The Second District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s determination that a beach restoration project, including incorporation of a settlement agreement entered into by the Broad Beach Geologic Hazard Abatement District (BBGHAD) and the City of Moorpark, constituted a single project that is statutorily exempt from CEQA review. The court also held that BBGHAD abdicated its police power in parts of the settlement agreement, rendering certain provisions void. (County of Ventura v. City of Moorpark (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 377)

BBGHAD was formed to restore a 46-acre stretch of beach in Malibu. The restoration project, which was determined to be statutorily exempt from CEQA, required deposits of large quantities of sand at five-year intervals. Each deposit would generate 44,000 one-way truck trips over the course of three to five months. Moorpark officials were concerned that the haul trucks would negatively impact the city’s residents. Moorpark and BBGHAD ultimately entered into a settlement agreement to resolve these concerns. The settlement agreement contained restrictions on the haul routes that BBGHAD could use for the project.

The County of Ventura challenged the project. The trial court denied Ventura’s petition for writ of mandate and request for injunctive relief, and denied in part and granted in part the request for declaratory relief. This appeal followed.

CEQA Exemption Claim

Ventura argued that the settlement agreement was distinct from the beach restoration project, and was therefore not exempt from CEQA. The court disagreed, finding that the settlement agreement was part of the whole of the action because it was one piece of a single, coordinated endeavor to address erosion. The court applied CEQA’s broad definition of “project” in the context of the statutory exemption. The court considered the test for “separate projects” from Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1209: (i) both respondents were proponents of the settlement agreement; (ii) the agreement and beach restoration served a single purpose, to abate a geologic hazard; and (iii) even if the beach agreement could be completed without the agreement, the two became inextricably linked when the agreement was incorporated into the coastal development permit. Thus, the court found, the agreement was not a separate project under Banning Ranch.

The court also determined that the settlement agreement, as part of the restoration project, was exempt from CEQA as an “improvement” (Pub. Resources Code, § 26505) undertaken by a geologic hazard abatement district “necessary to prevent or mitigate an emergency” (Pub. Resources Code, § 26601). CEQA provides a statutory exemption for such actions. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (b)(4).) The court emphasized that statutory exemptions cannot necessarily be harmonized with CEQA’s general purpose of protecting the environment.

Preemption Claim

Ventura argued the settlement agreement was void because Vehicle Code section 21 preempts Moorpark’s ability to control project traffic. The court disagreed. The court explained that, under the state constitution, cities may only enact and enforce laws that do not conflict with state law. The court further explained that Vehicle Code section 21, subdivision (a), preempts local traffic control ordinances and resolutions. Applying the independent review standard, the court determined that the settlement agreement is an ordinance rather than a contract or resolution, and therefore Vehicle Code section 21 did not apply. Thus, the court found, there was no preemption problem with the settlement agreement.

Extraterritorial Regulation Claim

Ventura argued the settlement agreement was an unlawful attempt by Moorpark to exercise its regulatory powers outside of city limits. Again, the court disagreed. The court explained that the prohibition against extraterritorial regulation does not apply to a local authority’s contracting power. In addition, the court said, a city has authority to enter into contracts to enable it to carry out its necessary functions. Applying the independent review standard, the court explained that trucks’ use of roads can create a public nuisance, and Moorpark appropriately entered into the settlement agreement in an attempt to abate that nuisance.

Police Power Claim

Ventura argued BBGHAD abdicated its police power when it granted Moorpark the power to dictate sand hauling routes that BBGHAD’s contractors were required to use. Ventura also argued this rendered the settlement agreement void in its entirety. The court explained that BBGHAD is allowed under state law to exercise a portion of the state’s police power, but it may not contract away its right to exercise its police power in the future. The court explained that the determination of hauling routes is a police power, and therefore the portions of the settlement agreement that surrendered BBGHAD’s discretion to alter those routes in the future were void.

The court next considered whether the settlement agreement was invalid in its entirety. The court determined the settlement agreement had at least two purposes: (i) to determine permissible and prohibited sand hauling routes, and (ii) to describe the duration of and limited discretion to modify the route restrictions. Only the second purpose was unlawful, the court found, and because that could be extirpated from the agreement, the court determined the remainder of the agreement could remain in force. Thus, the court declined to find the agreement void in its entirety. (Elizabeth Pollock)