Posts Tagged ‘Certified Regulatory Program’


In Pesticide Action Network North America v. California Department of Pesticide Regulation (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 224 (republished as modified) the First Appellate District reversed the Alameda Superior Court and found that environmental documents prepared by the California Department of Pesticide Regulation, regarding amended labelling for two pesticides, inadequately analyzed potential impacts on honeybees. The court held that the Department was required to analyze the environmental baseline, alternatives, and cumulative impacts in documents promulgated under CEQA’s exemption for certified regulatory programs (CRP).

The Department of Pesticide Regulation registers all pesticides in California, after evaluating their efficiency and potential for impacts to human health and the environment. The Department has a continuing obligation to reevaluate pesticides, and may cancel a prior registration. Since 2006, there has been a documented widespread collapse of honey bee colonies in the United States. One suspected factor is exposure to pesticides such as dinotefuran, the active ingredient in pesticides sold by the real parties. For this reason, in 2009, the Department initiated the still-ongoing process of reevaluating dinotefuran’s registration. Simultaneously, in 2014, the Department issued public reports for a proposal to amend labels for pesticides containing dinotefuron. The amended labels would allow the pesticides to be used on fruit trees, and in increased quantities. The reports concluded that the use of each pesticide in a manner consistent with the new labels would have no direct or indirect significant adverse environmental impacts, and therefore the Department did not propose alternatives or mitigation measures. The Department issued a final approval of the label amendments in June 2014. Pesticide Action Network filed a petition for writ of mandate in Alameda Superior Court and after a lower court finding for the Department, this appeal followed.

The Department’s pesticide program falls under the CEQA section 21080.5 exemption for CRPs. This exemption permits a state agency to rely on abbreviated environmental review documents, which are the functional equivalent of CEQA documents. Here, the Department issued the functional equivalent of a negative declaration. The standard of review is whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion, which is established if the agency did not proceed in a manner required by law, or if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence.

First, the court rejected the Department’s assertion that because it operates a CRP, its functionally-equivalent environmental review documents are otherwise exempt from CEQA’s substantive requirements. The court found that section 21080.5 is a “limited” exemption, and environmental review must otherwise comply with CEQA’s policy goals, substantive requirements, content requirements stated in section 21080.5, and any other CEQA provisions, as well as the Department’s own regulations.

Second, the court found that the Department’s report was inadequate under CEQA because it failed to analyze alternatives and cumulative impacts, and did not describe the environmental baseline. With respect to alternatives, contrary to the Department’s assertion, a functionally-equivalent document prepared under a CRP must consider alternatives, as required by both CEQA and the Department’s own regulations. The Department argued that it did not need to consider alternatives because it concluded there would be no significant environmental impacts. The court explained that the standard for a CRP for determining whether an adverse impact may occur is the same as the “fair argument” standard under CEQA. Furthermore, the content requirements for environmental review under a CRP require that a state agency provide proof–either a checklist or other report–that there will not be adverse effects. The court found that the Department did not produce or consider such evidence.

The court also held that the substantive requirements and broad policy goals of CEQA require assessment of baseline conditions. The Department argued that it had acknowledged and assessed baseline conditions, but the court disagreed. The Department’s baseline discussion was based on one statement that “the uses are already present on the labels of a number of currently registered neonicotinoid containing products.” The court found that this general statement was not sufficient.

The court found that the Department also abused its discretion when it failed to consider cumulative impacts. In its report, the Department simply stated that the cumulative analysis would be put off until the reevaluation was complete. The court found that this one-sentence discussion lacked facts and failed to provide even a brief explanation about how the Department reached its conclusion.

Finally, the court found that the Department is required to recirculate its analysis. Recirculation is required when significant new information is added to an environmental review document, after notice and public comment has occurred, but before the document is certified. The court explained that, in light of the Department’s required reevaluation, its initial public reports on the amended labeling were so “inadequate and conclusory” that public comment on them was “effectively meaningless.”

Pesticide Action Network provides important guidance regarding environmental compliance under a CEQA-exempt CRP. The court emphasized that unless specifically exempt from a CEQA provision, even functionally-equivalent CRP documents must comply with CEQA’s substantive requirements and broad policy goals. Also notable was the court’s application of the “fair argument standard” to the analysis of whether an impact would be significant under the functional equivalent of a negative declaration.

