not argue that the ordinance would have a direct impact on the environment, the analysis focused on whether the ordinance would cause a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change.

First, UMMP argued that a zoning ordinance necessarily constitutes a project as a matter of law, relying on language in Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (a). The court rejected this argument, reasoning that although that section lists “the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances,” the examples provided therein illustrate activities undertaken by a public agency. Such activities may or may not qualify as “discretionary projects,” and therefore are not necessarily subject to CEQA.

Next, UMMP argued that the ordinance would result in a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment in three ways—by increasing traffic and air pollution, causing increased cultivation of marijuana, and resulting in new construction activity. The court rejected each of these assertions, explaining that the arguments relied on false assumptions that were unsupported by the record. The court found that the ordinance was intended to increase access to medical marijuana and there was no evidence that it would be more burdensome for patients to travel to cooperatives after enactment of the ordinance, and it was purely speculative to assume any new buildings would be constructed as a result of the ordinance. And if new buildings were constructed, the court said, approval of a new conditional use permit would require appropriate CEQA review for that construction project anyway.

Thus, the court concluded that enactment of the ordinance did not constitute a ‘project’ under CEQA.

Ninth Circuit Upholds EIS for TRPA’s Regional Plan Update

On November 2, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency’s 2012 Regional Plan Update (RPU).

TRPA adopted the RPU as the general governing document for development and environmental protection in the Lake Tahoe region. The RPU generally restricts future development to areas that are already developed, and sets forth the amount of further development that will be permitted in those areas. The precise nature of that development is to be determined in “Area Plans” to be adopted later. Before approving the RPU, TRPA prepared an extensive EIS examining the potential environmental effects of the update.

Shortly after TRPA approved the RPU, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court alleging that TRPA’s actions violated the Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in various respects. Their principal contentions were that the RPU failed to adequately address the localized effects of runoff created by the amount of development permitted, and that the RPU improperly assumed that best management practices (BMPs) could be utilized to achieve the RPU’s planning goals, despite TRPA’s poor record of enforcing BMPs in the past. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of TRPA. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The Ninth Circuit held that the EIS adequately addressed potential impacts regarding water quality, soil conservation, and cumulative effects on biological resources. Applying a standard similar to the one used for evaluating environmental impact statements under NEPA, the court held that the RPU and EIS took the requisite “hard look” at these resource areas, despite that fact that the analysis was generally intended to be region-wide with additional site-specific review occurring later during the approval of Area Plans.

In finding that the EIS adequately addressed the localized effects of runoff, the court upheld TRPA’s reliance on the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) model, which aims to reduce the total flow of certain pollutants into the lake, and noted that the EIS’s storm-water modeling simulation addressed localized effects of runoff near concentrated development areas. The court concluded that the EIS adequately explained its basis for finding that concentrating development in community centers would not result in more concentrated runoff or other water quality impacts.

Regarding soil conservation, the court held that TRPA was not required to perform site-specific analysis of impacts because evaluation of coverage at a more localized scale would occur, as part of the Area Plan process, prior to development taking place.

Finally, upholding the EIS’s reliance on BMPs despite historically less-than-perfect enforcement by TRPA, the court noted that the EIS explained the steps that had been taken to improve enforcement. For example, TRPA’s BMP handbook acknowledged past failures in maintenance and incorporated that experience into updated BMP guidelines. The court also noted that the RPU provided incentives for redevelopment, and thus, was designed to move properties from TRPA’s retrofit program into its mandatory permitting program for new development, which requires BMP maintenance plans and logs. Thus, the court concluded that TRPA reasonably relied on data in the record in concluding that the RPU would have a less-than-significant effect on water quality.

Ninth Circuit Upholds EIS for Tahoe Regional Planning Agency’s Regional Plan Update

On November 2, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a published opinion upholding the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency’s environmental impact statement (EIS) for TRPA’s Regional Plan Update. The panel unanimously affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of TRPA and against the Plaintiffs Sierra Club and Friends of West Shore. The published opinion explains that TRPA’s EIS adequately addressed the Regional Plan Update’s significant environmental impacts and that TPRA’s reliance on best management practices to reduce water quality impacts was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. The panel also affirmed the district court’s award of costs for preparation of the administrative record in favor of TRPA. The ruling is a significant step in TRPA’s efforts to restore Lake Tahoe’s treasured environment and revitalize Tahoe’s communities. RMM attorneys Whit Manley and Chip Wilkins represent TPRA in the litigation.

You can read more from the Sacramento Bee.

Fifth District Court of Appeal Disagrees, in Part, with “Hayward Area Planning” Decision and Awards Costs for Record Preparation to Real Party in Interest

The Fifth District Court of Appeal, in a partially-published opinion, ruled on a cost award in Citizens for Ceres v. City of Ceres (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 237. The court disagreed in part with the decision in Hayward Area Planning Association v. City of Hayward (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 176 (“Hayward Area Planning”), and granted real party in interest’s request for the cost of preparation of the administrative record.

Citizens for Ceres (“Citizens”) filed a petition for writ of mandate under CEQA challenging the City of Ceres’ approval of a Wal-Mart shopping center. At Citizens’ request, the city prepared the administrative record, through its outside counsel. Pursuant to agreement with the city, real party in interest Wal-Mart subsequently reimbursed the city $48,889.71 for the costs of preparing the record.

After the city and real party in interest won on the merits at the trial court, Wal-Mart filed a memorandum of costs requesting payment for the cost of preparation of the administrative record. In response, Citizens filed a motion to tax costs, arguing that the city could have recovered the cost of preparation of the record, but Wal-Mart could not. The trial court granted Citizens’ motion, based on the holding in Hayward Area Planning, and denied Wal-Mart’s request for costs.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court and found that Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2), do not bar a real party in interest from recovering the cost of record preparation where the petitioner requested that the lead agency prepare the record, and the real party reimbursed the agency. Section 21167.6 provides three express options for preparation of the administrative record in a CEQA action: (i) the agency can prepare the record; (ii) the plaintiff can prepare the record subject to the agency’s certification; or (iii) the agency and the plaintiff can agree on a different procedure. The First District Court of Appeal in Hayward Area Planning held that prevailing parties are entitled to seek an award of the cost of preparing an administrative record only when the record was prepared in one of the three approved ways. The Hayward Area Planning court held that a real party in interest could not recover costs when the petitioner directed the agency to prepare the record and the agency delegated that task to the real party interest.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal explained that Section 21167.6(b)(1) requires the parties to “pay any reasonable costs or fees imposed for the preparation of the record of proceedings in conformance with any law or rule of court.” Wal-Mart applied to recover costs under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 and 1033.5, and the court found that there is nothing in section 21167.6 limiting such recovery so long as the record was prepared in one of the three specified ways. Here, the record was prepared in one of those ways—it was prepared by the agency—and contrary to the holding in Hayward Area Planning, the right to recover is not limited any further.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting Citizens’ motion to tax costs and remanded for the lower court to determine whether the requested administrative record costs were reasonable.

California Continues its Leadership in the Fight Against Climate Change

Governor Brown recently signed Senate Bill 32 and Assembly Bill 197 continuing California’s leadership on climate change. SB 32 and AB 197 were inextricably linked—each bill requiring the passage of the other.

SB 32 significantly increases the state’s targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions. It calls for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of at least 40 percent below the statewide limit by 2030.

AB 197 requires CARB to prioritize direct emission reductions and consider social costs when adopting regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as a means to protect the state’s “most impacted and disadvantaged communities.” Social costs are defined as “an estimate of the economic damages, including, but not limited to, changes in net agricultural productivity; impacts to public health; climate adaptation impacts, such as property damages from increased flood risk; and changes in energy system costs, per metric ton of greenhouse gas emission per year.” The legislation requires CARB to prioritize those rules and regulations that would result in direct emissions reductions at large stationary and mobile sources. AB 197 also creates oversight of future CARB greenhouse gas emissions reductions strategies by adding two legislators to the state board as ex-officio nonvoting members and creating a joint legislative committee that will make recommendations to the legislature concerning the state’s programs, policies, and investments related to climate change.