The Second District Court of Appeal in Conway v. State Water Resources Control Board rejected claims that the Regional Water Quality Control Board improperly established “total maximum daily loads” or TMDLs. The court also rejected challenges to the Board’s compliance with CEQA in establishing TMDLs.

The Clean Water Act requires all states to identify polluted water bodies within their jurisdictions. For all such water bodies the state must set TMDLs, which is the maximum amount of pollutants (or load) that a water body can receive from point and nonpoint sources. The Regional Water Quality Control Board has established the TMDLs for pollutants in McGrath Lake. McGrath Lake is surrounded primarily by agricultural fields, as well as petroleum facilities, public roads, and a former landfill. The lake including its lake bed sediment is polluted with pesticides and polychlorinated byphenyls (PCBs).

Owners of private property on the lake will likely be held responsible for remediation of the pollution. They challenged the TMDL established for the lake, arguing that it may only be stated in terms of pollutants in the water. They contend the TMDL is impermissibly stated in terms of concentration of pollutants in lake bed sediment. On this basis, the petitioners argued that the TMDLs violate the Clean Water Act and the state Water Code. They also argued that the TMDL was adopted in violation of the CEQA. The trial court denied their petition for a writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District affirmed, holding that for the purposes of establishing TMDL the lake is both its water and its sediment.

Petitioners’ unsuccessful theory was that  TMDL can only regulate the movement of pollutants into the water column, pointing out that the Code of Federal Regulations definition of a “Load” as the “amount of matter [contaminants] introduced into a receiving water.”

The court was not convinced. The court noted that in this case the sediment is wet, it is intermixed with the lake waters, and thus it is part of the lake. The Regional Board could reasonably determine that the lake bed sediment is not a distinct physical environment. Instead, the lake waters and the lake bed sediment form a single physical environment. Notably, pollutants in the sediment leach into the water. The court also noted that the federal regulations give the Board expansive authority for defining how TMDLs are measured, as appropriate to the circumstances: “TMDLs can be expressed in terms of either mass per time, toxicity, or other appropriate measure.”

Petitioners further argued that “other appropriate measure” for measuring TMDL could not include measurement by concentration in the sediment. Petitioners argued that this would present a “slippery slope” towards expansive regulation of activities on land, such as regulation of pesticide use on agricultural land.

The court seemed unwilling to follow petitioners down this rabbithole, reasoning: “But slipping down the slope stops where application of a law or regulation becomes unreasonable.”  If it would be unreasonable or absurd to interpret the Clean Water Act and its implementing regulations as applying to land miles from the lake, the law and regulations will not be so interpreted, it held. But this case was not concerned with land miles from the lake, but with the lake bed itself.

The court also rejected, in fairly summary terms, Petitioners’ CEQA challenge. Essentially, Petitioners argued that the Board, which complies with CEQA through a certified regulatory program, had to consider the impacts of whatever remediation activities would be needed to reach the established TMDLs. Petitioners further argued that “dredging” was the only feasible remediation technique, and so the Board had to evaluate the impacts of dredging. The court disagreed. It noted that the adoption of TMDLs was only the first step in the process. The environmental review for that was appropriately tiered, according to the court. The Board had neither planned nor proposed to adopt any particular method for cleanup at this time. Without discussing whether cleanup ought to be at least disclosed as a reasonably future phase of the Project, the court summarily dismissed the CEQA claims. It held cleanup was a decision for the future, and would be subject to further environmental review in the future.

 

The court held that a Nonindustrial Timber Management Plan (NTMP) approved by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) authorizing logging on 615 privately owned acres in Mendocino County did not violate CEQA. Center for Biological Diversity v. Cal. Dept. of Forestry and Fire Protection (Dec. 30, 2014) ___ Cal.App.4th ___, Case No. A138914.

Timberland use in California is primarily governed by the Forest Practice Act and Forest Practice Rules. An NMTP is a long-term plan for sustained yield timber production utilized by owners of less than 2500 acres of timberland and whose focus is not manufacturing forest products. Though Cal Fire’s approval of timber operations is generally subject to CEQA, the Forest Practice Act’s regulatory scheme is a certified regulatory program. An NTMP functions as the equivalent of an EIR.