 

Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College District

Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College District (2016) 1 Cal.5th 937

In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court emphatically rejected the notion that public agencies should get no deference in deciding whether to treat proposed projects as changes to previously reviewed projects or as new projects under CEQA. In doing so, the court strongly disagreed with the reasoning presented in the Third District’s decision in Save Our Neighborhood v. Lishman (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1288, which first articulated the “new project” threshold question as a de novo question of law for the courts. The Supreme Court concluded that Division One of the First District Court of Appeal erred in applying Lishman’s “new” project standard to the case at hand, which involved a community college district’s proposed changes to the disposition of a small building complex and landscaped area on a campus for which a campus-wide renovation plan was previously reviewed in an unchallenged mitigated negative declaration (MND). The district considered the subsequent changes in an addendum to the MND and approved the demolition of an existing complex of outdated buildings and their replacement with a new parking lot, concluding that the changes posed no new or more severe environmental impacts than were previously described in the adopted MND.

The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the question of whether Lishman’s “new project” test was the correct approach for courts reviewing subsequent review documents, or whether courts should follow the more deferential, substantial evidence standard explained in Mani Brothers Real Estate Group v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1385. Few appellate courts had followed the Lishman approach after the court in Mani Brothers rejected it. Division One of the First District applied it to the college district’s case in an unpublished decision, but oddly declined to apply it again a few weeks later in its published decision, Latinos Unidos de Napa v. City of Napa (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 192, 201-202, thereby highlighting the conflict in the law.

The Supreme Court noted that the Lishman court’s focus on the similarities or lack thereof in the features associated with an originally-reviewed project and subsequent proposal as lacking any basis or standards in CEQA. The court further noted that because of the lack of any standards or framework for measuring the “newness” of a given project, a “new project” test applied by the courts “would inevitably invite arbitrary results.” Moreover, the court emphasized that, given the purpose of CEQA to ensure agencies consider the environmental effects of proposed actions, focusing on the characterization of a proposed project as a new project or a modified project misses the point of subsequent review. Rather, the court concluded, the fundamental determination an agency must make is whether an original environmental document retains some informational value, or whether the proposed changes have rendered it wholly irrelevant.

The court affirmed the college district’s view (shared by the Regents of the University of California, League of California Cities, California State Association of Counties, Association of California Water Agencies, California Building Industry Association, Building Industry Association of the Bay Area, and California Business Properties Association, who participated as amicus parties at the Supreme Court) that the question of whether an initial environmental document remains relevant in light of changed plans or circumstances is inherently a factual question for the agency to answer in the first instance and is reviewable under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review.

Following oral argument, the court ordered supplemental briefing on two issues: (1) the standard of review that applies to an agency’s determination not to prepare an EIR for modifications to a project that was previously reviewed by a negative declaration; and (2) whether CEQA Guidelines section 15162, as applied to projects initially approved by negative declarations rather than EIRs, was a valid interpretation of the governing statute, Public Resources Code section 21166, which does not mention negative declarations. Guidelines section 15162, subdivision (a) prohibits agencies from requiring a subsequent or supplemental EIR unless the agency determines “on the basis of substantial evidence in the light of the whole record,” that “substantial changes . . . will require major revisions of the previous EIR or negative declaration due to the involvement of new significant environmental effects or a substantial increase in the severity of previously identified significant effects.” The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that application of this substantial evidence standard in section 15162(a) to projects initially analyzed in negative declarations creates a CEQA loophole that permits agencies to evade their obligation to prepare an EIR under the less deferential fair argument standard. As the court explained, “the substantial evidence test referred to in the Guidelines does not, as plaintiff supposes, refer to substantial evidence that the project, as modified, will necessarily have significant environmental effects. It instead refers to substantial evidence that the proposed modifications will involve ‘[s]ubstantial changes’ that ‘require major revisions of the previous EIR or negative declaration due to the involvement’ of new or significantly more severe environmental effects.” The court held that section 15162 constitutes a valid gap-filling measure as applied to projects initially approved via negative declaration, including the college district’s project at hand.

Lastly, the court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the subsequent review schemes in the statute and Guidelines were inapplicable to the district’s project because the originally-approved campus renovation project was more akin to a plan or program than a specific project. Both the Court of Appeal below and petitioner relied on Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307 to conclude that when an agency initially adopts a broad, large-scale environmental document (such as the college district’s original MND) that addresses the environmental effects of a complex long-term management plan, a court can find that a material alteration to the plan regarding a particular site or activity may be a new project triggering environmental review under Public Resources Code section 21151. The Supreme Court rejected the attempt to frame the original campus renovation plan and subsequent changes to the disputed area in this manner, holding that the tiering provisions, and therefore the Sierra Club decision, had no applicability here. The court noted that unlike the program EIR at issue in Sierra Club, the MND previously adopted by the college district was a project-specific review that could not be characterized as a first-tier document.

The Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeal’s consideration the merits of the district’s addendum and approval of the building demolition and parking lot project. The Court of Appeal had not previously reached the merits because of its conclusion that the subsequent project was “new.”

RMM partners Sabrina V. Teller and James G. Moose represented the respondent San Mateo County Community College District in the litigation from the trial court through the Supreme Court.

First District Court of Appeal Applies Substantial Evidence Standard of Review to Subsequent MND and Upholds County’s Decision to Permit Expansion of Buddhist Retreat Center

In Coastal Hills Rural Preservation v. County of Sonoma (2016) (previously published at 2 Cal.App.5th 1234)* the First District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s determination that the County of Sonoma did not violate CEQA or the Planning and Zoning law when it adopted a subsequent mitigated negative declaration (MND) and approved a master use permit to expand the existing Ratna Ling Buddhist retreat center and printing facility.

The Tibetan Nyingma Meditation Center (TNMC) has operated a monastery and retreat center in Cazadero since 1975. In 2004, TNMC purchased an additional property, which it designated the Ratna Ling Retreat Center. Since 2004 Ratna Ling has undergone numerous changes and expansions, including growing from a one-printing-press facility to operating six printing presses. In response to applications from Ratna Ling, the county adopted and approved a series of mitigated negative declarations in 2004, 2008 and 2012. In 2014, Ratna Ling applied for a third multiple-use permit, and the county adopted a subsequent MND to the 2004 and 2008 MNDs, superseding the 2012 MND. The 2014 subsequent MND analyzed Ratna Ling’s application to make permanent four storage tents for its printing-press operation, and construct a new six-bedroom residence and up to eight tent cabins.

Coastal Hills Rural Preservation (CHRP) filed suit, arguing that the county should have prepared an EIR because the project greatly expands the printing-press operation. CHRP also argued that the approval violated the county’s general plan and zoning provisions. The trial court denied the petition, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.

CHRP argued that the project was inconsistent with the county’s general plan and zoning provisions in violation of Government Code section 65300. The site is designated for “resources and rural development” under the county’s general plan, which is intended to “protect lands used for timber, geothermal and mineral resource production and for natural resource conservation.” Contrary to CHRP’s argument that the printing press included “extraordinary levels of manufacturing productions …, massive storage structures and commercial Internet sales,” the court found that substantial evidence supported the county’s determination that the proposed uses were consistent with the land use regulations. The court explained that an agency’s determination regarding consistency with its own general plan is given great deference because “the body adopting a general plan has unique competence to interpret those policies when applying them to a proposed project.” There was no evidence in the record that the printing activities were undertaken for profit, the printing press use had been permitted since 2004, and the Board fully considered the county’s land use policies and the extent to which the project conforms to those policies.