In October 2008, the Bower family submitted a proposed NTMP to Cal Fire seeking authorization for timber harvesting activities northeast of Gualala. Petitioners took issue with the fact that Cal Fire approved, and the Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) did not object to, logging activity on a 17-acre section that DFW identified as a Late Succession Forest Stand (LSFS). This LSFS was considered a potential functional nesting habitat for a threatened seabird, the marbled murrelet. At the same time, there was no known history of any actual murrelet nesting in the LSFS.

Following a preharvest inspection of the Bowers’ property, a forester asserted the LSFS had only marginal potential for marbled murrelet occupation. A revised NTMP submitted in 2009 required retention of several large-diameter trees to benefit wildlife. Cal Fire issued responses to public comments on the NTMP and approved the document, concluding that large wildlife trees were being preserved, and species largely dependent on late seral habitat features would not be adversely impacted. DFW did not submit a nonconcurrence.

Petitioners filed a petition for a writ, complaint for breach of public trust, and request for injunctive relief. Petitioners contended that Cal Fire, in approving the NTMP, had failed to comply with CEQA and the Forest Practice Rules. They insisted the cumulative impacts of the proposed logging would eliminate enough large trees in the LSFS to render the stand unsuitable for murrelet nesting. Petitioners also argued the NTMP violated the California Endangered Species Act (CESA) by authorizing logging that would be adverse to nesting habitat essential for the survival and recovery of the murrelet.

Reviewing Cal Fire’s approval under the substantial evidence standard, the court denied the petition. It characterized petitioners’ contentions as disagreements over the evidence—parties drawing “dramatically differing conclusions from the same record.” The calculations and comparisons petitioners attempted to make, even if accurate, did not offer a complete description of the resulting environment, the court stated. Furthermore, Cal Fire was entitled to choose between differing expert opinions. Petitioners failed to affirmatively show that there was no substantial evidence in the record to support Cal Fire’s findings. The court also rejected petitioners’ claims that the NTMP did not analyze a reasonable range of alternatives.

Petitioners also claimed the NTMP should have been recirculated based on “significant new information” added prior to certification. They cited to a 2009 one-page memorandum from a Cal Fire biologist recommending additional protective measures for large tree retention. Each of the biologist’s recommendations were addressed in additional mitigation measures. The court found that the memo disclosed no new environmental impacts nor any substantial increase in the severity of an impact. The mitigation measures added in response to the memo were discussed in a second review, in which petitioners participated, and were accepted eight days prior to the close of the public comment period.

Petitioners’ CESA claims failed because Cal Fire found that implementation of the plan, as mitigated, would not result in take, jeopardy, or adverse modification of habitat in violation of the CESA. That finding was supported by substantial evidence.

Petitioners’ claim against DFW also failed. Petitioners cited no authority for the proposition that an NTMP is subject to review through traditional mandamus under CCP section 1085, particularly when the petition is not directed to the agency with authority to approve or reject the project. DFW’s decision not to actively oppose Cal Fire’s decision was merely an exercise of agency discretion.

In POET, LLC v. State Air Resources Board (2013) __Cal.App.4th__ (Case No. F064045) (POET), the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the California Air Resources Board (CARB) committed procedural violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved regulations for the nation’s first “Low Carbon Fuel Standard” program. The court ruled that CARB must set aside its approval of the regulations and take proper actions to comply with CEQA, but that the regulations should remain operative in the meantime in the interest of protecting the environment.

Facts and Procedural Background

The Low Carbon Fuel Standard regulations took effect in 2011 as part of the California Global Solutions Act of 2006 (Assembly Bill 32). The Act established the first comprehensive greenhouse gas regulatory program in the United States. The regulations at issue in POET were designed to reduce the carbon content of transportation fuels used in California.

On April 23, 2009, at the close of the public comment period, CARB passed a resolution that approved the proposed regulations for adoption. The resolution designated the board’s executive officer as the “decision maker” assigned to respond to certain remaining environmental issues. The board gave the executive officer authority to modify and adopt the regulations, but he did not have the option of declining to implement them.