The Court of Appeal also affirmed the trial court’s determination that the Board did not violate CEQA. Because the court was considering the county’s decision to prepare a subsequent MND where an MND had already been prepared under Public Resources Code section 21166, the court applied the substantial evidence test rather than the fair-argument standard of review. The court noted that the issue of the standard of review is currently before the California Supreme Court in Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo Community College Dist. (Sept. 26, 2013, A135892 [nonpub. opn.]), review granted Nov. 5, 2013, S214061).

The court found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that any fire risks posed by the storage tents were adequately mitigated: the membranes covering the tents met applicable fire protection standards, there was 200 to 300 feet of defensible space around each tent, and a condition of approval required Ratna Ling to provide and maintain its own onsite fire engine. In addition, the court held that, regardless of whether the county should have included the tents in the baseline for its analysis, substantial evidence in the record indicated that the Board fully considered the potential impacts of the tents.

The court also ruled against arguments put forth by amicus curiae Friends of the Gualala River and Forest Unlimited. Contrary to those arguments, the county’s Hazard Mitigation Plan was not effective until October 25, 2011, well after the storage tents were permitted and constructed, and therefore was inapplicable. In addition, the county did not improperly defer mitigation when it required Ratna Ling to coordinate with the fire district and comply with all fire-related conditions, because the mitigaton simply granted the county the right to impose new, stricter requirements if deemed necessary.

Finally, CHRP argued that the county engaged in impermissible spot zoning. The court explained that because the record and the relevant zoning regulations did not suggest that the authorized use for Ratna Ling is prohibited as to all other parcels in the same zone, this was not impermissible spot zoning in violation of Government Code section 65852.

*On November 22, 2016, the California Supreme Court granted review (210 Cal.Rptr.3d 14), depublished the decision, and transferred the case back to the First District, Division One, for reconsideration in light of Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College District et al. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 937, 957–959. On May 16, 2016, the First District filed an unpublished decision in matter, available at 2017 WL 2118370.

Sixth District Court of Appeal Upholds EIR for a Quarry Reclamation Plan, Rejecting Arguments Under CEQA and SMARA

On August 31, 2016, the Sixth District issued a decision in Bay Area Clean Environment v. Santa Clara County (previously published at: 2 Cal.App.5th 1197)* upholding the County’s EIR for a quarry reclamation plan. The non-profit challenger asserted claims under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (SMARA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The court concluded that the county had not violated either statute.

The 3,510-acre quarry started producing limestone and aggregate in the early 1900s. In 2006, the Department of Conservation concluded that the quarry was violating SMARA because slope instability issues had not been properly addressed in the earlier 1985 reclamation plan. High selenium levels downstream of the quarry also posed a problem. In 2007 and 2010, Real Party in Interest Lehigh Southwest Cement Company applied to the county for amendments to the 1985 plan that would close one pit while allowing for the opening of new mining areas to replace the reclaimed pit. In particular, the 2010 application proposed a new pit called the South Quarry. But, subsequently, Lehigh applied in 2011 for an amendment to the 1985 reclamation plan that closed the problematic pit without proposing any new pits. This 2011 application superseded all earlier applications.

The county prepared an EIR for the reclamation plan amendment and made the requisite findings under both CEQA and SMARA. The county concluded that the project would result in significant and unavoidable impacts of excess selenium runoff during the 20-year period of reclamation. Bay Area Clean Environment and Midpeninsula Regional Open Space District filed challenges to the project. Midpeninsula ultimately settled with Lehigh, but Bay Area Clean Environment appealed the trial court’s denial of its petition for writ of mandate.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal started by addressing the SMARA claims. First, the court concluded that evidence in the record supported the county’s finding that the reclamation plan complies with SMARA with regard to water quality. The court explained that SMARA provided the county with discretion to allow reclamation activities that may result in adverse impacts—such as the additional deposition of selenium in Permanente Creek—if those actions were necessary to comply with federal and state laws. Second, the court held that evidence in the record supported the county’s conclusion that the project’s impacts to red-legged frogs were mitigated to the extent possible.

The court turned to the CEQA claims next. First, the court rejected the challenger’s argument that the county had failed to analyze the cumulative impact of the potential new South Quarry pit that had been proposed in the earlier 2010 application. The court explained that the South Quarry pit was not a reasonably foreseeable future project because the application for a use permit for the new pit had been withdrawn. The court also noted that the county had not engaged in improper piecemealing because the amendment to the reclamation plan was a stand-alone project that did not depend on the future approval of a South Quarry pit.

Second, the court addressed the argument that the county’s findings about impacts to the red-legged frog were insufficient and not supported by substantial evidence. The EIR reported that direct impacts to the frog would be less than significant. The EIR also determined that impacts to aquatic life, of which the frog is included, from excess selenium runoff in the downstream areas would be significant and unavoidable. The court concluded that substantial evidence in the record supported the EIR’s conclusions about both direct and indirect impacts to the frog. The court also held that a statement of overriding considerations for impacts to the frog was not required because the potential direct impacts to the frog were less than significant. Although it is not clear from the opinion, presumably the county adopted a statement of overriding considerations for the significant and unavoidable impact to aquatic life from excess selenium runoff. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that a statement of overriding considerations directed specifically to the frog was required.

Finally, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant Lehigh’s motion to augment the administrative record. Lehigh had argued that an email between a herpetologist and staff of the Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) should be included in the record under Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (e)(10). In the email, Dr. Mark Jennings explained to DFW staff that his 2007 report contained typographical errors and that he had in fact never observed the red-legged frog in one particular pond. This email was sent to the consulting firm that prepared the biological resources assessment for the EIR. The court concluded that the email could be properly included in the record as evidence of the presence or absence of the frog in the reclamation area that was relied upon by the consultants who prepared the biological study for the EIR.

* Review Denied and Ordered Not to be Officially Published ,December 14, 2016, per Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115, 8.1120 and 8.1125.

The Council on Environmental Quality Finalizes Guidance Directing Agencies to Consider Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in NEPA Reviews

The Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) released final guidance providing a framework for federal agencies to quantify greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions for projects subject to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). When addressing climate change, agencies should consider both the potential effects of a proposed action on climate change as well as the effects of climate change on a proposed action and its environmental impacts.

CEQ recommends using projected GHG emissions as a proxy to quantify impacts—along with providing a qualitative discussion of the relationship between GHG emissions and climate change—to assist federal agencies in making “a reasoned choice among alternatives and mitigation actions.” Both direct and indirect effects should be analyzed in comparison to the no-action alternative—amounting to cumulative effects analysis. The guidance expressly provides that a separate cumulative effects analysis for GHG emissions is not necessary. The preference is for a quantitative analysis of GHG emissions based on available tools and information. Where agencies do not quantify projected GHG emissions, a qualitative analysis should be included along with an explanation of why quantification was not reasonably available. Simply stating that the proposed project represents only a small fraction of GHG emissions globally is insufficient. Finally, proposed mitigation of GHG emissions should be evaluated to ensure they are “verifiable, durable, enforceable, and will be implemented.”

In analyzing how climate change will affect a proposed project, CEQ does not expect agencies to undertake original research or analysis; rather the expectation is that agencies will rely on existing, relevant scientific literature, incorporating such research by reference into an environmental document. Accounting for climate change during the planning process allows agencies to consider a project’s vulnerability to climate change, in addition to particular impacts of climate change on vulnerable communities, allowing agencies to explore opportunities to increase a project’s resilience to climate change as part of the initial design.

Overall, CEQ would have agencies treat the analysis of GHG emissions and climate change like any other environmental impact under NEPA. The guidance acknowledges that the “rule of reason” and proportionality play a role in determining the extent of analysis, which should be commensurate with the quantity of projected GHG emissions “as it would not be consistent with the rule of reason to require the preparation of an EIS for every federal action that may cause GHG emissions regardless of the magnitude of those emissions.”

This guidance does not carry the force and effect of law. Nevertheless, it does provide a common approach to be used by federal agencies in analyzing climate change, and is bound to be persuasive in determining whether an EIS adequately addresses climate change impacts.