The plaintiffs in the case included POET, LLC, which produces corn ethanol in the Midwest. POET challenged the regulations, claiming CARB violated CEQA during the adoption process. The Fresno County Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of mandate and entered judgment in favor of CARB. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeal’s Analysis

As a threshold matter in its 95-page opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded CARB’s actions were subject to CEQA. CARB contended that because it operated a certified regulatory program, it was required to follow only the procedures set out in its specific regulatory program. The court disagreed. Certified regulatory programs are exempt from CEQA’s procedural requirements regarding preparation of negative declarations and EIRs under Public Resources Code section 21080.5, which provides that a state agency’s preparation of environmental documents under its own regulatory program may serve as the functional equivalent of an EIR. The court noted, however, that this exemption is narrow and such regulatory programs remain subject to “CEQA’s broad policy goals and substantive standards,” including the timing of environmental review and approval of projects.

In its analysis of the CEQA claims, the court first determined that approval of the project under CEQA occurred when the CARB’s decision-making board (Board) approved the regulations for adoption in April 2009. CARB argued approval did not occur until the executive officer took final action on the regulations the following year. The court applied Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116 (Save Tara), calling it “the leading case regarding the application of the definition of ‘approval’ under CEQA Guidelines section 15352.” The Supreme Court in Save Tara articulated a general test for determining the point at which agency action on a proposed project necessitates CEQA review. The Fifth District quoted Save Tara in noting the determination must take into account the terms of the resolution as well as “the surrounding circumstances to determine whether, as a practical matter, the agency has committed itself to the project . . . so as to effectively preclude any alternatives or mitigation measures that CEQA would otherwise require . . . .”

Save Tara involved a private project and a post-approval CEQA EIR compliance condition in an agreement to convey property. The Fifth District extended the Save Tara principles regarding project approval to “projects undertaken by public agencies under certified regulatory programs.” The court held that the Board’s 2009 approval of the Low Carbon Fuel Standard regulations constituted “approval,” based on the clear language in numerous Board documents, as well as the practical effects of the action.

From there, the court concluded CARB violated CEQA because its environmental review under its certified regulatory program was not completed before the regulations were approved. The court noted that this “premature approval” decided a controversial issue involving carbon intensity values related to land use changes for ethanol produced from corn. This was because CARB, in delegating subsequent environmental review authority to the executive director, expressly denied the executive director the authority to modify this aspect of the regulations.

The court also held the CARB “violated a fundamental policy of CEQA” by improperly delegating responsibility for completing the environmental review process to its executive director. Under CEQA Guidelines section 15025, subdivision (b) and case law, a public agency’s decisionmaking body may not delegate the review and consideration of a final EIR or approval of a negative declaration prior to approval of a project. “For an environmental review document to serve CEQA’s basic purpose of informing governmental decision makers about environmental issues, that document must be reviewed and considered by the same person or group of persons who make the decision to approve or disapprove the project at issue.” The court stated that this purpose “applies with equal force whether the environmental review document is an EIR or documentation is prepared under a certified regulatory program.”

The Court of Appeal further held that the CARB violated CEQA when it deferred formulating mitigation measures for NOx emissions from biodiesel fuel. Courts have recognized an exception to the general rule prohibiting the deferral of the formulation of mitigation measures under CEQA Guidelines section 15126.4, subdivision (a)(1)(B). The court stated that under this exception, an agency must commit to “specific performance criteria for evaluating the efficacy of the measures implemented.” In this case, the court held that CARB’s statement that future rules would “establish specifications to ensure there is no increase in NOx” failed to constitute the objective performance criteria required for the exception.

The Remedy

The court remanded the case, directing the trial court to issue a writ of mandate compelling CARB to set aside its approval of the Low Carbon Fuel Standard regulations while allowing the Low Carbon Fuel Standard program to remain in place “as long as [the Air Resources Board] is diligent in taking the action necessary” to comply with CEQA. The court concluded that “the environment will be given greater protection” if the status quo is preserved. The court noted this was a rare outcome. More commonly, the courts have set aside rules, ordinances or other types of written requirements governing third party action when CEQA has been violated. But the court determined that such a remedy was appropriate under power authorized it by Public Resources Code, section 21168.9.